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The financial crisis has led to a far-reaching redesign of the European regulatory and 
supervisory framework. Following the commitments made in the context of the 
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structure for supervisory cooperation, initially through the European supervisory 
authorities, and later in its ambition to form a Banking Union.
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of credit-rating agencies, better capital for banks, the re-regulation of secu 
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3. How were uniquely EU rules on state aid applied to the banking sector? 
This book is designed to give professionals, policy-makers and students a better un-
derstanding of the new regulatory framework and insights into the policy context 
that has led to the new rules. The causes of the crisis are discussed from an interna-
tional perspective. Annexes provide information on the relevant pieces of regulation 
and the businesses to which they apply, the new institutions and their composition.
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FOREWORD 
he past few years have been a crucial period for financial 
regulation in Europe: lessons have been drawn from the 
major gaps and failures that had led to the 2008-09 crisis and 
dramatic changes have taken place in almost all areas related to 
financial services.  
The sheer scale of the work that has been done to tighten 
financial regulation in the EU is undeniably impressive. With regard 
to this aspect of legislation, many steps have been taken towards 
making our financial system more stable and resilient. However, the 
jury is still out concerning the ability of this reformed financial 
system to deliver on growth. Now that we are a few years into the 
implementation of some of the earlier measures, it is time to take a 
step back, take stock of the changes introduced and identify the 
improvements that can be made.  
In a context in which many decisions have been taken in a 
short timeframe, timely, proper and effective implementation of the 
measures agreed on is also of the essence and should be, in the near 
future, one of the main priorities. In some cases, it is only when full 
implementation is effective that it will be possible to assess whether 
the objectives of the legislation have been met. For instance, one of 
the objectives of the wave of financial re-regulation was to eliminate 
the moral-hazard problems caused by institutions that were 
considered too-big-to-fail. The moving of supervision to a higher 
decision level, intended, inter alia, to limit the possible leniency of 
national supervisors towards their own institutions, as well as the 
re-design of the insolvency architecture with the introduction of 
tools such as bail-in and the establishment of a single resolution 
fund, were intended to achieve this goal.  
The new system is to be gradually implemented over time, 
however, and it might still be too early to judge whether the 
provisions will be sufficient. In the same vein, it is not at all clear 
whether the Banking Union in its current shape has really managed 
T
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in practice to break the negative bank-sovereign feedback loop, 
which was its original aim.  
Of course, beyond the effort made in terms of financial re-
regulation, the current situation in the EU is raising other issues and 
calling for action in different fields. A case in point is the need to 
promote growth and investment, for which the need is pressing but 
which, so far, has been eclipsed by the necessity to amend the 
regulatory framework. It is time, now that timid growth seems to be 
returning and the bulk of the work in terms of financial regulation 
has been done, to shift our focus to innovation and investment. 
Welcome initiatives to this end have been taken or reflected on at 
the EU level. In particular, the Capital Markets Union project aims 
at decreasing to some extent the reliance on bank funding, which 
has for years been a fixture on the EU's financial landscape, in order 
to provide new, alternative sources of funding for European 
companies and thereby bridge some of the investment gap that we 
have been witnessing for years. This issue of investment will surely 
be one of the major topics of discussion for years to come.  
Two final issues raised by the progress made towards a 
tightening of financial regulation are the democratic accountability 
of the system and the divide between the members and the non-
members of the eurozone.   
One of the ways to address the first issue, which has been 
pending for some time and has been brought to the fore by the 
increase in EU competences that accompanied the recent reforms, 
should be to strengthen the role of the European Parliament but also 
of national parliaments in the decision-making and monitoring 
processes. The process of monetary dialogue with the European 
Central Bank and the conclusion of interinstitutional agreements 
between the European Parliament on the one side and, respectively, 
the ECB carrying out its tasks within the framework of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism and, soon, the Single Resolution Board, on 
the other side, are mechanisms that can be built on. But the crucial 
role of national parliaments should be taken into account and a way 
of involving them more closely should be reflected on.  
The recent developments relating to the Banking Union also 
entail the risk of increased fragmentation and of a divide between 
countries that are members of the euro area and therefore de facto 
members of the Banking Union, and the others that have to choose 
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to opt in. Bearing in mind that most of the countries that are 
currently not members of the euro area are actually pre-ins, i.e. they 
intend to adopt the single currency once they meet the criteria, there 
is a solid case for a system that allows non-euro area countries to 
remain as closely involved as possible in the decisions taken in the 
euro area. This should be kept in mind in a context in which there is 
sometimes a tendency to push for a reinforcement of the cohesion 
of the ‘core’ in order to solve immediate issues and demonstrate 
credibility in the short term. A balance must be found and the issue 
of multi-speed Europe is certainly one of the most important current 
constitutional questions to explore.  
As a contribution to the effort to evaluate and take stock of 
recently-passed legislation in order to identify and address future 
issues, this book is a welcome body of work and a very useful 
background document.  
Danuta Hübner 
Member of the European Parliament 
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PREFACE 
he financial crisis has led to a far-reaching redesign of the 
European regulatory and supervisory framework. Following 
the commitments made in the context of discussions in the G-
20, but also reacting to internal shortcomings, the EU engaged in a 
massive programme to re-regulate financial institutions and 
markets. The EU furthermore redesigned the structure for 
supervisory cooperation, initially through the European 
Supervisory Authorities, and later with Banking Union. 
The purpose of this book is to systematically assess the new 
regulatory and supervisory framework. Its structure reflects the big 
items on the agenda: 1) better supervisory cooperation and 
integration; 2) the G-20 items: better oversight of credit rating 
agencies, improved capital standards for banks, a larger role for 
central clearing in derivative markets and the regulation of 
alternative investment funds, depositor protection and bank 
resolution rules; and 3) specific EU matters, namely state aid, which 
acted as a surrogate for harmonised bank resolution.  
This book aims to give professionals, students and policy-
makers a better understanding of the new regulatory framework 
and of the policy context that has led to the new rules. The intention 
is not to discuss the causes of the crisis from a European perspective, 
although this is certainly done in the various chapters, especially in 
the introductory chapter. The Annex provides an overview of the 
different pieces of regulation and the businesses to which they 
apply. 
CEPS has built up considerable expertise in the regulation 
and integration of financial markets in its 30-plus years of 
operations, of which this book is the result and the beneficiary. I 
would like to thank the numerous colleagues who helped me in 
preparing the various chapters and without whom it would have 
been impossible to finalise this book. 
T
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In particular, I wish to acknowledge the valuable research 
assistance and input provided by my colleagues Cosmina Amariei, 
Willem Pieter De Groen, Jan-Martin Frie, Mirzha de Manuel 
Aramendía and Diego Valiante. I am also grateful for many 
discussions with CEPS Corporate Members and other stakeholders, 
which yielded useful insights. Finally, I wish to thank Anne 
Harrington and Lee Gillette for patiently editing the text, Els Van 
den Broeck for skilfully formatting the entire draft and my sister 
Wiennie for designing the cover.  
I am delighted that the results of this collective effort can be 
made available to a broader readership. 
 
Karel Lannoo 
Chief Executive Officer, CEPS 
Brussels 
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1. THE POLICY REACTION TO THE 
CRISIS: A MOVING TARGET 
his is not just another volume about the causes or the history 
of the financial crisis. Rather, it is a book about the actions 
taken by the European Union to prevent a crisis of this 
magnitude from ever erupting again. A far-reaching redesign of the 
European regulatory and supervisory framework was undertaken, 
following the commitments the EU made in the context of 
discussions in the G-20 summit meetings1 and in reaction to serious 
internal shortcomings. The creation of a Banking Union (BU) with 
the shift of banking supervision from national authorities to the 
European Central Bank (ECB), at least for the eurozone, and the 
creation of a Single Resolution Board (SRB) have been the most 
tangible outcomes. 
This book aims to systematically discuss and assess the new 
regulatory and supervisory framework in a readable and accessible 
way. The structure follows the big themes on the agenda: What is 
changing with Banking Union? Have the G-20 concerns been 
adequately addressed by the EU: oversight of credit rating agencies, 
better and more capital for banks, the re-regulation of securities and 
derivatives markets, asset management, depositor protection and 
bank resolution? And how were uniquely EU rules on the 
prohibition of state aid applied to the banking sector during the 
crisis? 
Although much has been done at the global, regional and 
national level, this book concentrates on the response taken directly 
                                                        
1 The G-20 (or Group of 20) Summit was created as a response both to the 
financial crisis of 2008–10 and to a growing recognition that key emerging 
countries were not adequately represented in the core of global economic 
discussions and governance. For an appraisal of the G-20’s efforts to develop a 
more sustainable regulatory framework for financial institutions, see Lannoo 
(2014). 
T
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by the EU to the financial crisis. Some EU member states in 
particular, spurred on by their electorates, have taken action, but not 
necessarily in coordination with entities at the EU level. Attention is 
paid, however, when the response by EU member states has 
contravened EU rules, most importantly regarding those governing 
state aid to the banks. This book does not discuss the EU’s reaction 
to the economic crisis, although both crises ran in parallel, at least 
from 2010 onwards, as the worsening of the fiscal situation of the 
sovereigns affected the domestic banking sectors in the distressed 
countries and led to the formation of Banking Union. 
This book presents seven different themes of re-regulation 
and new supervisory structures, in line with issues dominating the 
global and European agenda. Action on these items has not 
necessarily been coordinated. A political consensus grew at 
different stages during the crisis that action was necessary. Some 
policy actions even pre-date the financial crisis, such as the efforts 
to regulate rating agents. Other elements came very late, such as 
recognition of the need to transfer supervision to the ECB, as it 
became clear that the level of supervisory cooperation created with 
the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)2 was insufficient to 
deal with the problems in the European banking sector. But the 
different themes are sequenced chronologically, in the same order 
as they emerged during the crisis. 
Seen in hindsight, much was achieved at EU level over a 
period of about seven years. From the early days, in the second half 
of 2007 to June 2012, when agreement was reached on transferring 
banking supervision to the ECB, and to early 2014, when 
agreements were reached on the EU’s bank recovery and resolution 
Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). No 
less than 38 different actions in the area of financial reform were 
proposed by the European Commission during that period, most of 
                                                        
2 As early as September 2009, the European Commission brought forward 
proposals to replace the EU's existing supervisory architecture with a European 
system of financial supervisors (ESFS), consisting of three European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) – a European Banking Authority (EBA), a 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and a European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). The three ESAs and a European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) were established in January 2011 to replace the 
former supervisory committees. 
THE GREAT FINANCIAL PLUMBING | 3 
 
which were completed by the end of 2014. These proposals entailed 
even more legislative actions, as often the particular financial 
reform was split over different legal instruments, a directive and a 
regulation, for example, or was further subdivided. 
In the early days of the crisis, which was caused by growing 
risks and losses in the US subprime housing market, it rapidly 
became clear that the EU regulatory framework was inadequate and 
that supervisory cooperation was not as strong as it should have 
been, given the level of market integration. In certain domains, the 
reaction took time to materialise in concrete proposals, whereas in 
others, it crystallised rapidly. The bank run on Northern Rock in 
September 2007 – the first since Victorian times in Britain – 
emphasised that essential elements of the framework for managing 
a financial crisis simply did not work, and that the operational 
model and the level of harmonisation of the 1994 Directive on 
deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) were seriously flawed. But it was 
not until 2014 that agreement was finally reached on the need to 
implement real reform at EU level.  
The failure of two local German banks in September 2007 
revealed three major shortcomings: the absence of supervisory 
cooperation (or the presence of destructive regulatory competition 
in the EU), the deficiencies in the prudential rules covering 
securitisation and consolidation, and the lack of proper risk 
management in the banks. It brought about a consensus among EU 
member states on the need to insist on maximum harmonisation of 
rules and a fully identical set of financial rules, namely the ‘single 
rulebook’, and to improve supervisory cooperation and the 
functioning of the supervisory colleges of banks. The building 
blocks for an upgrade of the three Committees of Supervisors, the 
so-called ‘Level-3 Committees’ – the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the Committee of European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) and the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) – were being 
put in place that would eventually equip them to become fully-
fledged agencies. On the legislative side, agreement was reached in 
the early days of the crisis that rating agencies should be regulated 
at EU level and the treatment of securitisation in the first capital 
requirements Directive (CRD I) should be changed. 
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On the more systemic side, however, there was scant 
awareness among policy-makers in the first year of the crisis, 
leading up to the failure of Lehman Brothers, of the deep 
weaknesses in the EU financial system and in its oversight.3 Against 
the background of mounting losses in the EU financial system, 
estimated at the time to amount to about €272 billion, no 
fundamental decisions were taken towards more centralised 
oversight. The finance ministers, meeting in the Ecofin Council, 
reacted by issuing a roadmap and increasing the level of tasks for 
the Level-3 Committees, but without upgrading their means or legal 
status. In its May 2008 meeting, the Council stressed in its 
conclusions: “The EU Committees of Supervisors should be able to 
gather aggregate information in order to assess these features 
within and across financial sectors and to alert the Economic and 
Financial Committee (EFC)4 to potential and imminent threats in the 
financial system.”  
One may wonder, however, whether the Council fully 
appreciated the magnitude of the task it was assigning to the Level-
3 Committees, each of which employed only about 15 persons. The 
Council also reacted with a new memorandum of understanding 
amongst the supervisory authorities, central banks and finance 
ministries to improve supervisory cooperation and the functioning 
of the Colleges. No less than 113(!) different EU authorities were 
signatories to the agreement. A more serious reaction, considering 
the staggering losses that were then mounting in the financial 
system, would have prepared the EU much better for confronting 
what was still to come. 
The phase that started in September 2008 is well known, but 
many policy-makers continued to believe that the problem was 
caused by the US financial system. There was not only the failure of 
Lehman Brothers, but also the bail-out by the US Treasury of the 
insurance giant AIG and the growing problems in US monoline 
insurers. AIG alone received an emergency loan of $85 billion from 
the Federal Reserve of New York, $22.4 billion of which went to 
                                                        
3 The following section draws from Lannoo (2008). 
4 Composed of senior officials from national administrations, central banks, the 
ECB and the European Commission, the Economic and Financial Committee 
(EFC) was established on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty to promote policy 
coordination among the member states. 
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banks, and more than half of the latter sum went to European banks 
in collateral relating to credit default swap (CDS) transactions from 
AIG. Its default would thus have meant even-deeper trouble for 
European banks.  
The biggest shock for the banks in Europe came from the 
short-term lending market, which froze almost overnight. Banks 
with a large amount of short-term loans on their balance sheets, 
often related to takeovers or risky business models, were the first 
victims, such as Dexia or Fortis in Belgium. Lending costs jumped 
overnight. The crisis had become systemic, which forced EU 
governments to react. Ireland was the first country to guarantee 
liabilities in its banking system, forcing the UK and other EU 
countries to follow suit. The Dutch, British and French governments 
suggested the creation of a European banking resolution fund, but 
Germany was strongly opposed to such an idea. The country-by-
country reactions and the existence of a variety of national bank 
guarantee and bail-out schemes led to deep distortions in the single 
market, which fundamentally changed the landscape of European 
banking. The overall level of the support, representing about 14% of 
GDP, helped EU countries to recover rapidly, but it also lay the 
ground for the ensuing sovereign crisis, by rapidly increasing 
government-debt levels and highlighting the differences in the 
quality of public finances. 
The EU reacted by instituting the High-Level Expert Group 
on EU Financial Supervision, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, 
former Governor of the Bank of France. The de Larosière report 
proposed, inter alia, the creation of the European System of 
Financial Supervisors (ESFS), composed of the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)  and the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB), and called for a meeting of the G-20 at the level of 
heads of state and government. The latter convened first in 
Washington, D.C. in November 2008, and set the stage for a globally 
coordinated process of financial re-regulation in the successive 
London and Pittsburgh G-20 summits. The London G-20 agreed “to 
extend regulation and oversight to all systemically important 
financial institutions, instruments and markets…to take action, once 
recovery is assured, to improve the quality, quantity, and 
international consistency of capital in the banking system”, to 
regulate rating agencies and hedge funds, and to ensure that “all 
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standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on 
exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and 
cleared through central counterparties”, and “to develop an 
international framework for cross-border bank resolution 
arrangements”. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) within the G-20 
was given the central role of leading this process. 
The G-20 agenda was followed-up closely by EU policy-
makers, and formed the background on which the majority of the 
proposals for regulatory reform were based. But it became rapidly 
clear that the institutional reform that was intended by the creation 
of the ESAs was not sufficient, above all for banking. The stress tests 
carried out by the European Banking Authority (EBA) did not 
succeed in calming fears about the state of the EU banking sector, as 
their results were in each case rapidly overtaken by events. The 
stress test of July 2010 – which had been carried out by EBA’s 
predecessor (the CEBS) – concluded that an additional €3.5 billion 
capital was needed for about seven banks, five of which were 
Spanish. But by mid-August 2010, the moribund Anglo-Irish Bank, 
although it had not been included in the test, was in need of another 
transfusion of €10 billion and by September, it appeared that the 
capital needs of Spanish savings banks were much greater than 
originally foreseen. The 2011 stress test was followed by growing 
uncertainties about the capital needs of these Spanish banks, which 
were estimated to be around €60 billion, whereas the test had 
concluded that the minimum shortfall for eight banks in meeting a 
5% core tier 1 ratio was about €2.5 billion. The deep uncertainties in 
European financial markets at that time led to a formal decision at 
the level of the heads of state and government in the October 2011 
European Council to require EU banks to meet a 9% Tier 1 ratio by 
June 2012. 
The sovereign crisis and the dreaded ‘doom loop’ created by 
the dependence of banks on the quality of the finances of their 
sovereign was the second element leading to the decision for deeper 
institutional reform, and the creation of a Banking Union. The wide 
differences in funding costs of banks risked derailing the single 
financial market, as the cost of credit to banks in the peripheral 
countries was much higher than in the North. This also risked 
undermining the single monetary policy.  
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The second report prepared under the leadership of Herman 
Van Rompuy (2012) and published ahead of the June 2012 European 
Council, proposed the creation of a Banking Union, to be composed 
of a single European banking supervision system, a European 
resolution and a European deposit insurance scheme. The European 
Council decided, barely two years after the start of the European 
Banking Authority, to move supervision to the ECB, based upon 
Art. 127(6) of the EU Treaty. Agreements on the deposit guarantee 
schemes Directive (DGSD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM)  followed in early 2014, even if reaching agreement on the 
centralisation of the latter function at the eurozone level was 
problematic in view of the reach of the EU Treaty.  
1.1 The book at a glance 
Credit Rating Agencies: The early targets (chapter 2). From having 
virtually no rules, the EU moved with great alacrity to agree on 
regulation and centralised supervision of credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) in a matter of a few months. But the rules did not change the 
‘issuer-pays’ model of rating agents and its inherent conflicts of 
interest. Five years after the Regulation on credit rating agencies 
came in force, the sector remains highly concentrated, with the Big 
3 – Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investors Services and Fitch 
Ratings – controlling about 90% of the EU market. Also the 
regulatory reliance on ratings remains elevated, despite the 
ambition to reduce it, as both supervisors and monetary policy 
authorities continue to refer to ratings for policy purposes. A more 
fundamental change in the business model of rating agents could 
have avoided the detailed conflict-of-interest, transparency and 
competition provisions of the regulation.  
Game Change in Asset Management (chapter 3). The asset 
management industry was more affected by the crisis than its 
representatives acknowledged. Not only did it solidify the view that 
the hedge fund industry should be regulated, but it also spilled over 
to other parts of the asset management industry, and more 
prudential and conduct-of-business regulation was adopted. The 
Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard Madoff fell apart by the end 
of 2008, highlighting the lack of separation between depositories 
and managers. More conflict-of-interest and remuneration 
regulation followed in the wake of the overall debate over the 
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distorted incentive structures found throughout the financial 
industry. 
Solidifying Derivatives Markets and Financial 
Infrastructure (chapter 4). One of the hallmarks of the London and 
Pittsburgh G-20 summit meetings was the determination to require 
central clearing of OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives contracts, at 
least for the contracts that can be standardised. The result was a 
huge structural change, which a few years later brought the largest 
part of the OTC market into central clearing and trading. These 
changes, however, required detailed discussions on which products 
should be centrally cleared and even more on the prudential 
standards for central counterparties, which are still in the course of 
implementation. 
New Capital Requirements: Basel III implementation in EU 
law (chapter 5). The element that attracted the most attention as a 
result of the crisis, namely the banks’ lack of capital, required 
extensive discussions before agreement was reached on the new 
rules at international level, with the Basel III agreement in 
December 2010, and even more time to formulate the EU rules in the 
capital requirements Directive (CRD IV) in September 2013. In the 
meantime, some steps were taken with the addition of ‘skin in the 
game’ or retention requirements for securitisation in 2009, and the 
governance and remuneration amendments in 2010. The result at 
the end is a complete paradigm shift, with the larger the bank, the 
more capital it needs to amass, through additional capital buffer 
requirements. The only element advantaging large banks that has 
not been changed so far are the internal models to calculate the 
capital at risk. Basel III and the CRD IV also set rules for the 
minimum level of liquidity for banks, for the first time at 
international and EU level.  
The ECB as Bank Supervisor (chapter 6). The biggest 
institutional change as a result of the crisis was the agreement, taken 
by consensus by all EU member states, to transfer supervisory 
powers to the ECB, thanks to an article in the EU Treaty providing 
for this possibility. The ECB became as such the largest bank 
supervisor in the world, as measured by the total assets under its 
supervision. The decision to move in this direction was one of the 
three building blocks to restore confidence in the European financial 
system, together with the creation of the European Stability 
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Mechanism (ESM), and the outright monetary transactions (OMTs) 
of the ECB or the ‘whatever it takes’ assurances from its President 
Mario Draghi. 
Recovery and Resolution, the Single Resolution 
Mechanism and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes (chapter 7). The 
element that proved the most challenging to harmonise – and 
probably also the most novel of the great plumbing exercise – was 
the requirement to put bank resolution schemes in place and the 
creation of resolution authorities. The non-existence of a specific 
resolution framework allowed banks to require state support, as 
they were too big, too complex or too interconnected to fail. The new 
framework, composed of mandatory bail-in and sector-sponsored 
resolution funds, together with pre-funded deposit protection 
schemes, should allow the authorities to manage a bank crisis in an 
orderly way, make failing banks resolvable and putting an end to 
the ‘too-big-to-fail’ dictum. In short, it should bring market 
discipline back into the banking sector. 
The EU’s State Aid Policy during the Crisis (chapter 8). The 
roughly 14% of GDP used during the crisis to bail out banks will be 
a drag on the EU member states’ economies for some time to come. 
Not only is an important part of the financial system still state-
owned, but the costs have also significantly increased state debts as 
a result of bail-outs. In accordance with EU Treaty rules, the EU 
imposed tight restructuring requirements on state-aided banks. But 
it has only been since the savings banks crisis in Spain that a 
significant form of burden-sharing with debt-holders was applied, 
which was spelled out in the EFSF (European Financial Stability 
Facility) Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Sector Policy 
Conditionality in Spain, dated July 2012. State aid policy will 
continue to form a cornerstone of the new resolution schemes, as the 
use of resolution funds will require authorisation under the EU’s 
state aid rules. 
Safe to bank? (chapter 9). Only the future will be able to tell 
us whether the new regulatory and supervisory framework works 
and whether it will be safe to bank. Considering the different layers 
and cushions that have been put in place (see Table 1), much will 
depend on the proper implementation and enforcement of the rules 
and the degree of toughness exercised by the supervisor. But policy-
makers will also need to be vigilant in addressing the outstanding 
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regulatory issues and give judicious consideration to new 
supervisory priorities. 
Table 1. Financial re-regulation and supervision in a nutshell 
Item Before New rules 
Capital Basel II/CRD Basel III/CRD IV: More and better 
quality capital (up to more than 
the double) 
OTC 
derivatives 
markets 
No EU rules, bilateral 
trading 
Central clearing (about 2/3 in 
CCPs, EMIR rules) and trading 
(MiFID II) 
Rating 
agencies 
No EU rules, ‘freedom of 
speech’ 
License and supervision (CRA 
Regulation) 
Hedge funds No EU rules License and supervision (AIFMD) 
Resolution No EU rules Resolution authorities and funds, 
mandatory bail-in, single 
resolution authority (SRB)  and 
fund 
Deposit 
guarantee 
schemes 
Minimum level of 
€20,000 (later increased 
to €100,000), no 
mandatory pre-funding 
Pre-funding (0.8% deposits) and 
quick pay-out 
Supervision MoUs, Committees European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs), Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), European 
Systemic Risk Board 
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2. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: 
THE EARLY TARGETS* 
onsensus on the need to regulate credit rating agencies 
(CRAs)  emerged rapidly, even before Lehman Brothers filed 
for bankruptcy. As the first waves of the subprime crisis 
started to roll in, it rapidly became apparent that rating agencies 
bore a heavy responsibility for the lack of due diligence. This was 
even more the case in the EU, where, unlike the US, no regulation 
of rating agencies was in place until 2009. 
The debate on the role of rating agents and the appropriate 
regulatory framework considerably pre-dates this crisis, however. 
As early as the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the delayed reaction of 
rating agents to the public finance situation of these countries was 
strongly criticised. The same criticism of CRAs was levelled when 
the dot.com bubble burst in 2001. Many reports were written on 
their role in that episode, but it was not until mid-2008 that a 
consensus emerged in the EU that the industry was in need of 
statutory legislation. In the meantime, the US had adopted the 
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act in 2006. At global level, in 2003, 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
adopted a Statement of Principles on the role of credit rating 
agencies – but apparently the initiative was not successful.  
Rating agents pose a multitude of regulatory problems, none 
of which can be solved easily. Some of these are specific to the 
profession and the current market structure, whereas others are of 
a more generic nature. Some are related to basic principles of 
conduct in the financial services sector, while others are part of 
horizontal market regulation, such as market access and 
competition. The financial crisis also demonstrated the important 
                                                        
* This chapter extends and updates an earlier ECMI Policy Brief on the subject 
(see Lannoo, 2010). Valuable comments and input by Jan-Martin Frie are 
gratefully acknowledged. 
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role of rating agents in financial stability, which involves the new 
macro-prudential authorities. 
This chapter starts with an overview of the credit rating 
industry today. The second section analyses the use of credit ratings 
and shows how the authorities created a captive or artificial market 
for CRAs. Section 3 briefly outlines the role of CRAs in the crisis, 
and section 4 reviews the EU CRA Regulation and its successive 
amendments. The chapter concludes with a comparison of 
proposals for regulatory reform of the sector, which remain, even 
after the new rules, unimplemented. 
2.1 The credit rating industry today 
The credit rating industry is a global business. Despite the fact that 
there are 27 registered and certified CRAs in the EU today, the 
rating industry worldwide as well as in the EU is controlled by a 
handful of players that are of US parentage. Standard & Poor’s 
(S&P)  and Moody’s, taken together, accounted for a market share 
of 74.2% in the EU in 2013.5 And with Fitch accounting for 16.2% 
that year, the ‘Big 3’ serviced an enormous 90.4% of the EU market. 
In certain market segments, such as ratings of structured finance 
products, the market share of the Big 3 is even higher, reaching 96% 
in the first half of 2014.6 In 2012, 98.5% of their ratings were solicited 
i.e. the issuer of the product or the rated entity itself requested the 
rating.7 A brief portrait of these three companies is given in Box 1.  
Such an oligopolistic market structure can result in a sub-
optimal degree of competition in the market. CRAs can afford to 
keep prices well above production costs, resulting in high mark-ups 
(and consequently unnecessarily high prices for clients and end-
consumers). Figure 1 illustrates that the Big 3 achieved very high 
profit margins, ranging between 34-50% in 2013, which are just 
below the pre-crisis level for S&P and Moody’s, and slightly higher 
for Fitch. Figure 1 also demonstrates that all three have recovered 
from the drop in revenues during the financial crisis, with S&P 
                                                        
5 ESMA (2014b), Share of 2013 industry turnover generated from rating 
activities and ancillary services. 
6 ESMA (2014a, Table 1), based on a number of ratings outstanding. 
7 ESMA (2013, Table 6).  
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experiencing the slowest recovery and remaining just below its 2007 
level in 2013. 
Box 1. The ‘Big Three’ CRAs 
Moody’s was incorporated in 1914 as a bond-rating and investment 
analysis company. Today, the US-listed company Moody’s Corporation 
is the parent company of Moody’s Investors Service, which provides 
credit ratings and research on debt instruments and securities, and 
Moody’s Analytics, which encompasses its non-ratings businesses, 
including risk-management software for financial institutions, 
quantitative credit analysis tools, economic research and other services. 
Combined, the group employs about 9,900 persons.  
Standard & Poor’s was incorporated in 1941, following the merger of 
two firms that were active in credit-risk analysis. Both firms originated 
from similar circumstances as Moody’s, in the context of the huge 
industrial expansion of the US in the second half of the 19th and early 
20th centuries. S&P was taken over by McGraw Hill in 1966, the US-listed 
media concern, and today forms the most important part of the group in 
terms of revenues, and even more so in profits (about 73%), although 
these seriously declined in the period 2007-11. S&P ratings services 
employ about 6,000 persons.  
Fitch Ratings – by far the smaller originally ‘European’ player in the 
sector with headquarters in New York and London – is part of the Fitch 
Group, which also includes Fitch Solutions, a distribution channel for 
Fitch Ratings products, and Algorithmics, which provides risk-
management services. The Fitch Group was a majority-owned 
subsidiary of the French Fimalac group, but the controlling stake was 
recently sold to the US media conglomerate Hearst. Fitch grew through 
acquisitions of several smaller rating agents, including IBCA and Duff 
& Phelps. Fitch Ratings employs around 2,000 persons. 
Figure 1. Revenues and operating margins of the Big 3, 2007-13  
 
Sources: ESMA supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories - 
Annual report 2014 and work plan. 16 February 2015. 
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That the credit rating business is largely of American 
parentage should come as no surprise, as it is an intrinsic part of the 
market-driven system pioneered by the US. Unlike the bank-driven 
model found throughout Europe, a market-driven system relies on 
a multi-layered system to make it work (Black, 2001). Reputational 
intermediaries – such as investment banks, institutional investors, 
law firms and rating agents – and self-regulatory organisations – 
e.g. professional federations and standards-setters – play an 
important role in making the system, in between issuers and 
investors, work. In effect, financial markets are constantly affected 
by adverse selection mechanisms, and investors need third-party 
tools such as credit ratings in order to reduce asymmetric 
information and to improve their understanding of the riskiness of 
financial products. 
Since there had not been much of a capital market in Europe 
until recently, banks have essentially performed the credit-risk 
analysis function, and continue to do so today. But the capacity of 
European banks to conduct credit-risk analysis declined, possibly as 
a result of the strong reputation of the US capital market model. The 
introduction of the euro and a set of EU regulatory measures led to 
the rapid development of European capital markets and a demand 
for ratings. Moreover, European authorities created a captive 
market for an essentially US-based industry. 
2.2 A captive market for CRAs in the EU 
Two forms of ‘regulation’ created a captive market for CRAs in the 
EU: Basel II, implemented in the EU as the capital requirements 
Directive, and the liquidity-providing operations of the European 
Central Bank. Both explicitly use the rating structure of CRAs to 
determine risk-weighting for capital requirement purposes, and 
‘haircuts’ and minimum thresholds for the ECB’s liquidity-
providing operations.8 The United States did not use either method 
to the same degree, as it did not implement Basel II (largely because 
the Federal Reserve did not want to have the vast majority of US 
banks relying on CRAs for setting regulatory risk weights), and the 
                                                        
8 A haircut is a percentage deduction of the market value of securities held by 
banks. 
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discount window of the Fed is not based on ratings. The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 2010 
goes even further, requiring regulators to remove any references to 
“investment grade” and “credit ratings” of securities.9  
This Basel II approach was not modified in Basel III, nor in the 
EU’s CRD IV/CRR (capital requirements Regulation), which 
implements Basel III in European law (see chapter 5). In its 
‘standardised approach’, to be used by less sophisticated banks, it 
bases risk weights on assessments by rating agents that qualify as 
an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI), discussed in 
more detail below. The capital requirements increase with the 
decline in the rating, from 0% for AA-rated (and higher) 
government bonds, or a minimum of 20% for banks and 
corporations, up to 150% for ratings of CCC or below (CRR Arts 116-
125). But the risk weight is 0% for all sovereign debt in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) funded in domestic currency (CRR Art. 114). 
A zero-risk weight means that a bank does not have to set any 
capital aside for these assets. The new rules set criteria on how to 
use ECAIs’ ratings (CRR Arts 138-141), and recommend banks to 
use other forms of credit assessment as well.  
The use of rating agents is possibly even more prevalent in 
the assessment of marketable assets used as collateral in the ECB’s 
liquidity-providing operations. The credit assessment for eligible 
collateral is predominantly based on a public rating, issued by an 
eligible ECAI. In the ECB’s definition, an ECAI is an institution 
whose credit assessments may be used by credit institutions for 
determining the risk weight of exposures according to the CRD.10 
The minimum credit-quality threshold is defined in terms of a 
‘single A’ credit assessment, which was temporarily relaxed during 
the financial crisis to BBB-.11 If multiple and possibly conflicting 
ECAI assessments exist for the same issuer/debtor or guarantor, the 
                                                        
9 Public Law 111 - 203 - Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/ 
PLAW-111publ203.pdf). 
10 See ECB (2006, p. 43). 
11 “Single A” means a minimum long-term rating of “A-” by Fitch or Standard 
& Poor’s, or an “A” rating by Moody’s (see ECB, 2006, p. 41).  
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first-best rule (i.e. the best available ECAI credit assessment) is 
applied.12 
The liquidity categories for marketable assets are subdivided 
into five categories, based on issuer classification and asset type, 
with an increasing level of valuation haircuts, depending on the 
residual maturity.13 An important group of assets in the context of 
the financial crisis, classified as ‘category V’, are the asset-backed 
securities (ABS), or securitisation instruments. The extent to which 
banks used ABS collateral in liquidity operations rose dramatically 
after mid-2007, from 4% in 2004 to 18% in 2007 and 28% in 2008 
(Fitch, 2010, p. 7). Within ABS, residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS) form the most important element, exceeding 50%. 
These securitisation instruments, and in particular the residential 
mortgage-backed securities segment, were an extremely important 
market for CRAs. Moody’s, for example, assigned the AAA rating 
to 42,625 RMBS from 2000 to 2007 (9,029 mortgage-backed securities 
in 2006 alone) “like in a factory”, but later had to downgrade the 
assets.14  
2.3 Credit ratings and the crisis 
In 2007, 89% of those originally rated as investment grade were 
reduced to junk status. Critics claim that the poor performance of 
credit ratings in the structured finance segment was due to the 
particular market concentration in this segment, reducing the need 
to compete over the quality of ratings and increasing the incentive 
to issue complacent ratings instead. Until the financial crisis hit, the 
Big 3 dominated the market, obtaining a share of close to 100% 
(ESMA, 2014a, p. 9). Conflicts of interest become even more 
apparent when market concentration is also present on the supply 
                                                        
12 See ECB (2008, p. 42). 
13 The liquidity categories were changed in September 2008 and the valuation 
haircuts increased in July 2010. See changes to risk-control measures in 
Eurosystem credit operations, European Central Bank, Press Notices, 4 
September 2008 and 28 July 2010. 
14 As characterised by Phil Angelides, Chairman of the 10-member Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission appointed by the US government to investigate the 
causes of the financial crisis, and quoted in Bloomberg, 2 June 2010. 
THE GREAT FINANCIAL PLUMBING | 17 
 
side, i.e. the issuer side. In 2007, the top 12 underwriters of 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) controlled over 80% of the 
market.15 This would be less of a problem if the investor were to pay 
for the rating, but under the issuer-pays model, this raises particular 
concerns as the underwriters of MBS could probably exert 
considerable pressure on the CRAs. In 2006, the share of structured 
finance ratings of the overall revenue was on average 50% or more 
(CESR, 2008, p. 8), which emphasises the reliance of the CRAs on 
this market segment. Lawsuits related to inflated and improper 
ratings on structured finance products forced Standard & Poor’s in 
2015 to pay a record $1.37 billion in a settlement with state and 
federal prosecutors in the US.16 Similarly, Moody’s is currently 
under investigation by the US Department of Justice.  
The reference to credit ratings in regulation and risk models 
resulted in a ‘cliff effect’ and put CRAs under the spotlight as the 
crisis unfolded. A cliff effect is created when the rating of an entity 
or a security has dropped below a certain threshold, rendering it 
ineligible for certain regulatory purposes such as the ECB 
operations.17  In this case, the securities of the entity are sold and a 
fire sale begins, where multiple actors try to sell the same product 
amidst sharply declining liquidity and prices. A downward spiral 
is set in motion and the market price no longer adequately reflects 
the value of the security. As the issuer comes under pressure, the 
rating drops further and also affects the rating of entities holding 
the security.  
In the case of sovereigns, this cliff effect is particularly strong 
and directly affects the respective banking sector, which is usually 
highly exposed to the sovereign through bond holdings and implicit 
guarantees. The downgrade of a sovereign also has direct effects on 
the ratings of many non-sovereign issuers, since CRAs usually do 
not issue ratings more than a few notches above the rating of the 
sovereign in which the issuer resides. The Financial Stability Board, 
                                                        
15 As reported by Professor John Coffee in OECD (2010), Hearings on 
Competition and Credit Rating Agencies, 5 October, p. 9. 
16 US Department of Justice, 3 February 2015. 
17 The European Commission (2011, footnote 29) defines cliff effects as “sudden 
actions that are triggered by a rating downgrade under a specific threshold, 
where downgrading a single security can have a disproportionate cascading 
effect”. 
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under the G-20 umbrella, strongly recommended a change in 
market practices, providing principles to mitigate excessive reliance 
on ratings and to limit the risk of cliff effects that could result from 
legal and market practices. These measures are equally intended to 
improve the quality of credit ratings as such as they encourage 
investors to perform their own in-house credit analysis.  
2.4 The EU rating agencies regulation and its 
successive amendments 
As the subprime crisis started to unfold, a policy consensus rapidly 
emerged that rating agents should be regulated at EU level. The 
proposal for a regulation was published in November 2008 and 
adopted in April 2009, which was a minimum interval in EU 
decision-making.18 The regulation was the first new EU legislative 
measure triggered by the financial crisis. It was also one of the first 
financial services measures to be issued as a regulation, meaning it 
is directly applicable, unlike a directive, which has to be 
implemented in national law. 
The EU was not starting from scratch, however. Back in 2004, 
further to an own initiative report of the European Parliament 
(Katifioris report), the European Commission asked the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators (CESR)  for technical advice 
regarding market practice and competitive problems in the CRAs. 
In a Communication (European Commission, 2006) published in 
December 2005, it decided that no legislation was needed for three 
reasons: 1) three EU directives already covered rating agents 
indirectly: the 2003 market abuse Directive (MAD), the CRD and 
MiFID (markets in financial instruments Directive); 2) a code of 
conduct for credit rating agencies was published by the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)  in 
2004;19 and 3) self-regulation by the sector, following the IOSCO 
code.20  
                                                        
18 Regulation (EC) 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies. 
19 See www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf 
20 Communication from the Commission on Credit Rating Agencies (2006/C 
59/02), OJ C 59/2 of 11.03.2006. It should be added that rating agents were 
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In 2006, in a report for the Commission, CESR concluded that 
the rating agents largely complied with the IOSCO code.21 But 
concerns remained regarding the oligopoly in the sector, the 
treatment of confidential information, the role of ancillary services 
and unsolicited ratings. In a follow-up report published in May 
2008, focusing especially on structured finance, CESR strongly 
recommended following the international market-driven approach 
by improving the IOSCO code. Tighter regulation would not have 
prevented the problems emerging from the loans to the US 
subprime housing market, according to CESR.  
Notwithstanding the CESR’s advice, the Commission went 
ahead and issued a proposal in November 2008, after two 
consultations in July and September 2008. It was virtually agreed by 
the European Parliament in a single reading by April 2009, and 
formally adopted in September 2009.  
The Regulation came into force 20 days after its publication in 
the Official Journal, on 7 December 2009. But guidance had to be 
provided by CESR before the Regulation could take effect, by 7 June 
2010, regarding registration, supervision, the endorsement regime 
and supervisory reporting; and by 7 September 2010, regarding 
enforcement practices, rating methodologies and certification. 
CESR, later reconfigured as ESMA, has to report annually on the 
application.  
The Regulation (CRA I) provided for EU-wide definitions, 
standards on organisational requirements, supervision, 
transparency and conflict of interest as well as for a third-country 
equivalence regime. Two amendments were made to this initial 
Regulation shortly after it entered into force. The first amendment 
(CRA II)22 tabled by the Commission on 2 June 2010, and adopted 
on 21 March 2011, modified the Regulation to centralise the 
regulation, registration and day-to-day supervision of CRAs at 
                                                        
exempted from the market abuse directive (2003/125/EC) rules on conflicts of 
interest disclosure (see Di Noia & Micossi, 2010, p. 65). 
21 CESR’s Report to the European Commission on the compliance of Credit 
Rating Agencies with the IOSCO code, CESR (2006), 06-545. 
22 Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 May 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies. 
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European level with ESMA, as originally envisaged by the high-
level de Larosière (2009) report. National supervisors remain 
responsible for the supervision of the use of credit ratings by 
financial institutions, and can request ESMA to withdraw a license. 
The amendment also introduced definitions of infringements and 
sanctions and gave ESMA the power to impose fines for failure to 
respect provisions of the regulations (see Art. 36 and Annex II). 
ESMA may also delegate specific supervisory tasks to national 
authorities. The amendment, however, does not propose any 
specific involvement of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
\, which could have been useful in the control of the methodologies 
and the macroeconomic models used by CRAs.  
A second amendment (CRA III)23 was proposed by the 
European Commission on 15 November 2011, in the midst of the 
euro sovereign crisis, to curtail the market power of rating agents. 
CRA III, which was formally adopted in May 2013, made some 
significant changes and introduced new provisions. The changes 
chiefly relate to conflict of interest stemming from the issuer-pays 
model, competition in the market, overreliance on external ratings 
and special provisions governing the rating of sovereigns. CRA III 
also extended the scope of the Regulation to rating outlooks and 
credit watches, which can be interpreted as important components 
of a credit rating. The key provisions of the Regulation relate to 
transparency, conflicts of interest, competition, overreliance and 
third-country access. 
2.4.1 Transparency 
Transparency requirements impact the market for ratings in a 
number of ways. Increased transparency leads to more competition 
as it facilitates unsolicited ratings, reduces conflicts of interest and 
increases market stability as disclosure of information allows for 
internal risk modelling, thereby decreasing reliance on credit 
ratings.  
                                                        
23 Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 21 May 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating 
agencies and Directive 2013/14/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2013 amending Directive 2003/41/EC, Directive 
2009/65/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU. 
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The Regulation requires CRAs to disclose their 
methodologies, models and rating assumptions. ESMA is mandated 
to set standards for methodologies and also introduced CEREP, as 
a central repository where CRAs are mandated to publish historical 
performance data and information about their methodologies. One 
important aspect in terms of transparency to the markets is the 
annual transparency report (description of internal control 
mechanisms, allocation of staff, record-keeping policy, revenue 
information etc.). Periodic disclosure obligations on rating agencies 
include, among others, the requirement to disclose their 20 largest 
clients in terms of revenue.  
CRA II added additional transparency requirements for the 
structured finance segment. Especially in the area of structured 
product ratings, the CRAs had failed to adequately assess risks in 
the underlying assets in the run-up to the crisis. CRA II requires 
issuers, originators and sponsors of structured finance instruments 
to jointly disclose the same information about credit quality and 
performance of the underlying assets that they have given to the 
CRA, as is the case in the US under the SEC’s Rule 17g-5. This 
change was welcomed by the markets as it would make both 
regimes comparable and restore confidence in the securitisation 
market. Disclosure of this information should also enable the 
publication of unsolicited ratings and spur competition in this 
market segment. In 2012, for example, all ratings on structured 
finance products were issued on a solicited basis (ESMA, 2013a). 
The extent to which this disclosure process will work is questionable 
as ratings on structured finance products are complex and require 
substantial resources.  
Another novelty with respect to transparency in the market is 
the European Rating Platform (Article 11a), to be administered by 
ESMA. Starting from 1 January 2016, all ratings issued on a solicited, 
i.e. an issuer-pays basis, must be reported to ESMA, which will 
publish this on the European Rating Platform.24 This measure aims 
at increasing oversight and comparability between ratings.  
                                                        
24 This is not applicable to the investor-pays model, as it would erode its 
profitability. On 30 September 2014, the Commission published the applicable 
technical standards in a delegated Regulation (see OJ, L 2/24 of 6.01.2015). 
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Finally, CRA III introduced some requirements with respect 
to sovereign ratings. CRAs are required to regularly publish a 
calendar with a timeline for the publication of sovereign ratings for 
the coming 12 months. Ratings should be published only after close 
of business of trading venues, in order to allow market participants 
to incorporate the rating event into their decision-making process. 
Sovereign ratings should be reviewed every six months and not 
include policy recommendations.  
2.4.2 Conflicts of interest 
A proper identification, disclosure and management of conflicts of 
interest are crucial to preserve market trust and integrity. 
Transparency measures can be seen as equally effective in 
preventing conflicts of interest as the requirement to disclose 
potential conflicts of interest and the names of the rated entities 
providing more than 5% of the rating company’s annual revenues. 
Furthermore, CRA I sets operational requirements to ensure the 
independence of employees of CRAs, such as a mandatory rotation 
of analysts and the prohibition of an analyst’s involvement in 
negotiations of fees. Analysts’ remuneration should also not depend 
on the revenues generated from the entities they rate.  
CRA III addresses conflicts of interest that could arise where 
the same investors hold considerable capital or voting rights in 
more than one CRA. The threshold in terms of capital and voting 
rights in one CRA is set at 5%, which prohibits an investor to hold 
5% or more in another CRA.25 It further stipulates that a CRA shall 
abstain from issuing a rating, where a shareholder or member 
holding 10% of the voting rights of that agency: i) is also holding 
10% or more of the rated entity, ii) is a member of the administrative 
or supervisory board of that rated entity or iii) where the rated 
entity holds 10% or more of the CRA. CRA I had only addressed this 
type of conflict of interest with respect to analysts’ ratings.  
The latest amendment introduces a general civil liability 
regime in the absence of a contractual relationship between the 
investor and the CRA in the case of issuer-pays models. Civil 
                                                        
25 The 5% threshold corresponds to the threshold set in the Transparency 
Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC), above which an entity needs to disclose the 
shareholding. 
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liability relates to infringements that had an impact on the rating 
outcome and were done “intentionally or [with] gross negligence”. 
Although it will be difficult to prove that an infringement was done 
intentionally or with gross negligence, this measure sends the right 
signal and acts as a strong incentive for CRAs not to issue 
complacency ratings. A further amendment established that fees 
should not be discriminatory and are justifiable only where actual 
costs differ and that fees should be disclosed to ESMA. This measure 
should allow ESMA to detect market abuse.  
Given the complexity of structured finance products and their 
role in the crisis, special provisions to avoid conflict of interest in 
relation in this market segment have been part of the regulatory 
framework from the initial regulation. CRA I encouraged CRAs to 
inform clients about the specificities of structure finance ratings 
compared to ratings on traditional investments and required that 
structured finance ratings should be clearly identifiable as such 
(Article 10(3) CRAI). CRA III introduced a rotation mechanism, for 
the CRA (Article 6b), by defining a maximum 4-year duration of any 
contractual relationship between issuers and CRAs and a minimum 
period during which the CRA is prohibited from entering into a new 
contract.26 The provision only applies to the issuer-pays model and 
is targeted at related conflicts of interest. For the time being, the 
rotation mechanism is limited to re-securitisation products with 
underlying assets from the same originator in order to allow for 
gradual adjustment in the market.27 The Commission will have to 
report to the Council and the Parliament by 1 January 2016 on the 
appropriateness of extending the rotation to other products, 
whether a different maximum duration of the contractual 
relationship is warranted and whether a hand-over file should be 
produced by the outgoing CRA to limit the loss of information when 
the new CRA comes in. 
                                                        
26 Where this period is equal to the duration of the expired contract. 
27 A re-securitisation product is a financial instrument where (at least one of) 
the underlying assets is a securitisation product. The rotation mechanism has 
been introduced to re-securitisation only, as the default risk of a re-securitised 
product depends much less on the debt servicing capacity of the issuer itself, 
as for instance in the case of a corporate bond. Hence the loss of information 
from limiting long-lasting relationship is relatively low (CRA III, Recital 14). 
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2.4.3 Competition 
Many of the measures on transparency and conflict of interest are 
also meant to stimulate competition, such as the rotation 
requirement. Transparency measures are also intended to increase 
competition in the market as they allow users of ratings to better 
understand and compare the quality of ratings as well as reduce 
barriers to entry.  
One instrument is aimed at supporting small- and medium-
sized CRAs (SME CRAs) in the market, with exemptions for the 
provisions on independence and avoidance of conflicts of interest 
(Art. 6), for the requirement to establish a review function and for 
the rotation requirement introduced by CRA III, with the latter 
exemption again specifically aimed at fostering competition in the 
highly concentrated structured finance segment. CRA III 
introduced the requirement to appoint an SME CRA (Art. 8d)28 
where multiple credit ratings have been solicited, and requires an 
issuer to solicit at least two CRAs where a rating of a structured 
finance instrument is solicited (Art. 8c). The obligation to appoint 
an SME CRA, however, is merely based on a comply-or-explain 
enforcement mechanism, calling into question its effectiveness.  
A provision in CRA III also foresaw the creation of a network 
of SME CRAs in which they bundle resources and have a bigger 
impact on the market. But after consulting the market participants, 
the Commission’s feasibility report May 2014 concluded that such a 
network has no support among stakeholders at this point and has 
not been pursued further since (European Commission, 2014). 
2.4.4 Overreliance – captive market 
As a response to the financial crisis, several initiatives were 
launched to reduce reliance on credit ratings, by market participants 
as well as by regulators, and to implement alternatives to credit 
ratings (FSB, 2010 and 2012). The CRA III is the European equivalent 
of these efforts at international level. The amendment for the first 
time mentions that credit ratings have a regulatory value and aims 
                                                        
28 Where a small- and medium-sized CRA is defined as a CRA with a share of 
no more than 10% of the EU market. Market share here is measured with 
reference to the annual turnover generated from credit-rating activities and 
ancillary services, at group level (CRA III, Art. 8d(3)). 
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at reducing the captive market for CRAs. To this end, the 
amendment stipulates that central banks should perform their own 
credit assessments as outlined in FSB principles and encourages 
financial institutions not to rely solely on credit ratings.  
On the side of the regulators and supervisors, the ESAs (EBA, 
EIOPA and ESMA) and the ESRB are obliged to refrain from 
referring to ratings in their guidelines, recommendations and 
technical standards where this would trigger cliff effects. The ESAs 
have been working to identify and where possible to remove, by 31 
December 2015, all references to ratings in their guidelines and 
recommendations and to mitigate the over-reliance on ratings (EBA, 
EIOPA & ESMA, 2014a and 2014b). By the end of 2015, the 
Commission has to report to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the steps taken thus far to delete references and to 
identify alternatives to external credit ratings. Based on this report, 
the Commission will have to assess whether all references to credit 
ratings in EU law can be deleted by 2020. This ambitious exercise is 
laudable, but probably illusory, given the continued reliance on 
ratings in the capital regulation of banks (CRD IV).  
2.4.5 Third-country equivalence 
Since the industry is essentially of US parentage, a focal point in the 
discussions has been the third-country regime. The Regulation 
states that CRAs established in a third country may apply for 
certification, provided that they are registered and subject to 
supervision in their home country, and that the Commission has 
adopted an equivalence decision. However, credit ratings issued in 
a third country can only be used if they are not of systemic 
importance to the EU’s financial stability (CRA I, Art. 5.1), meaning 
that all large CRAs need to be fully registered in the EU. In addition, 
credit ratings produced outside the EU have to be endorsed by the 
CRA registered in the EU, subject to a series of conditions (Art. 4.3). 
So far the legal and supervisory framework of the US, Canada, 
Australia, Japan, Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Mexico and 
Singapore have been recognised as equivalent to the requirements 
set out by the CRA Regulation. 
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Box 2. The Dodd-Frank Bill and CRAs 
The EU regime for CRAs is comparable to the US regime, as 
introduced by the Dodd-Frank Bill. Whereas the US had already 
regulated the sector in 2006 with the Credit Rating Agency Reform 
Act, this was a light regime requiring CRAs to register with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Washington, D.C., as 
a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO). 
The Dodd-Frank Bill fundamentally alters this regime by requiring 
tight operational (internal controls, conflicts of interest, qualification 
standards for credit rating analysts) and governance requirements, 
and detailed disclosure requirements (including disclosure of the 
methodologies used). The SEC implemented the measures of the Bill 
on 18 May 2011, and created an Office of Credit Ratings to issue 
penalties and to conduct annual examinations and reports.  
Sources: SEC website, Cinquegrana (2009) and Clifford Chance (2010). 
2.5 The regulatory debate 
The EU’s regulations do not fundamentally alter the problem that 
CRAs pose from a public policy perspective: 1) the oligopolistic 
nature of the industry, 2) the potential conflict of interest through 
the issuer-pays principle and 3) the public good of private ratings. 
The EU approach seems to be a second-best solution. A more 
fundamental review is needed of the business model of the CRAs, 
and which other industry sectors could provide a useful alternative 
model. 
The oligopolistic nature of the industry was addressed in the 
Regulation in several ways, such as the conflict-of-interest 
provisions arising from the issuer-pays model. Despite these rules 
and an increasing number of registered and certified CRAs, the 
market remains highly concentrated. Nevertheless, the effects of 
some of the provisions of the latest amendments still need to be 
assessed and will take time to fully materialise. The report by the 
Commission and ESMA to the Council and the Parliament at the 
end of 2015 should be revealing in this regard. 
Measures to wean asset management companies from their 
reliance on external credit ratings and the deletion of references to 
external credit ratings in legislation can be expected to reduce the 
captive market for credit ratings. And they should also have a 
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positive impact on competition. But whether increased competition 
will eventually improve the quality of ratings is questionable, as 
research finds that more competition would not necessarily 
improve standards. New entrants do not necessarily improve the 
quality of ratings – on the contrary. They attract business by friendly 
and inflated ratings. As competition reduces future rents, it 
increases the risk of the short-term gains by cheating. 
In an analysis of the corporate bond markets, Becker & 
Milbourn (2009) found a significant positive correlation between the 
degree of competition and the level of the credit ratings. Concretely, 
they noticed a positive correlation between Fitch’s entry into the 
market and ratings levels, without exception. These findings are not 
surprising given the predominance of the issuer-pays model and the 
inability of the dataset used to distinguish between solicited and 
unsolicited ratings. Due to the issuer-pays model, the CRAs 
compete for the supply side of the industry (i.e. the issuer) not the 
demand side (i.e. the investor). The CRA Regulation does not 
change this situation. 
On the structure of the industry, it could be argued that the 
EU is actually increasing the barriers to entry by introducing a 
license and setting tight regulation, rather than taking the 
oligopolistic nature as one of the fundamental reasons for the 
abuses. In addition, since statutory supervision of the industry may 
increase moral hazard, it gives a regulatory ‘blessing’ and may 
further reduce the incentives for banks to conduct proper risk 
assessments. 
In their contribution to a VoxEU report, Pagano & Volpin 
(2009) propose an even more drastic solution in which ratings 
would be paid for by the investors. The investor-pays model was 
dominant in the US until the 1970s, but because of increasingly 
complex securities in need of large resources and the fear of 
declining revenues resulting from the dissemination of private 
ratings through new information technologies, the issuer-pays 
principle was introduced. Pagano & Volpin do not discuss how to 
deal with free riding, but moving back to the investor-pays principle 
may also require further regulation to prohibit the sale of ancillary 
services by CRAs to issuers. The EU Regulation goes in the direction 
of requiring more disclosure (see Annex I, Section E of the 
Regulation), but it is questionable whether investors will read this. 
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On the contrary, given that a supervisory fiat has been given, 
investors may be even less inclined to read all the information, as 
was demonstrated during the financial crisis.  
Ponce (2009) discusses an interesting alternative to the issuer-
pays and investor-pays models: the platform-pays model. He 
demonstrates on the basis of large data sets that the transition from 
the investor-pays to the issuer-pays model had a negative impact on 
the quality of the ratings. Under the issuer-pays model, a rating 
agency may choose a quality standard below the socially efficient 
level. In this case, Ponce argues, a rating agency does not internalise 
the losses that investors bear from investing in low-quality 
securities. A rating agent may give ratings to low-quality securities 
in order to increase its revenues. To avoid this, Ponce proposes the 
‘platform-pays’ model, which takes the form of a clearing house for 
ratings, complemented by prudential oversight of ratings’ quality 
to control for bribery. The platform assigns the agent (based on 
performance and experience), and the issuer pays up front. This 
would at the same time overcome the oligopoly problem. The 
problem with this model, however, is that its governance will need 
to be watertight. An alternative to this model is the Rating Fund, 
whereby both issuers and investors would contribute to a fund, 
which would assign ratings based on performance (Kotecha et al., 
2010). 
A variant of this latter idea is the creation of a privately 
funded but European rating agency, proposed by the German 
management guru Roland Berger (2012). Berger sees many 
weaknesses in the current structure of the rating industry – namely 
being too US-centred, oligopolistic and ridden with conflicts of 
interest – and proposes to find a European investor base to fund a 
European agency. Investors would, in his proposal, also pay for 
ratings, but a central credit platform should consolidate all credit 
data outside the banking system, covering the ratings as well as data 
about issuers. The contractual relationship, however, would remain 
between issuers and rating agencies. 
At the other end of these proposals stands the idea of creating 
a publicly funded European rating agency. CRA III mandated a full 
exploration of two questions: i) the appropriateness of developing a 
creditworthiness assessment of sovereign debt and ii) the feasibility 
and desirability of setting up a European credit rating foundation 
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for all other credit ratings (Art. 39b). The Commission was tasked 
with reporting to the Council and the Parliament on these two 
questions by 31 December 2014 and 31 December 2016 (Recital 43), 
respectively. This idea was broadly discussed in the midst of the 
sovereign debt crisis, when a succession of downgrades of 
sovereigns followed one another at an increasing pace, whereas 
CRAs had not seen the problem coming. The initial downgrade for 
Greece, for example, only happened in early 2009 when the country 
was about to receive a first serious warning from the EU Council 
(starting from the A or A+ level to CCC or sovereign default in 
2012), or even later for Portugal and Ireland (see Lannoo et al., 2011).  
Given that incentives and reputation are key to the 
functioning of the ratings business, Larry Harris (2010) proposes an 
entirely different approach. Taking inspiration from the debate over 
bonuses in the banking sector, he proposes to defer part of the 
bonuses based on results. Given that credit ratings are about the 
future, the performance of the securities rated would be the 
indicator of the fee CRAs can charge. An important part of the fees 
would be put into a fund, against which the rating agencies could 
borrow to finance their operations. Disclosure of these deferred 
contingent compensation schemes would be required, so that 
investors can decide for themselves which schemes provide 
adequate incentives.  
Another possibility for creating the right incentives is to move 
to a partnership structure in the CRA business, as is common in the 
audit sector, which share several characteristics in common with 
rating agencies. These include notably the type of work, the 
importance of reputation and global presence, the network 
economies and the oligopolistic structure, and the conflicts of 
interest. The audit sector is regulated by EU Directive (2006/43/EC, 
amended by 2014/56/EU), which brought the sector under 
statutory supervision. It sets tight rules on the governance and 
independence of auditing firms, and on quality control, and limits 
the provision of non-auditing services to an audit client. The 
downside of the partnership model, however, is the liability 
problem, which will deter many firms from being active in that way, 
although the second amendment to the CRA Regulation introduces 
a form of civil liability for rating agencies as well. 
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2.6 Assessment and conclusions 
Considering the policy alternatives outlined above, the EU and the 
US should probably have considered the specificities of the sector 
more carefully before embarking on legislation. The legislation that 
was adopted does not alter the business model of the industry and 
gives rise to side effects, the most important of which is the 
supervisory seal, or the licence to issue ratings. Given the depth of 
the financial crisis and the central role played by rating agents, a 
more profound change would have been useful, towards the 
‘platform-pays’ model or a long-term incentive structure, as 
discussed above. In the meantime and given the continued 
dominance of the issuer-pays model, the second-best solution is to 
increase transparency and mitigate conflicts of interest. 
Under the new structure, ESMA is given a central role in the 
supervision of CRAs, but the question remains whether it can cope. 
The supervisor needs to check compliance with the basic 
requirements to decide on a licence and to verify adherence to the 
governance, operational, methodological and disclosure 
requirements imposed on CRAs. This is a heavy workload, 
especially considering that no supervision had been in place until 
2010. First indications, however, promising, with ESMA creating a 
data base to compare ratings performance, and having registered, 
by the end of 2014, 27 different rating agents. In-depth 
investigations by ESMA into structured finance ratings (ESMA, 
2014a) and into sovereign ratings (ESMA, 2013b) were important 
exercises that should be conducted on a regular basis. These 
inquiries also target other asset classes and include smaller CRAs.  
The CRA market remains highly concentrated, even if the 
market share of the top 3 firms seems to be declining to about 90% 
today, from over 94% before the crisis.29 Given the issuer-pays 
model and the inherent conflict of interest as revealed during the 
crisis, it is important to make sure that ESMA has sufficient 
resources to effectively monitor the CRAs. The recent budget cuts 
of the ESAs are not encouraging in this regard. 
                                                        
29 In the segment for structured finance, the Canada-based CRA DBRS has 
managed to enter the market and captured 4% by the first half of 2014 (ESMA, 
2014a, Table 1). In 2013, two more CRAs entered the market, but their market 
share remains marginal.  
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ESMA should make full use of its powers to closely supervise 
this vital sector. Where a situation arises in which penalties are 
appropriate, it could be considered to prohibit a credit rating agency 
from issuing ratings for a given period or in a given segment, as was 
done in the United States. The SEC denied the US-based CRA Egan-
Jones the regulatory seal for certain ratings over a period of 18 
months in 2013. Such a measure threatens the revenue streams of 
CRAs, helps to restore market integrity and equally gives a boost to 
smaller competitors.  
More generally, the advantage of having a regulatory 
framework in place is that the Commission’s competition 
directorate can start scrutinising the sector from its perspective. To 
our knowledge, the competition-policy dimensions of the CRA 
industry in Europe have not been closely investigated, as no 
commonly agreed definitions or tools were available at EU level and 
since the sector is essentially of US parentage. EU registration for 
the large CRAs will allow the authorities to verify their compliance 
with EU Treaty rules on concerted practices and abuse of dominant 
position, which may raise some feathers. 
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3. GAME CHANGE IN ASSET 
MANAGEMENT* 
he regulatory context for the European asset management 
industry changed more drastically than was initially 
expected at the beginning of the crisis. Despite claims by the 
industry that they were not responsible for the crisis, policy makers 
clearly thought differently. New rules concern hedge funds and 
private equity, on which no European framework had previously 
existed, restrictions on remuneration, tighter rules for depositaries, 
a more aligned supervisory framework plus all that is expected still 
to emerge out of the ‘shadow banking’ hat. But great opportunities 
are opening up to the asset management industry as Europe seeks 
to reduce the reliance on bank funding and the pension gap. 
In regulatory terms, the wider asset management industry as 
such does not exist. Rather, the applicable rules depend on the 
particular license that the financial institution in question possesses. 
One may be licensed as a fund management company, a bank, an 
insurance undertaking, a pension fund or a broker. Broker. (Table 2 
presents an overview of the applicable regulatory regimes). These 
various classifications immediately raise the question of possible 
inconsistencies, duplication or arbitrage among regimes. For certain 
segments of the asset management business, there is no question of 
which regulatory regime governs their operations, as they 
unambiguously fall into one of the aforementioned categories; for 
others, however, the vertical regulatory framework does not lend 
itself well to the range of activities they undertake.  
                                                        
* An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Karel Lannoo and Mirzha de 
Manuel Aramendía, “Game Change in Asset Management”, in Michael Pinedo 
and Ingo Walter (eds), Global Asset Management, SimCorp StrategyLab, 2013. 
Valuable research assistance from Cosmina Amariei is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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The crisis, however, has not lead to more convergence across 
regimes, on the contrary. The vertical segmentation of the industry, 
because of systemic and prudential reasons, seemed to be 
appropriate in the view of policy makers.  
This segmentation of the financial industry implies that the 
diversity across the EU of the institutional framework will continue 
to be with us for some time to come. The crisis has strengthened 
financial disintegration, reducing the pressure for regulatory 
convergence, although asset-allocation patterns may have become 
more aligned across countries. The differences in consumer 
preferences, cultural habits and institutional heritage will thus 
remain a fundamental part of the European financial-markets 
landscape for some time to come.  
The alternative investment fund managers Directive 
(AIFMD) should bring more EU-wide convergence to the regulation 
of the typical activities of asset managers: discretionary 
management, mandates and alternative investment funds. Hence 
UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable 
Securities)  remains the traditional investment fund regime, while a 
new pillar has been added for alternatives, meaning non-UCITS. In 
addition a special regime was added for real estate funds, the 
ELTIFs (European long-term investment funds). 
In this chapter, we start with a review of the changes in the 
EU’s asset management markets as a result of the crisis. A second 
part discusses the new regulatory framework for asset management 
and the challenges ahead. We focus primarily on the new AIFMD, 
the consolidation of the UCITS regime and its recent changes, and 
challenges ahead. We make reference to the links with other 
regulatory frameworks, primarily Solvency II and the markets in 
financial instruments Directive (MiFID)  as necessary. 
3.1 The asset management industry 
The crisis fundamentally altered the face of the asset management 
industry, allowing the insurance industry to re-emerge as the 
leading player. Of the three traditional groups of institutional 
investors – investment funds, insurance companies and pension 
funds – the first group had dominated the sector in terms of total 
assets since 2004. But the financial crisis led to big outflows and 
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declines in value in investment funds, which only gradually 
recovered. By the end of 2014, net assets under management (AuM) 
by the European industry totalled €19.0 trillion, representing a 
39.7% increase compared to the end of 2007, when they totalled 
€13.6 trillion. Discretionary mandates’ assets at the end of 2014 were 
estimated at €9.9 trillion, or 52% of AuM, whereas investment funds 
accounted for the remaining €9.1 trillion or 48% of AuM – of which 
about 71% or €6.5 trillion are long-term UCITS, that is, UCITS 
excluding money market funds.  
Figure 2. Total AuM of the European asset management industry 
(investment funds and discretionary mandates) by client type (€ trillion) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data from EFAMA. 
By client type, the insurers’ assets in the EU has increased in 
value from 3.9 € trillion in 2007 to an estimated €5.5 trillion in 2014, 
while financial assets of pension funds totalled €4.6 trillion in the 
same year, up from €2.8 trillion in 2007. The retail clients share grew 
the least, which raises some fiduciary duty issues, as discussed 
below. 
Although some insurance companies and pension funds 
manage assets in-house, a substantial number of these firms rely on 
the expertise of third-party asset managers. In some cases, they may 
adopt a hybrid model, keeping some investment functions in-house 
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while outsourcing others. For example, at year-end 2013, around 
67% of the insurers’ investment portfolio was managed by third-
party asset managers compared to 33% that was managed in-house. 
The dramatic decline in the European investment fund 
industry in 2008 reflected the extraordinary events in financial 
markets following the fall of Lehman Brothers, with huge declines 
in global stock markets, big outflows of money out of the financial 
system and out of equity investment funds in particular. In the retail 
space, the loss on confidence in managers was coupled with 
extended sovereign guarantees on bank deposits, prompting a flight 
to safety. This decline was prolonged in Europe as a result of the 
sovereign debt crisis, which led to a repatriation of assets and a 
restoration of the home bias. This trend only started to be reversed 
in the second half of 2012. By comparison, the European insurance 
industry, which also manages long-term savings plans in life 
insurance products and group insurance plans, but on its balance 
sheet, managed to consolidate its image as a truly long-term 
institutional investor. 
The growth of the European and US fund industry was fairly 
comparable until the crisis struck, but the decline was more 
pronounced in the EU, and the recovery in the US. Assets managed 
by the EU and US funds stood at 31% and 57%, respectively, of 
worldwide assets in the third quarter of 2014 (ICI, 2014). 
Events in financial markets had a direct bearing on the 
investment fund industry and on its future structure. The demise of 
Lehman Brothers revealed the uncertainty of holdings trapped in 
bankruptcy procedures and the non-market risks linked to the use 
of derivatives. Some banks had also made use of structured 
products, such as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) to support 
guaranteed equity products. The large-scale fraud perpetrated by 
Bernard Madoff, blown wide open by the end of 2008, was a further 
setback for the fund industry, which revealed the shortcomings 
prevalent in the regulation of custody and the need for action at 
global level. Several European managers had invested in Madoff 
funds (mostly through funds of funds or feeder structures) but had 
not taken proper measures to ensure a complete separation between 
fund manager and depositary, as required under UCITS. Industry 
and regulators suddenly woke up to counterparty and custody risks 
in asset management. 
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The decline in the European fund industry emphasised even 
more the need for further consolidation, as the average size per fund 
declined. The average size of a UCITS today is seven times that of 
an average US mutual fund, although the 10% largest funds 
concentrate 65% of assets (Lannoo, 2015). The sub-optimal average 
UCITS size brings about higher operational costs for investment 
management, a high total expense ratio (TER) or management fee 
for the investor and duplication of infrastructure. In this sense, the 
European asset management industry still today performs below its 
potential, the cost of which is passed on to the user. The main causes 
are to be found in the high level of fragmentation, the absence of a 
European market concept among investors and firms, and the 
remunerative niche markets that funds can target, exploiting 
differences in tax and regulatory regimes across Europe. The UCITS 
IV amendments, discussed below, address these challenges, but 
only partially. Another revision of the Directive is expected to 
further remove barriers to market integration.  
The long-term implications of the financial crisis for the fund 
industry remain unchanged. Too many funds were too closely 
managed or distributed by deposit-taking banks as an alternative 
savings instrument. Even today most funds are distributed by banks 
in Europe – a situation that poses questions in terms of competition 
and market structure. The situation persists, despite the recent 
growth in passive and exchange-traded investing, the development 
of alternative distribution platforms and the forced sales of asset 
management subsidiaries by several banks in Europe, following the 
financial crisis and the conditions linked to state aid. Measures need 
to be elaborated to support the separation between banks and fund 
managers and to come to a more genuine application of the open 
architecture framework. This calls, inter alia, for a stricter 
application of conflict of interest rules, as enshrined in MiFID I and 
II. In particular, it raises the question whether the cost of investment 
advice needs to be fully separated from management fees, as is 
required in the UK and the Netherlands.  
3.2 The UCITS regime 
UCITS accounts today for almost a third of global assets in 
traditional investment funds, a quarter of which are sourced outside 
Western Europe. With changes in the course of implementation and 
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others still in the pipeline, the UCITS regime has reached a high 
degree of maturity, but at the same time complexity. UCITS IV 
allows greater market integration for the fund industry, UCITS V 
adds some elements of the AIFMD  to UCITS, mainly as regards the 
separation between depositary and fund manager, and the 
remuneration of fund managers. Amidst growing recognition that 
the UCITS framework needs a full recast to achieve modernisation 
and simplification, the European Commission launched a 
consultation in 2012. The future UCITS VI framework may take the 
form of a regulation and address the use of derivatives and indices, 
leverage limits and access to less-liquid asset classes. 
The UCITS framework is one of the bright stories of European 
integration but the single market for UCITS funds remains evasive, 
given the lack of progress at EU level in addressing the distribution 
and infrastructure bottlenecks. Member states are adopting their 
own solutions, addressing in particular conflicts of interest in retail 
distribution, building sensible but divergent frameworks that act as 
barriers to the cross-border business. The situation is unlikely to be 
solved unless EU standards would converge to the highest national 
denominator. 
The 1985 UCITS Directive was the frontrunner of a wave of 
EU rules governing the free provision of financial services across 
borders under home country rules. The Directive introduced 
harmonised product regulation for investment funds that were 
allowed for cross-border sales in the EU (and the countries of the 
European Economic Area). It was followed in the early 1990s with 
directives defining the terms under which the banking, insurance 
and investment services sectors could ‘passport’ their services across 
the EU on the basis of authorisation from their home-state regulator 
(see Table 2 below).  
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Table 2. Salient aspects of EU financial services directives affecting the asset management business 
 
Capital 
Requirements 
Directive 
(CRD IV) 
Solvency II Pension Funds 
Directive (IORP) 
MiFID II UCITS III, IV and V Alternative 
investment funds 
managers (AIFs) 
Initial capital - Minimum 
€5 million 
- Minimum 
capital 
requirement or 
MCR  
- Capital depends on 
the sort of 
guarantee (if any) 
provided to 
beneficiaries and 
the presence of 
steering 
mechanisms (under 
upcoming revision 
of directive) 
- Minimum 
€730,000, may be 
reduced to 
€125,000 for not for 
own account 
trading firms, or  
€50,000 for local 
firms (Directive 
2013/36/EU, CRD 
IV) 
- €125,000 per 
management 
company 
- Plus 0.02% of AuM 
exceeding €250m  
- Max. €10m capital 
 
- €300,000 for 
internally 
managed AIFM 
or €125,000 for 
externally 
managed AIFM+ 
- Plus 0.02% of 
AuM exceeding 
€250m  
- Max. €10m 
capital 
Additional 
capital 
requirements 
- Minimum 8% 
(tier 1 and 2) of 
risk-weighted 
assets or VAR for 
trading book, 
systemic and 
buffers  
- Solvency capital 
requirement of 
SCR  
- Risk-based 
solvency 
charges based 
on standard 
formula or 
approved 
internal models 
- Risk-based 
solvency charges 
(under upcoming 
revision of 
directive) 
- Function of trading 
book (Directive 
2013/36/EU (CRD 
IV) and Regulation 
575/2013 (CRR)) 
- Capital requirement 
shall never be less 
than required under 
Art. 21 of Directive 
2006/49/EC 
- Capital 
requirement 
shall never be 
less than 
required under 
Art. 21 of 
Directive 
2006/49/EC 
Permissible 
activities (non-
exhaustive, only 
when related to 
- Portfolio 
management, 
safekeeping and 
administration of 
- Life insurance 
(including 
group 
insurance) 
- Management and 
investment of 
funded 
- Individual 
portfolio 
management, 
securities 
- Management of 
investment funds 
- Non-core: 
- Management 
and marketing of 
non-UCITS 
- EU AIFMs  
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asset 
management) 
securities, trading 
in and 
underwriting of 
securities 
- Non-life 
insurance (large 
and mass risk) 
occupational 
pension schemes 
brokerage and 
order execution 
activities 
- Discretionary asset 
management 
(including pension 
funds) 
- Investment advice 
- Safekeeping 
(custody) and 
administration of 
UCITS 
- Non-EU AIFMs 
if they manage 
an EU AIF or 
market a non-EU 
AIF in EU 
Asset allocation - Holdings in non-
financial 
institutions 
limited to 60% of 
own funds, and 
15% for a single 
holding. 
- Large credit 
exposures to 
single clients are 
limited to 800% of 
own funds and 
25% for a single 
exposure 
- Quantitative 
restrictions 
abolished by 
Solvency II, and 
replaced by a 
risk- based 
regime 
- Investment limits 
based on minimum 
harmonisation 
- Member states may 
set more stringent 
rules for 
institutions active 
on their territory, 
but within certain 
limits; 
- Investment in 
sponsoring 
undertaking are 
limited to 5% of the 
technical provisions 
- Rules on large 
exposures 
- < 10% of assets in 
single security, except 
for public debt, and < 
40% for single 
investments of 5% 
- < 10% non-listed 
securities  
- < 10% of same body 
for money market 
instruments, and < 
20% for investments 
in single other funds 
and deposits with 
credit institutions 
- Special rules for 
master-feeder 
structures 
- No requirements 
- Liquidity 
towards 
investors in line 
with liquidity of 
underlying 
- Special reporting 
requirements to 
supervisors for 
certain leveraged 
AIFs 
Conduct of 
business 
- Host-country 
rules on 
advertising and 
‘general good’ 
- Responsibility 
and governance 
- Conflicts of 
interest 
- Conduct of 
business specific 
- Conflicts of interest 
- Host country social 
and labour rules 
- Harmonised, but 
host country in 
charge of 
enforcement of 
rules for branches 
- Host country conduct 
of business rules 
(unless subject to 
MiFID rules for non-
core); 
- Conflict of 
interest  
- Risk and 
portfolio 
management 
functions 
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to life and non-
life activities 
- Valuation 
 
- Host country 
advertising and 
marketing rules 
- Delegation and 
outsourcing 
- Valuation 
- Remuneration 
Disclosure - Pillar III - Public 
disclosure 
- Disclosure to 
supervisors 
- Disclosure to 
clients 
 
- Disclosure of 
investment policies, 
risk and accrued 
benefits to fund 
members 
- Extensive, full 
price transparency 
(equity securities, 
fixed income, 
commodities), 
unbundling of cost 
of transactions 
- Key Investor 
Information 
Document (KIID) 
- Annual report, 
disclosure of 
investment 
strategy, risk 
management, 
depository, fees 
and charges 
- Reporting to 
authorities 
- Controlling stake 
notification rules 
Investor 
compensation 
- Deposit guarantee 
Directive 
- Insurance 
guarantee fund 
 - Investor 
compensation  
schemes directive 
- Investor 
compensation 
schemes (depending 
upon national 
implementation) 
- Not applicable 
Final date for 
implementation 
- 2014 - New framework 
(Solvency II) by 
2014 
- 2004 - November 
2007/2016 
- July 2011 (UCITS IV), 
2016 (UCITS V) 
- July 2013 
Technical 
adaptations 
- European 
Banking 
Committee (EBC), 
extensive 
- European 
Insurance and 
Occupational 
Pensions 
Committee, 
extensive 
- European Insurance 
and Occupational 
Pensions 
Committee, limited 
- European 
Securities 
Committee (ESC), 
extensive 
- European Securities 
Committee (ESC), 
limited 
- European 
Securities 
Committee 
(ESC), extensive 
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The UCITS Directive was amended and expanded in 2002 and 
again in 2009, to become more of a horizontal asset management 
directive to reflect the increasing convergence of the core sectors of 
the financial services industry, and in 2014, to clarify the delegation 
arrangements and the depositaries’ liability. The last sector to 
undergo cross-border liberalisation was pension funds in 2002. The 
Directive on Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision 
(IORPs) had limited success so far – there were only 11 cross-border 
IORPs in Europe in 2011 – and is now being revised to tighten 
supervision and governance arrangements for funds. In the 
meantime, the new wave of the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) had started to come into effect, most importantly with 
MiFID. In 2012, the AIFMD  came to set the framework for all non-
UCITS managers in the pursuit of a level-playing field and more 
transparency towards both supervisors and investors. 
The UCITS framework itself has been transformed over time. 
In 2002, key amendments expanded the scope of activities that were 
possible under the original UCITS Directive. The so-called ‘UCITS 
III’ product directive widened the scope of eligible assets for funds, 
to include derivatives and indices, under certain conditions. It also 
facilitated new formats, such as funds of funds, money market 
funds, cash funds or index tracker funds. A second directive – the 
UCITS III Management Directive – detailed minimum standards, 
including the introduction of a minimum level of own funds to be 
held by the management company and broadened its permissible 
activities. It also introduced a simplified prospectus, the 
predecessor of today’s key investor information document (KIID). 
The UCITS III Directive granted the ‘single license’ to fund 
management companies in the broad sense of the word. It comprises 
not only the management of investment funds – the core services – 
but also other activities related to portfolio management, such as 
pension funds for individuals, investment advice and 
administration of investment funds, which are seen as non-core or 
ancillary.30 
                                                        
30 Other forms of portfolio management, e.g. management of pension fund 
portfolios or those of individuals, are presented as a derogation from the central 
objective of the Directive, which is management of investment funds as 
authorised under the Directive (Art. 5).  
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In 2009, at the depth of the financial crisis, UCITS IV brought 
forth a further set of amendments, which had to be implemented by 
July 2011. These facilitated a genuine European passport for UCITS 
management companies, allowing for the separation between the 
location of the company and the jurisdiction where funds are 
registered. UCITS IV also facilitates cross-border mergers of UCITS, 
which makes it possible to increase the average size of European 
funds. In the same vein, it allows for master-feeder structures, 
which had previously been specifically excluded due to concerns 
over portfolio diversification.31 Entity pooling should generate scale 
economies and thus contribute to a consolidation of the sector 
serving end-users. However, the uptake has been limited so far, 
since barriers remain, notably with respect to taxation. Finally, 
UCITS IV further eases cross-border marketing of UCITS by 
simplifying administrative procedures. The home supervisor 
directly notifies the host authorities, which can monitor commercial 
documents but cannot refuse access. 
UCITS has also served as a laboratory for EU investor 
protection, in particular for disclosure rules. UCITS IV created the 
first EU standard format of summary pre-contractual disclosure. 
The ‘key investor information document’ or KIID was an important 
step forward in helping consumers choose and understand their 
purchases. It is currently being reviewed in the context of its 
extension to other (packaged) retail and insurance-linked 
investment products (PRIIPs). The new standard should help to 
compare UCITS with other investments such as unit-linked 
insurance policies, personal pensions and bank structured products, 
but the challenge of comparability should not be underestimated. 
Yet, the investor protection credentials of UCITS suffered a 
great blow with the Madoff scandal. In response, the European 
Commission proposed a stricter separation between the depositary 
or custodian and the fund manager. Madoff revealed that parts of 
the European asset managers had not properly applied the 
separation between manager and depositary, which is a strict 
obligation under UCITS. The scandal also highlighted that the 
UCITS rules on deposits were only principle-based and had not 
                                                        
31 A ‘feeder UCITS’ is a UCITS or an investment compartment thereof that 
invests at least 85% of its assets in another UCITS, called the ‘master UCITS’. 
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been correctly implemented in several EU member states (ESMA, 
2010). The issue is also that once certain derivative financial 
instruments are allowed to be used in UCITS, a 100% separate 
holding certainty is illusory since derivatives cannot be held in 
custody as transferable securities can. The UCITS V Directive 
(adopted in 2014) brings the depositary rules in UCITS in line with 
those in the AIFMD. In addition, it adds rules regarding the 
remuneration of fund managers, as was also included in the 
AIFMD. 
The duties of fund depositaries in EU regulation boil down to 
three: i) control the title of any assets received by the fund; ii) keep 
assets in custody or, where this is not possible, keep their records; 
and iii) monitor cash flows and other oversight functions. The 
difference between custody and record-keeping is fundamental, given 
the different standards of responsibility that apply. Custody 
involves holding a security, either physically or electronically while 
record-keeping only concerns taking note of the given right or 
contract. The AIFMD imposes strict liability for the loss of an asset 
kept in custody while liability in record-keeping arises in case of 
negligence or intentional failure. The gist is in determining which 
assets can be kept in custody instead of kept in record. Only 
transferable securities, money market instruments and fund units 
capable of being held in an account in the name of the depository 
can be held in custody. Less clear cut is the situation arising in cases 
of collateral arrangements, securities lending and repos. The assets 
exit custody only if there is a transfer of ownership away from the 
alternative fund manager.  
Therefore, each transaction needs to be examined. Indeed, 
the 2002 collateral Directive distinguishes between ‘title transfer’ 
and ‘security’ arrangements: under a security arrangement there is 
no transfer of title so the assets remain in custody. But without 
harmonised securities and bankruptcy laws, problems will continue 
to arise in practice. The key difference between the depositary rules 
for UCITS and AIFs lies in the ability of (professional) investors in 
AIFs to renounce some of the guarantees offered by the Directive (in 
relation to the restitution of lost assets) in a limited number of 
circumstances, catering in particular for investments in emerging 
economies.  
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3.3 A new EU regime for ‘alternative’ funds 
The financial crisis crystallised the consensus that European and 
global regulation of alternative funds was necessary. Before 2008, 
regulatory approaches varied across European jurisdictions, from 
registration-only to more detailed frameworks. The crisis changed 
this view rapidly, and although initially much politicised and 
strongly contested by the industry, the new regime is now seen as 
an opportunity for business growth, as like for UCITS, a single 
passport now exists for alternative fund managers in the EU, albeit 
restricted to professional clients. 
The London G-20 summit in April 2009 agreed that “all 
systemically important financial institutions, markets and 
instruments should be subject to an appropriate degree of 
regulation and oversight”. Leaders of the world’s main economies 
intended to put an end to regulatory arbitrage, seen to be one of the 
drivers of the crisis. The G-20 stated that hedge funds and other 
asset managers should be registered and disclose information about 
their leverage to supervisors. In addition, they should be subject to 
effective risk management.  
The AIFMD  proposal was under preparation before the crisis 
broke and was published very soon after the London G-20. The 
problem was to find a comprehensive way of regulating the sector, 
given its diversity and the risk of relocation to offshore jurisdictions. 
The EU Directive applies to managers of alternative investment 
funds – wherever they are registered – and formally not to the 
funds. In contrast with UCITS, the AIFMD does not contain product 
structuring rules, such as restrictions on eligible assets, issuer 
concentration or leverage limits. In this sense, and by adding a 
reciprocity provision, the EU ensures that the whole non-
harmonised fund sector that falls outside the scope of the UCITS 
Directive is covered, including also private equity, commodity and 
real estate funds. Managers of funds domiciled in third countries 
will be able to benefit from the EU passport after an uncertain 
transition period, provided they comply with the Directive (de 
Manuel & Lannoo, 2012, p. 95 and Annex 2). 
The AIFMD Directive follows to a great extent the spirit of the 
provisions in UCITS and MiFID on the conduct of business, 
organisational, reporting and prudential requirements. The 
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Directive added elements that have come up in the crisis, such as 
the need for appropriate liquidity management, strict segregation of 
assets and additional reporting requirements for highly leveraged 
funds. It adopts a tough stance on delegation and outsourcing to 
limit circumvention. 
The AIFMD applies a partial exemption to managers under 
€100 million assets under management or €500 million if investors 
are locked in for five years and in the absence of leverage. Managers 
under this threshold will be requested to register and provide 
simplified reporting to authorities to enable more effective financial 
stability oversight. The transparency threshold for private equity 
managers with stakes in non-listed companies is 10% for disclosure 
to competent authorities and over 50% of voting rights for 
disclosure to other shareholders.  
Although intensely criticised by the industry, which claimed 
it would lead to high costs for investors and a flight of funding 
activities out of the EU, the Directive creates a single licence for non-
UCITS funds and their managers in the EU, which had not existed 
before. In sum, the AIFMD represents a consistent framework for 
the regulation of the wider asset management industry from a 
prudential policy perspective by introducing minimum common 
rules. In particular, it addresses: i) prudential oversight, ii) leverage 
and pro-cyclicality, iii) maturity and liquidity transformation and 
iv) links with the banking system. It is also aimed at improving 
transparency and service obligations towards professional investors 
but relies on the buy-side prudential rules to enforce full 
transparency on the underlying (the look-through principle in 
Solvency II). More clarity within the non-UCITS sector will benefit 
users, supervisors and the industry alike. 
With the agreement reached on the European long-term 
investment funds (ELTIFs)  in April 2015, an EU-wide product 
regime now also exists for illiquid assets, such as real estate, 
infrastructure and unlisted securities. But only managers 
authorised under the AIFMD can offer ELTIFs. Unlike UCITS, 
ELTIFS are not redeemable whenever the investor wishes; on the 
contrary. Investors in ELTIFs will usually only be able to withdraw 
money at the specified end date of their investment, at least ten 
years after the initial payment is made. Withdrawing money earlier 
can be done, on the condition that certain criteria are met. Although 
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the product is mostly designed for institutional investors, 
investment is also possible by retail investors. Details will have to 
be worked out in implementing legislation. 
3.4 Money market funds  
By most accounts, money market funds (MMFs)  were the worst 
affected sector in the asset management industry by the financial 
crisis. The run on US money market funds in 2008 underlined not 
only their importance for the economy but also the lack of any 
specific EU framework for MMFs other than UCITS. Divergent 
national requirements allowed the use of the denomination ‘money 
market’ for funds with constant and fluctuating net asset values 
(NAVs), funds investing in longer maturities and even funds 
investing in non-money market instruments (usually called 
cash+funds). In stark contrast, US MMFs were narrowly defined by 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (2a-7 rule) as stable-NAV 
complying with specific requirements on credit quality and 
maturity, among others. 
The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)  
issued guidelines in 2010 on the common definition of MMFs in the 
EU. It introduced two categories of money market funds: i) short-
term MMFs subject to the same maturity constraints as MMFs in the 
US, after the 2010 revision of the 2a-7 rule; and ii) MMFs invested in 
longer-term securities under a fluctuating NAV.  
Stable-NAV MMFs are at the centre of the international 
discussions on ‘shadow banking’ led by the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB). It was proposed that the constant NAV MMFs would 
have either to provide sufficient capital to back their ‘promise’ of 
liquidity at face value or otherwise completely abandon such 
‘promise’ and move into fluctuating NAVs. But fierce opposition by 
the industry, coupled with the fear of causing stress in money 
markets, have frustrated reform by the SEC so far. The stable NAV 
associated with US MMFs is not prevalent in Europe where even 
‘short-term MMFs’ tend to have fluctuating NAVs. The European 
Commission proposed to implement the FSB guidelines in 
September 2013 with a regulation on money market funds, i.e. 
constant NAV can only be promised if funds have a capital buffer 
of at least 3%. The European Parliament proposed to allow constant 
NAVs without capital buffer for MMF invested government 
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securities, and for MMFs bought by public authorities, charities and 
NGOs. It will be up to the EU Council and the European Parliament 
to reach agreement on this. 
3.5 The interaction with MiFID 
Whereas UCITS, strictly speaking, regulates products and the 
AIFMD managers, MiFID regulates investment services, affecting 
the wider asset management industry but also the insurance sector. 
It allows for the free provision of investment services all over the 
EU with a single licence, subject to conduct-of-business and 
organisational provisions. The 2004 MiFID was replaced by MiFID 
II and MiFIR (markets in financial Instruments Regulation) in 2014, 
extending the scope and considerably tightening the rules. The 
challenge for the industry is how to deal with the interaction 
between these three pieces of legislation.  
MiFID brought more competition to exchanges in equity 
trading, by abolishing their monopoly, and through the 
introduction of alternative trading facilities. In return, it imposed 
stricter requirements on firms in securities transactions, through 
best execution, client categorisation (the ‘suitability’ and 
‘appropriateness’ test), conflict-of-interest and transaction reporting 
requirements, which have been harmonised to a high degree. These 
measures reduced transaction costs, but the benefits to users have 
so far failed to materialise (Valiante & Lannoo, 2011). MiFID II 
further tightens the rules, but will only be fully applicable by 2017. 
Conduct-of-business rules in MiFID apply to asset managers 
when they provide discretionary asset management and investment 
advice, as well as to the providers of back-office services such as 
custody and administration. MiFID applies therefore to product 
originators, in this instance fund managers, to the extent that they 
also carry out the distribution of their products. These rules are 
above all organisational requirements, in particular regarding the 
prevention of conflicts of interest, and conduct-of-business 
obligations, in particular client suitability and best execution.  
An important issue for the fund management industry is the 
regime for inducements under MiFID. Inducements are payments 
by an investment firm of a fee, commission or non-monetary benefit 
that could place the firm in a situation where it would not be acting 
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in compliance with the MiFID principle of acting “honestly, fairly 
and professionally in accordance with the best interest of clients” 
(Art. 24 MiFID II). The initial MiFID rules required distributors to 
demonstrate that inducements paid by the originator did not result 
in bias and facilitated enhanced services for customers. The 
difficulties in enforcing this approach in practice, in the context of 
the fallout from the financial crisis, were driving the revision of the 
directive, as discussed below. 
In effect, conflict-of-interest provisions create difficulties for 
widely accepted distribution practices in the fund management 
industry, namely the retrocession of fees from originators to 
distributors. In some instances product providers and 
intermediaries may be contemplating significant fees as a condition 
for the products being placed on the distributor’s panel or 
recommended list. Such fees are unconnected with, and additional 
to, conventional commissions which are paid on the sale of 
particular products. They are thus incompatible with the 
fundamental principle that a firm must not conduct business under 
arrangements in conflict with fiduciary duties to customers.  
Following the financial crisis, MiFID was opened for review 
in 2011, focusing on the upgrade of the conduct-of-business 
provisions and extending the requirements for trading facilities. It 
concerned the extension of the pre-trade price transparency 
provisions to the non-equity markets, particularly bond and 
derivative markets and the clarification of the rules applicable to in-
house matching by investment banks (‘dark pools’). To better 
ensure accurate implementation, these elements are part of a 
regulation (MiFIR), whereas the organisational and conduct-of-
business rules for trading platforms, brokers and data vendors are 
part of an update to the directive (MiFID II). Thus, the most 
important changes take the form of tighter rules for investment 
advice in order to better protect investors in the sale of complex 
financial products. Investment advice should be provided to clients 
on an independent basis; hence inducements are banned and fees 
must be unbundled (Art. 24 MiFID II).  
The label for independent advisors and the disclosure of the 
costs linked to distribution should help investors make more 
informed decisions, but questions concerning quality of advice and 
professional standards remain. Some member states have adopted 
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bolder structural solutions to conflicts of interest in distribution 
(notably a complete separation between sales and advice), but EU 
legislation did not follow suit. In the absence of structural solutions, 
much will depend on the effective application of the Directive in 
practice. Many blame poor supervision for the dismal record of 
MiFID I in improving investor protection. The new supervisory set-
up, discussed below, is expected to improve the situation.  
MiFID II is also expected to address the increasing complexity 
of some UCITS funds, following the expansion of eligible assets and 
practices enabled by UCITS III in 2009. Under MiFID I, all UCITS 
benefit from a blank categorisation as ‘non-complex’ financial 
instruments. This means that UCITS can be sold without any 
intermediary assessment of the adequacy of the product to the 
individual investor. This so-called ‘execution only’ regime is an 
exception to the generally applicable MiFID suitability and 
appropriateness tests. The growing complexity of UCITS products 
has challenged this exception: The evidence that investors do not 
understand non-market risks (such as counterparty risk) embedded 
in the use of derivatives calls for a cautionary approach in the sale 
process. Most retail investors purchasing an ‘investment fund’ still 
expect to hold the underlying securities and would need 
professional advice to understand, for instance, the benefits and 
risks of accessing the returns of the same basket of securities 
through a total return swap. But the question remains whether the 
issue should be tackled by reforming MiFID or UCITS itself.  
Product proliferation within UCITS has rendered its future 
uncertain, in particular after the adoption of AIFMD. Much bespoke 
brand fragmentation is already a reality. Not only do markets refer 
to ‘alternative UCITS’, but the UCITS rules themselves distinguish 
categories of UCITS such as sophisticated, structured, exchange-
traded and money-market. The introduction of the AIFMD as a 
horizontal legislation for all non-UCITS managers has increased the 
pressure to restrict the UCITS brand to traditional practices. 
3.6 Impact of the changing supervisory set-up 
The financial crisis finally made the Europeans realise that the form 
of supervisory cooperation they had was not adequate for their 
degree of market integration. Under the new set-up, supervision is 
much more coordinated, with the implementation of conduct-of-
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business rules being monitored by the European Securities Markets 
Authority (ESMA), and prudential control of banks almost entirely 
in the hands of the European Central Bank under the single 
supervisory mechanism. How the interaction between both will 
work in the future remains to be seen. 
The financial crisis revealed serious shortcomings in the 
oversight of financial markets, which initially led to the 
recommendations contained in the 2009 de Larosière report, and 
later in 2012 to the calls for a full Banking Union. The de Larosière 
report created the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), 
comprising three functional authorities covering banking, insurance 
and securities markets, and a European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), administered by the ECB. These authorities have the formal 
responsibility to enforce EU rules and supervise its application by 
national supervisors, and should thus contribute to eliminate some 
of the problems raised above. The ultimate goal is to have a single 
rulebook, which means having exactly the same rules in all member 
states across the Union. A single rulebook is also the objective of the 
ECB’s single supervisory mechanism, although it is too early to 
judge how this will work in practice. 
In the field of asset management, the responsibilities reside 
clearly in the field of ESMA, whose role has not been questioned as 
a result of the sovereign crisis. ESMA has the formal responsibility 
to mediate between supervisory authorities, and to delegate 
supervisory powers in the supervision of fund managers, for 
example. The role of ESMA appears of particular importance in 
providing technical guidance to the Commission to implement the 
post-crisis legislation and set standards, relying on supervisory 
coordination mechanisms and using powers of direct intervention 
only in exceptional circumstances.  
3.7 Towards a horizontal asset management regime 
A comparison of various national regimes within the EU covering 
retail investment products reveals an immense diversity, with a 
patchwork of different obligations on distributors regarding 
disclosure and investor protection, different forms of prudential 
supervision and a high degree of variation in marketing and 
advertising rules (see Table 3). The major challenge for the years to 
come is to work out a coherent regime for retail investment products 
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across sectors at EU level. The 2012 initiative on packaged retail 
investment products (PRIPs) aimed to level the playing field from 
the perspective of information and distribution. It was extended to 
insurance products and culminated in the adoption of the packaged 
retail investment and insurance-based products Regulation (PRIIP)  
in December 2014, to be applicable from 2017 onwards. 
From a prudential perspective, diverse business models and 
promises to investors warrant distinct treatment. Guaranteed 
insurance products are to be based on capital requirements (per 
Solvency II) while non-guaranteed products, where the full market 
risk falls on the investor, barely need any capital backing. Examples 
of the latter are investment funds and defined contribution 
pensions. Defined benefit pensions and hybrid arrangements will 
be subject to distinct rules that will take into account the promises 
made to beneficiaries and the steering mechanisms available, 
including the ability to raise contributions, cut benefits or rely on 
sponsor support. These changes will be operated under a revised 
Directive on Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision 
(IORPs). No framework exists yet in Europe for third-pillar 
pensions but the European Commission asked EIOPA in 2012 to 
deliver technical advice by 2015 – a process on which the future of 
the European asset management industry largely depends. 
Product structuring and authorisation rules remain very 
much fragmented, despite the fact that the similar economic 
functions of retail products called for a consistent approach. Until 
recently, unit-linked insurance products were not subject to EU 
rules on structuring while bank-structured products are even less 
regulated. The introduction into MiFID II of so-called ‘suitability at 
product design’ could provide the basis for a uniform framework 
based on the responsibility of senior management to approve the 
policy governing the services and products offered by the firm, in 
accordance with the characteristics and needs of the clients to whom 
their products will be offered or provided (see Art. 9). The extension 
of this principle to insurance products (in the Insurance Mediation 
Directive or IMD) and its practical implementation is now part of 
the PRIIPS Regulation. 
As for distribution, the level of mandatory fiduciary care 
afforded to retail investors as well as the degree of supervision 
undertaken by regulatory authorities may vary depending on the 
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distribution channel through which they access investment 
products, even if, in terms of outcomes or payoff profiles, the 
products are broadly similar. Pre-contractual disclosure is 
harmonised in the form of a mandatory key investor information 
document (KIID)  for investment funds, unit-linked insurance 
policies, structured products and third-pillar retirement schemes 
under the PRIIPS Regulation. Plain vanilla securities have to comply 
with the Prospectus Directive. Sales practices are governed by 
MiFID II except for unit-linked insurance products, which will 
remain under the IMD. As for private placements, MiFID will 
continue to apply to the extent that the securities are placed via 
investment firms in the sense indicated in the Directive (banks, 
brokers or financial advisers). 
Table 3. EU regulatory framework for retail investment products 
 
 Product 
 UCITS 
Non-
UCITS 
(AIFs) 
Life 
insurance  
(also unit-
linked) 
Listed 
security 
Structured 
products 
Fr
am
ew
or
k 
Marketing 
and sales 
practices 
- MiFID  
- UCITS 
- PRIIPs 
(2019) 
- MiFID  
- AIFMD 
- PRIIPs 
(retail) 
- ELTIF 
- IMD 
- PRIIPs 
- MiFID - MiFID 
- PRIIPs 
Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive 
Disclosure 
- PRIIPs 
(2019) 
- UCITS  
- MiFID 
- PRIIPs 
(retail) 
- AIFMD 
- MiFID 
- ELTIF 
- PRIIPs 
- Solvency 
II 
- IMD  
- Prospectus 
directive 
- PRIIPs 
- MiFID 
Asset 
allocation  
- UCITS - ELTIF - UCITS 
(unit-
linked) 
  
Prudential 
- UCITS - AIFMD 
 
- Solvency 
II 
 - CRD IV 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
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In view of the above, the framework for investment products 
remains very complex, even for an informed investor. Some 
products are tightly regulated at EU level, whereas for others, there 
is only general service-level rules. The problems raised by the 
interaction of a product directive (e.g. UCITS) with the rest of the 
framework (not based on product rules) indicates that many 
questions remain to be answered, possibly by developing a strong 
set of product-to-market principles and supervision, based on the 
responsibility of the originator to design products generally suitable 
for the investors they target.   
The PRIIPS Regulation, which has to be applied from 2017 
onwards, can bring more alignment in the applicable marketing and 
sales practices for retail investment products, by making the KIID 
obligatory. Whether this will effectively be the case remains to be 
seen, as the KIID is already required for UCITS today, which is not 
necessarily effectively implemented. It will be up to the member 
states, and the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), to ensure 
consistent implementation. The latter can prohibit the marketing, 
distribution or sale of certain products in certain circumstances. It is 
hoped that a more consistent regime for retail investment products 
will eventually emerge in future, and that the interaction with other 
pieces legislation, such as MiFID II, can be streamlined. 
3.8 Conclusions 
A well-developed regulatory framework is in place for the asset 
management industry in the European Union. Two basic regimes 
are emerging, one for retail investment products under UCITS and 
a second one under the AIFMD for professional investors. This has 
levelled the playing field between both. At the same time, the more 
integrated EU supervisory structure should lead to a stricter 
enforcement of rules, most notably with regard to the conduct of 
business rules enshrined in MiFID, and for marketing and 
distribution rules in PRIIPs. But much remains still to be done to 
bring full coherence to these frameworks. 
Post-crisis, the challenge for the industry and policy-makers 
is to restore confidence and allow a re-diversification of the savings 
of households. As further to the financial crisis, the increase in the 
protection offered by deposit guarantee schemes and the 
government bail-out of the banking system resulted in a 
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concentration of savings in the banking sector. This is however an 
unhealthy situation, as much for households as for the economy as 
a whole, since the transfer of savings to productive investments is 
hindered. The asset management industry should furthermore 
strive to deliver long-term value opportunities to investors, looking 
beyond UCITS into balanced funds for retirement savings. 
In the medium to long run, the objective should be to create a 
more coherent framework for the retail investment product regime 
across sectors and for long-term investments. Too many differences 
remain in the rules applicable to the fund business and other 
product originators, despite the recent initiatives. This creates 
distortions of competition, but also leads to inefficiencies and 
maintains the vertical structure of the financial industry as we know 
it today. A more open architecture of the financial industry should 
be the imperative across the board, in the interest of consumers and 
the public at large. 
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4. SOLIDIFYING DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS AND FINANCIAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE* 
n line with the G-20 commitment, a large part of the over-the-
counter (OTC)  derivatives market moved to central clearing 
fairly rapidly. The reaction created a clear trend break and 
brought the uncontrolled growth of the market, at least measured 
as notional amounts outstanding, to an end. Implementation is still 
in progress and continues to provoke tensions, mostly between the 
two blocs, the EU and the US, whose banks control a large chunk of 
this market.  
The move to require central trading and clearing of trades in 
derivatives followed failures in non-collateralised positions in 
bilateral OTC derivatives trading, mainly with the US group AIG, 
but also with other financial institutions. These failures sparked 
systemic disruption across the globe and led to a costly bailout for 
US taxpayers in 2008. The need for effective safeguards to deal with 
counterparty risks in derivatives trading was a key element in both 
the London and Pittsburgh G-20 meetings. The Pittsburgh G-20 
decided that “all standardized OTC derivative contracts should be 
traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where 
appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties (CCPs) by 
the end of 2012 at the latest. Non-centrally cleared contracts should 
be subject to higher capital requirements.”32 In addition, it was 
decided that OTC derivatives contracts should be reported to trade 
repositories. Opaqueness around bilateral net exposures of 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) caused risk 
                                                        
* Valuable research assistance and input by Cosmina Amariei and Diego 
Valiante for this chapter are gratefully acknowledged. 
32 G-20, Leaders Statement, Pittsburgh Summit, p. 9. 
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aversion and froze the interbank market, with broader implications 
for credit markets at global level. 
Together with the reinforcement of bank capital, mandatory 
central trading and clearing of standardised OTC derivatives are the 
most important shifts brought about by the financial crisis, but 
many uncertainties yet remain. The capacity of the industry’s 
infrastructure to clear millions of transactions and to facilitate 
collateral and counterparty risk management (such as portfolio 
compression and reconciliation) in order to minimise adverse 
effects on credit availability is only part of the challenge. Another 
issue is the resilience of CCPs as mutual risk absorbers. In addition, 
centralised repositories for all OTC derivatives trades were 
established. The initiatives in the settlement arena, both at the 
Commission and at ECB level, were already on the agenda well 
before the financial crisis hit, but the resolve to pursue harmonised 
rules and a single settlement engine crystallised as a result. 
This chapter analyses four components of the measures 
affecting securities and derivative markets: 1) the rules regarding 
central clearing of derivative financial instruments as contained in 
the European market infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) ; 2) the 
regulatory framework for and supervision of CCPs under the new 
EMIR legislation; 3) the authorisation requirements of trade 
repositories; and 4) the central securities depository (CSD) 
Regulation and the progress with the ECB’s Target 2 Securities (T2S) 
project. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the new rules 
on financial infrastructures.  
4.1 The anatomy of EMIR 
CCPs play a key role in the financial system, but their function 
primarily affects a few players in the market. The OTC derivative 
market on both sides of the Atlantic has been so far dominated by 
nine players, which control more than 80% of the market (Valiante, 
2010). The explicit and implicit costs for participating in CCPs and 
the impact on their profitability is a key factor for these players, as 
well as the related reduction in systemic risk. The question remains 
whether risk is better controlled when ‘multilateralised’ and 
internalised in CCPs, or whether we are creating even larger pools 
of risk.  
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For central clearing to occur, much depends on the eligibility 
of OTC derivatives, which amounts to about two-thirds of the 
market, and the governance and control of CCPs. Of the largest part 
of OTC derivative markets, the interest rates swap market, 86% has 
become clearable, and only a fraction remains non-clearable.33 But 
offloading contracts that are clearable may leave bilateral derivative 
markets with ‘tail-risk’ exposures, which may importantly affect 
markets and increase risks to be taken up by financial institutions. 
Ultimately, the costs of bilateral trading of complex products that 
cannot be cleared on highly standardised platforms will inevitably 
increase. 
Figure 3. Notional amounts outstanding, gross market value, gross credit 
exposure of OTC derivatives (€ trillion) 
 
Notes: The notional amount outstanding represents a market size indicator and is 
defined as the gross nominal or notional value of all deals concluded and not 
yet settled on the reporting date. The gross market value represents the cost of 
replacing all outstanding contracts at current market prices. Finally, gross credit 
exposure looks at the gross market values after legally enforceable bilateral 
netting but before collateral is taken out.  
Data source: BIS (2014). 
                                                        
33 According to Michael Davie of LCH Clearnet (2014). 
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The European market infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)  
remains in its final text very much at the level of principles in the 
prudential requirements for CCPs and the eligibility of derivatives 
for central clearing.34 These were further substantiated in delegated 
acts, of which the European Commission has issued 17 different acts 
so far. The minimum requirements for CCPs and the rules 
governing TRs are already applicable, whereas the requirements for 
central clearing and the collateralisation for non-centrally cleared 
derivatives are still in the course of implementation. The first 
regulation on the classes of over-the-counter (OTC)  derivatives to 
be subject to the clearing obligation was adopted by the 
Commission on 6 August 2015, foreseeing a gradual three-year 
implementation period.35 But this is at least two years later than the 
similar rule under the US Dodd-Frank Bill, and already led to a shift 
in derivatives trading from the US to the EU (ISDA, 2014). 
Non-financial corporations and pension funds (for a three-
year transition period) are exempt from the scope of the regulation. 
The exemption for non-financial corporations was already on the 
agenda well before the text was formally proposed, and was 
maintained, albeit with the maintenance of a clearing threshold. The 
same applies in the US under Dodd-Frank, which came into effect 
in October 2013. The exemption for pension funds was a major 
success of lobbying with the European Parliament, but does not 
apply in the US.  
The exemption from the scope of the regulation for non-
financial corporations applies below a clearing threshold of €1 
billion for credit and equity derivatives, and €3 billion for currency, 
interest rate, commodity and other OTC derivatives (Art. 10, EMIR; 
Art. 10, p. 82, ESMA, 2012). In addition, transactions that are 
considered positions that reduce risks directly related to the 
commercial or treasury-financing activities of the non-financial 
entity, the so-called ‘hedging transactions’ (Art. 10.3, EMIR), will 
not contribute to the clearing threshold. Following ESMA standards 
                                                        
34 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, 
OJ L 201 of 27.07.2012. 
35 Commission delegated regulation (EU) of 6.8.2015 supplementing Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard 
to regulatory technical standards on the clearing obligation. 
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(Art. 9.1 (a)(b)(c), p. 82, ESMA, 2012; based on Art. 10.3, EMIR), 
‘hedging’ may assume a broad meaning, i.e. all transactions that are 
done to indirectly or directly mitigate price risk, or are compliant 
with IFRS standards (Art. 3, Regulation no. 1606/2002).  
The exemption from central clearing for pension schemes is 
less clear cut, as it is only applicable during a transition period of 
three years. The representatives of pension schemes successfully 
argued that the margin requirements of CCPs would reduce returns 
for future retirees. However, pension schemes will be subject to 
reporting obligations and bilateral collateralisation requirements. 
“The ultimate aim is, however, central clearing as soon as this is 
tenable” (Recital 15, EMIR). This derogation also applies to group 
insurance schemes, provided they are ring-fenced from other 
activities within the insurance group (Art. 2.10(c)).  
Bilateral contracts that are not centrally cleared are subject to 
strict risk management procedures and operational requirements 
(such as collateralisation, portfolio reconciliation and 
affirmation/confirmation systems).36 The value of outstanding 
contracts shall be marked-to-market on a daily basis, except if the 
market is inactive (a quoted price is not readily available or fair 
value estimates are too divergent) (Art. 15, p. 85, ESMA, 2012).  
4.2 Authorisation and operational requirements for 
a CCP 
EMIR follows a dual approach for the authorisation of CCPs. EU-
based CCP’s are authorised by the relevant authorities in their home 
country, in most cases the bank supervisors. Authorised third-
country CCPs can be recognised to do business in the EU by ESMA, 
subject to an equivalence decision by the European Commission 
and an ESMA cooperation agreement with the respective home 
supervisory authority on exchange of information. Some 16 CCPs 
have been authorised from within the EU (ESMA, March 2015), 
while an equivalence decision was concluded with four countries in 
South East Asia: Australia, Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. The 
equivalence with the US has been pending for some time. 
                                                        
36 Another important service is compression, which allows netted positions to 
be further reduced (early termination) against each other at an agreed mark-to-
market valuation of the contract (Art. 3 RM, ESMA, 2012). 
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Once the initial conditions are met, clearing houses can offer 
their services freely within the EU, after notifying the host-country 
authorities. Previously, further to MiFID (Arts 34 and 37 in MiFID 
II), investment firms could have access to host-country clearing and 
settlement services, but the latter could not provide their services 
freely across borders, which is what EMIR, and the CSD Regulation, 
now put in place.  
The basic prudential and business conduct standards for 
CCPs today comprise: 
1. an “adequate” capitalisation of at least €7.5 million, 
“proportional” to the risk taken by the CCP (Art. 16);37 
2. exposure management, margining rules, a pre-funded default 
fund, the default waterfall or the financial safeguards 
available to a CCP to cover losses arising from a clearing 
member (CM) default, collateralisation and investment policy 
(Arts 40-47); and 
3. governance and conduct requirements (segregated and 
portable individual client accounts, conflicts of interest rules, 
outsourcing policy, Arts 33-39). 
These rules, and above all those under item (2), are key to the 
well-functioning of CCPs. They were further substantiated in 
technical standards, guidelines and recommendations that were 
issued by EBA and ESMA. Doubts, however, remain among 
specialists regarding the resilience of CCPs. Much depends upon 
the internal risk management methodologies of CCPs, whose 
operators call for greater transparency and disclosure of the results 
of the stress testing regime (see e.g. LCH Clearnet, 2014). The 
limited research on the subject demonstrates the heterogeneity of 
CCPs and of the members of CCPs, which should be a reason for 
concern on the part of policy-makers. 
Regulatory capital is required to cover gross operational 
expenses for winding down and restructuring the CCP. On top of 
this, capital is needed to cover operational, legal, and non-covered 
                                                        
37 It should be proportional to the “risk stemming from the activities of the 
CCP” (Recital 48 and Art. 16.2). This is a very open clause, which – for CCPs 
licensed as banks – could also create conflicts with current capital requirements 
(EBA will need to set regulatory technical standards for this). CCPs could also 
be subject to other capital requirements regulations. 
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credit, and counterparty and market risks. Calculations are set in the 
capital requirements Regulation (CRR), which comprise as well the 
exposures of banks to CCPs and their contributions to a default 
fund.  
As a consequence of market infrastructure surveillance, 
access to central bank liquidity, and capital requirement regulation, 
CCPs fall under the supervision of three European authorities, 
ESMA, EBA, and the ECB, apart from the local one. The list of the 
national competent authorities, as published by ESMA, comprises 
central banks, FSAs, securities markets regulators and ministries of 
finance, which does not facilitate supervision of entities that are 
very international by nature. It is structured in ‘colleges of 
supervisors’, whose operation is set in Art. 18 of EMIR, and subject 
to implementing technical standards, under the coordination of 
ESMA. 
The access of CCPs to central bank liquidity facilities, and the 
relationship with the location of CCPs, have been high on the 
agenda since CCPs were given a central role in the financial system. 
CCPs are critical infrastructures that may need a central bank 
backstop in case of trouble. But the policy line of EU central banks 
has not been univocal. Whereas the Bank of England (BoE) has 
openly raised this possibility, the ECB was more reluctant, and 
indicated that this cannot be a given. This divergence of views came 
to light in an EU Court case between the UK and the ECB on the 
location of CCPs, and whether they could be constrained by the 
currency area in which CCPs are operating.  
The ECB had stated in its Eurosystem Oversight Policy 
Framework (July 2011): “as a matter of principle, infrastructures 
that settle euro-denominated payment transactions should settle 
these transactions in central bank money and be legally 
incorporated in the euro area with full managerial and operational 
control and responsibility over all core functions for processing euro 
denominated transactions, exercised from within the euro area.” 
The location policy is applied to all CCPs that hold on average more 
than 5% of the aggregate daily net credit exposure of all CCPs for 
one of the main euro-denominated product categories. The UK 
challenged this on the grounds that the ECB lacked the powers to 
dictate such rules and that it violated the single market principle. 
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The location of a CCP relates to the situation in which a CCP 
fails and needs central bank liquidity support to keep the financial 
system function orderly. Who should be in charge in case of a 
liquidity crisis? The central bank where the CCP is headquartered 
with its main operations, or perhaps the central bank where the 
main financial entities of the CCP are based or possibly the central 
bank of the main currency cleared on the CCP? In effect, EMIR 
cannot force the ECB and its network (ESCB) to intervene, but 
Recitals 11 and 53 emphasise the ESCB’s important role in the 
process of licensing, supervision and support of the clearing and 
settlement system. ESMA worked very closely with the ECB in 
drafting the EMIR regulatory and technical standards.38  
On 4 March 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) annulled the ECB’s European Oversight Policy Framework 
and ruled that the ECB lacked the competence necessary to regulate 
the activity of securities clearing systems, as its competence is 
limited to payment systems alone by Art. 127(2) of the FEU Treaty.39 
But the Court case did not address the issue of the access to central 
bank facilities.  
Besides the moral hazard created by including the ECB in the 
supervisory process of a CCP, it is unclear how, if a CCP fails, the 
potential intervention of a central bank would look. Would the ECB 
intervene to inject liquidity (capital or credit line) in a CCP even 
though its failure is caused by the counterparty default of a US legal 
entity for knock-on effects of badly managed activities run in the US 
(whether the clearing member is a subsidiary or branch)?  
This situation could be highly controversial. Three steps are 
possible in this case: 1) the central bank where the CCP is operating 
can step in and directly inject liquidity in the CCP, disregarding the 
composition and nationality of its clearing members (location plays 
then a key role); 2) the central bank of the main currency traded on 
the CCP would inject liquidity directly in the CCP; or 3) MoUs 
                                                        
38 It should be recalled that the discussions on this item between the ECB and 
CESR, the predecessor of ESMA, have a long history. They started in 2001 and 
broke down in 2005 for about three years until the EU finance ministers 
mandated both in the context of the financial crisis to resume their work, 
leading to the ECB-CESR recommendations of June 2009, see 
www.ecb.eu/paym/pol/secover/escbcesr/html/index.en.html. 
39 Judgment in Case T-496/11, March 2015. 
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among central banks can actually regulate a common intervention 
based on the percentage of the default fund held by clearing 
members operating in the central bank’s jurisdiction or under its 
supervision. For instance, if US clearing members’ subsidiaries hold 
only 10% of the default fund, in case of liquidity problems, the Fed 
would only inject liquidity through a swap line for 10% of the total 
amount requested. The announcement made by the Bank of 
England and the ECB on 29 March 2015, as further to the Court 
judgement, indicated that third step would be followed: “The ECB 
and the BoE are today extending the scope of the standing swap line 
in order, should it be necessary and without pre-committing to the 
provision of liquidity, to facilitate the provision of multi-currency 
liquidity support by both central banks to CCPs established in the 
UK and euro area respectively.”40   
In the US, the Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC) is 
authorised under Title VIII, section 131, of the Dodd-Frank Act to 
designate a financial market utility (FMU) as ‘systemically 
important’ in cases where a failure of or a disruption to the 
functioning of an FMU could create, or increase, the risk of 
significant liquidity or credit problems spreading among financial 
institutions or markets and thereby threaten the stability of the US 
financial system. Currently designated FMUs, including five 
clearing entities41 supervised by the Board of the FSOC, the CFTC 
(Commodity Futures Trading Commission) or the SEC, are subject 
to heightened prudential and supervisory provisions. 
Defining an appropriate recovery and resolution framework 
for CCPs is most probably the next regulatory challenge for both EU 
and US regulators. There are many things to be clarified, most 
notably when recovery and resolution should be triggered, the tools 
to be used in each situation, and the nature of the resolution 
authority. 
                                                        
40 www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150329.en.html. 
41 The Clearing House Payments Company, L.L.C., on the basis of its role as 
operator of the Clearing House Interbank Payments System - (Board); Fixed 
Income Clearing Corporation - (SEC); ICE Clear Credit L.L.C. - (CFTC); 
National Securities Clearing Corporation - (SEC); and the Options Clearing 
Corporation - (SEC). 
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As a follow-up to the publication of the “Principles for 
financial market infrastructures” (April, 2012) and “Principles for 
financial market infrastructures: disclosure framework and 
assessment methodology” (December, 2012) CPMI and IOSCO 
published in October 2014 a report on “Recovery of financial market 
infrastructures”42 and in February 2015 the “Public quantitative 
disclosure standards for central counterparties”.43 Also, the FSB 
published a report on the “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution 
Regimes for Financial Institutions”, which includes an annex 
dedicated to resolution regimes for FMIs.44 These reports and 
principles are important milestones for all 28 jurisdictions. The 
European Commission is expected to publish a legislative proposal 
in 2015 on resolution and recovery of financial market 
infrastructures such as CCPs.  
For cash securities, CCPs may enter into interoperability 
arrangements provided certain criteria are met (Arts 51-53). These 
include interoperability with other CCPs and non-discriminatory 
data access to trading venues and settlement systems (Art. 51.2). 
ESMA had to report by end-2014 on the appropriateness of the 
extension of these interoperability arrangements to non-cash 
securities. In any case, counterparties can voluntarily enter into a 
bilateral interoperability agreement for non-cash securities, to be 
agreed by the authorities.  
The interoperability agreements are approved by national 
authorities, but ultimately ESMA can only issue a non-binding 
opinion (reconsidering clause) in case disagreement persists among 
the financial authority granting/denying approval and the financial 
authority where the CCP is located (Art. 54.3). This lack of power 
may affect the implementation of this requirement if the dispute 
among national authorities is not solved by ESMA’s moral suasion, 
especially if ESMA perceives that the national authority has not 
correctly interpreted the requirements set by the regulation. 
                                                        
42 CPMI-IOSCO Report, October 2014 (www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d121.pdf). 
43 CPMI-IOSCO Principles, February 2015 
(www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d125.pdf). 
44 FSB Report, October 2014 (www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/r_141015.pdf). 
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Arts 7 and 8, and Recital 34 of EMIR set a ‘reverse’ open access 
principle, also included in the markets in financial instruments 
Regulation (MiFIR, Arts 28 and 29), but applicable to all financial 
instruments.45 As a result, a competing CCP would get access to 
data feeds from the incumbent trading venue to offer clearing 
services in competition, and vice versa. The incumbent CCP would 
need to accept to clear transactions executed in different trading 
venues, so as to allow competing trading venues to compete with 
the incumbent trading platform on reasonable terms. Access to 
these services should be non-discriminatory, and it should not 
create the need for interoperability or liquidity fragmentation.46 In 
case either of these two conditions cannot be met, the incumbent can 
deny access. Even if the ‘liquidity fragmentation’ condition has been 
clearly defined by ESMA, requirements to establish when open 
access may need interoperability are unclear, which may leave 
space for market players to claim an arbitrary need to be 
interoperable in order to deny access (whether or not this is true). 
In addition, it is difficult to imagine CCPs competing without 
interoperability agreements in place, as this would imply sealing 
pools of collateral in vertical infrastructures and ultimately 
increasing costs. The risk of locking the system into a collection of 
sealed pools of collateral that are unable to talk to each other may 
drastically reduce the efficiency (and ultimately the stability) of the 
financial system. However, interoperability for derivatives is 
difficult to achieve because of the different nature and 
characteristics of these transactions, e.g. correlation among 
products. Against this background, technologies in this area are 
progressing quickly and competition among CCPs will certainly 
escalate in the near future around the provision of services that can 
improve the management of collateral and generate important 
savings for end users, ultimately leading to a more interoperable 
environment. 
                                                        
45 The current version of the text discussed within the European Parliament. 
46 Following ESMA (Art. 8, p. 81, ESMA, 2012), there is no “liquidity 
fragmentation” if there is at least one CCP in common (after the competing CCP 
is allowed to enter) and there are already clearing arrangements established by 
the CCP. 
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4.3 Trade repositories  
Trade repositories centrally collect and maintain the records of any 
derivative contract that has been concluded and any modification 
or termination of the contract. All derivative contracts must be 
reported to a trade repository within one business day of execution 
(T+1). This applies to both cleared and non-cleared trades, both 
listed and OTC derivatives, swaps outstanding and pre-enacted. 
This report must include the parties to and main characteristics of 
the contract.  
Until the eve of the crisis, limited information was available 
on the OTC derivatives contracts outstanding, and for those 
existing, no harmonised international standards existed. 
Opaqueness in derivative markets caused disruptive adverse 
selection effects in the interbank market, following Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy. Only one trade repository, the US DTCC, had 
been in existence since before the financial crisis, covering only 
credit derivatives. However, several new initiatives – such as Regis-
TR (joint initiative of Iberclear and Clearstream) – have been 
launched in the meantime and recently started operations.  
Trade repositories are authorised by ESMA, and its doing so 
becomes, in addition to authorising rating agencies, the second 
specific and unique supervisory task that it will perform. In return 
for doing so, ESMA charges fees to the repositories, which should 
fully cover its expenses. ESMA may delegate supervisory tasks to 
member state authorities. Six trade repositories were formally 
recognised by ESMA in early 2015. Trade repositories from third 
countries may also be recognised, as soon as an equivalence 
agreement with the country in question has been concluded (Art. 
75). As for other EU directives, the use of an ‘equivalence’ regime 
raises questions about the criteria used to determine equivalence. 
Too strict an equivalence regime would ring-fence EU markets and 
affect linkages with non-EU counterparties, while too lax an 
equivalence regime would create space for regulatory arbitrage. 
To ensure a proper supervisory framework works, ESMA has 
the powers to undertake general investigations, do on-site 
inspections of and eventually impose fines upon trade repositories. 
This is, in a European context, a fairly new concept, although it also 
appears already in the Credit Rating Agencies Regulation (see 
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Chapter 2). Data collected by trade repositories should be made 
available to the relevant European and national supervisory 
authorities.  
Notwithstanding the formal obligation to report, the market 
for trade repositories will remain small and highly concentrated. 
This market is, like the market for market data, global, with high 
scale economies and where only few players may emerge. Trade 
repositories should be interconnected and exchange information, 
with regulators defining mandatory formats for them to be capable 
of communicating with each other (Benito, 2012). It remains to be 
seen whether this will happen, as this has been an issue in the 
market data world as well for a long time, without much progress. 
Commercial interests in setting joint standards and exchange 
information may be minimal, which is fully recognised in the EMIR 
text (Recital 42). As a result, trade repositories should provide 
information on non-discriminatory terms, while regulation should 
clearly define how much information they can retain for commercial 
purposes (analytical data services) and how much should be 
disclosed to the market. The presence of multiple trade repositories, 
adopting the same standards and sharing information in order to 
reconcile a global picture of the market, can promote further 
competition among them in the provision of additional services to 
support middle office operations, e.g. confirmation, and collateral 
services, e.g. compression and real-time risk management, or just 
reporting services to regulators. In addition, trade repositories 
could also collect data in other less transparent areas, such as 
securities lending and repo operations, where transparency today is 
based on surveys and voluntary bilateral agreements between 
dealers and data vendors. 
4.4 The CSD Regulation and T2S 
After clearing with EMIR, the single license facilities will also apply 
to central securities depositories (CSDs), which hitherto had only 
been subject to a self-regulatory code. While the 2006 Code made 
some progress in the area of price transparency, hard-core issues 
such as interoperability and service unbundling did not advance, as 
too much was at stake for the operators. The CSD Regulation 
defines settlement, the settlement cycle (T+2) and settlement 
discipline, with penalties for settlement failures. It requires 
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transparent access criteria, price and fee transparency, and 
interoperability between CSDs and with other infrastructures, such 
as CCPs (chapter IV). An ‘equivalence’ regime for recognition to 
provide services in the European Union, as with EMIR, applies to 
third-country CSDs (Art. 25). 
The CSD Regulation sets for the first time harmonised 
prudential rules for CSDs in the EU. Although general global 
standards have existed since 2002, and were updated by the CPSS-
IOSCO in the principles for financial market infrastructures (April 
2012), the EU had left this until recently to the member states, which 
has hampered cross-border provision of settlement services in the 
EU. The regulation sets harmonised organisational requirements, 
conduct of business rules, rules for other CSD services, prudential 
standards and requirements for links with other CSDs. 
Authorisation is in the hands of the member states, with ESMA in 
charge of maintaining a CSD register. The regulation also 
establishes that member states should provide for a harmonised 
minimum level of administrative sanctions (including authorisation 
withdrawals) to be applied in case of breaches of the regulation to 
legal and natural persons (Art. 65).47 Considering Banking Union 
and Target 2 Securities (T2S), the final settlement engine of the ECB, 
authorisation of and sanctions against CSDs would fit more 
logically with the ECB, but this seemed a bridge too far. 
In addition to specific operational requirements such as daily 
reconciliation of the number of securities with the accounts, CSDs 
should segregate accounts of each participant and enable 
participants to segregate clients’ individual accounts (Art. 38). 
Provision of cash settlement services in commercial bank money 
must be done though a separate credit institution or can be done 
through its own accounts (Art. 40). The combination of both 
functions in a CSD had given rise to discussions on the draft 
regulation, and resulted in a separate article setting special 
conditions for authorisation (Art. 54). It requires CSDs in both cases 
to have a banking licence in line with CRD IV in case it falls within 
the same legal entity or when it is a separate legal entity, and can be 
                                                        
47 Administrative fines can go up to 10% of total turnover of a legal entity or to 
10% of total income of a natural person or to €5 million. The combined use of 
10% threshold in some countries and fixed €5 million threshold may still keep 
substantial divergences among EU countries. 
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subject to capital surcharges and additional prudential 
requirements. Authorities are allowed to designate more than one 
credit institution for cash-settlement services in case the 
concentration of risks is too high (Art. 54.6). Fears that securities 
accounts would be misused to support banking activities emerged 
following cases in which clients lost assets due to banking activities 
being conducted by the same entity, such as securities lending. 
Moving these services under a different legal entity provides a clear 
separation between pure settlement services and banking activities. 
At the same time, in combination with open-access rules, this may 
increase competition with other entities providing value added 
services across markets and CSDs. 
As CSDs will have to look downstream to expand their 
services with the arrival of T2S, they will come into even more direct 
competition with custodian banks, as well as with firms providing 
middle office services. In this context, the current phrasing of the 
provision regarding banking services may cause uncertainty for 
CSDs, at least in the short term, on the costs and future of their 
vertically integrated business model. The Commission may argue 
that this is only a legal cost, but besides additional administrative 
and regulatory costs, i.e. separate capital requirement, there is an 
issue of economies of scale and scope that might be lost by splitting 
activities across several entities. The question arises whether similar 
rules will ceteris paribus apply to custodian banks providing other 
banking type ancillary services. 
As regards T2S, all eurozone CSDs and several non-eurozone 
CSDs had signed up to T2S, including the Swiss CSD SIX, allowing 
the ECB to have a moderately favourable business case on which to 
proceed.48 According to the 2008 impact assessment, settlement 
costs could decline by about 30% if all Eurozone countries join (see 
Lannoo & Valiante, 2009). This would further decline with non-
Eurozone countries signing up, such as the Nordic countries, which 
are part of the Euroclear group. The Bank of England has, however, 
indicated that it will not participate in the platform for sterling-
denominated settlements. 
The framework agreement for those CSDs joining T2S, 
published in October 2011, is over 700 pages, containing 54 articles 
                                                        
48 See ECB press release, 3 July 2012. 
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divided over seven chapters. It contains amongst other things the 
pricing for the settlement services of T2S, which has constantly 
increased after the first estimates, reducing the original business 
case made by the ECB, i.e. an important reduction in settlement 
costs. The prices are expected to vary between €0.40 and €0.60, 
depending on the components of the service, which are on the 
higher end of the 2008 ECB business case (in scenario 1, all Eurozone 
countries participating). Additionally, as we pointed out before 
(Lannoo & Valiante, 2009), T2S will also force efficient business 
models to charge more than what they actually charge today as they 
have ‘agreed’ to migrate to the T2S infrastructure.  
Despite uncertainty around costs and who ultimately bears 
the operational risks, the EU institution-driven settlement platform 
is trying to succeed where market-driven solutions were not capable 
of progressing at the same pace, due to conflicting commercial 
interests, i.e. the creation of a harmonised framework for securities 
(and cash, with Target 2) settlement infrastructure. As a result of 
this initiative, competition among CSDs and providers of related 
services, e.g. global custodians, will become harsher on value added 
services and potentially on middle office services too, while small 
national players will be gradually pushed out of the market. 
4.5 The EMIR revolution? 
The new rules, as always, provide costs and benefits for the market. 
As with MiFID after the 2004 adoption, much debate was over costs, 
but the dynamic effects of the new rules in technological investment 
to compete in the new market environment are often 
underestimated. For end users, whether financial or non-financial 
institutions, the costs of collateral will certainly increase, at least in 
the short term.  
At the end of 2013, according to ISDA (2014a), over 90% of 
bilateral OTC transactions were subject to collateral agreements 
with cash and government securities accounting for roughly 90% of 
the $3.2 trillion estimated amount of collateral in circulation. 
Roughly $100 trillion of OTC derivatives contracts (as notional 
value) do not have any collateral agreement in place, but 
collateralisation is growing at a quick pace. The reported collateral 
received and delivered against $407 trillion in notional amounts 
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outstanding of centrally cleared OTC derivative transactions 
totalled roughly $295 trillion.   
At end of 2013, the estimated uncollateralised exposure 
amounted to $1.45 trillion (see Figure 4), representing 47.72% of the 
gross credit exposure. As a result of current reforms and 
technological developments, the uncollateralised exposure has been 
constantly going down as the market developed, even before the 
crisis and despite the growth of volumes in the market. After the 
initial spike in uncollateralised exposure during the worst moment 
of the financial crisis, the combination of risk aversion in 2008-09 
and market reforms in the last couple of years have pushed 
additional collateralisation into the system. These results are in line 
with a number of studies that looked at the expected increase in 
collateralisation as part of the envisaged OTC derivative markets 
reforms. According to a report prepared by the Macroeconomic 
Assessment Group on Derivatives (MAGD, 2013), these reforms 
will result in the total amount of collateral used to back trades rising 
to between €1.1 trillion and €1.8 trillion, with a central estimate of 
€1.3 trillion. Tabb Group estimated the need for collateral to be 
around $2 trillion. The European Commission (2010) estimated this 
exposure roughly to $1.4 trillion.  
Figure 4. Estimation of the uncollateralised exposure* 
 
* Collateralisation further reduces gross credit exposure. In order to estimate 
the level of under-collateralisation, 50% of the collateral in circulation (as 
estimated in the ISDA Margin Surveys) is subtracted from the gross credit 
exposure (as reported in the BIS semi-annual surveys).  
Source: Authors’ own configuration based on BIS and ISDA data. 
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Essential to this process is the creation of a modern and 
flexible infrastructure that optimises the use of collateral and allows 
offering diversified services for end users. This situation, on the one 
side, creates a lot of opportunities for the industry to develop, 
through new technologies, competitive services such as real-time 
risk management services, or cross-asset classes clearing. On the 
other side, it clashes with commercial interests that impede 
initiatives to make collateral pools more fungible to promote 
interoperable clearing platforms with other CCPs (mainly through 
cross-margining agreements).  
By setting risk management procedures among CCPs and 
instituting strict day-to-day supervision under the ESMA-ECB 
umbrella, an interoperable environment would certainly deliver 
better collateral management and huge savings for end users, a key 
element for the creation of a truly pan-European infrastructure. 
EMIR is very timid in this area and it sees interoperability as a threat 
to the stability of the CCP (interoperability will only be limited to 
‘cash securities’). However, the lack of fungible collateral pools 
would itself be a threat to the efficiency of the market as it could 
create costly sealed CCP operations, which would increase the need 
for collateral. In effect, two CCPs at the two sides of the same 
transaction may ask for the same amount of collateral, which will 
represent a costly duplication.  
In an interoperable framework, once risk management 
procedures are fixed and well-supervised, competition among 
CCPs would move to value added services linked to collateral 
management. In any case, EMIR will lead to investment in new 
clearing technologies, as the current clearing technology is neither 
scalable nor flexible enough to handle the changes that are coming 
(Tabb Group, 2011). As a result of better technology, moving 
potentially to almost real-time clearing will increase transaction 
volumes and liquidity, and so will the pie for market participants 
that enter into the arena. Shortening settlement cycles will also free 
more capital, which can be redeployed to improve market 
efficiency. 
In addition to the implications for clearing and CCP business, 
costs of membership in and reporting to trade repositories should 
also be considered. EMIR, in effect, creates huge opportunities for 
trade repositories, too, and the expected volume increase in traded 
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and cleared derivatives will further stimulate their growth. Existing 
organisations in clearing, trading and data reporting may benefit 
from this change, provided they have made the necessary 
adaptations. 
For this to happen, competition between CCPs will need to be 
strengthened, and interoperability enforced in the exchange-traded 
derivatives (ETD) space. Synergies with ETD may expand 
oligopolistic settings in adjacent markets (‘cross-subsidisation’), 
such as the unlisted OTC derivatives clearing space. Access to the 
respective CCPs by competing trading venues and by competing 
CCPs to the incumbent trading venue (reverse open access) is 
constrained because of closed vertical silos, i.e. there is no direct 
access to the data feed of the incumbent trading venue by competing 
CCPs and no possibility by competing trading venues to share a 
data feed with the incumbent CCP. This lack of competition may 
further limit growth and innovation in the EU’s derivative markets. 
As compared to the US, where anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the market grew by 35% in the post-crisis period, the EU’s 
exchange traded derivative market was rather stagnant. This is also 
why the European Commission prohibited the merger between the 
NYSE and D-Börse, which would have “created a quasi-monopoly 
in a number of asset classes, leading to significant harm to 
derivatives users and the European economy as a whole. With no 
effective competitive constraint left in the market, the benefits of 
price competition would be taken away from customers. There 
would also be less innovation in an area where a competitive market 
is vital for both SMEs and larger firms.”49 The implementation of 
EMIR should bring more competition to these markets, while 
allowing European competition policy authorities to better monitor 
markets. 
                                                        
49 The European Commission blocked the proposed merger between Deutsche 
Börse and NYSE Euronext after the companies’ refusal to apply tough 
conditions and sell the part of their business that was creating strong 
concentration, see press release, 1 February 2012 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-94_en.htm?locale=en). 
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4.6 Conclusions 
With a delay of more than 10 years, the EU is finally putting a 
regulatory framework in place for the post-trade financial market 
infrastructure. As a result of the financial crisis, this regulatory 
framework is following two important trends. On the one side, there 
is the general mandate given by the G-20 to regulators to strengthen 
financial stability, mainly through transparency and mandatory use 
of highly standardised infrastructures for clearing OTC derivatives 
transactions. On the other side, since the launch of the Financial 
Services Action Plan in 1999, Europe has been trying to build a pan-
European infrastructure framework leveraging on healthy 
competition among national incumbent settlement infrastructures 
and new pan-European competitors.  
Europe should continue to work to ensure stability without 
compromising the high-level goal of greater integration through 
competition at pan-European level, and a common market 
architecture with minimum standards through more effective 
ongoing supervision and enforcement. Any attempt by market 
operators to impede competition along the long value chain of 
financial market infrastructure on unfounded grounds should be 
considered an attack on the single market. However, it cannot be 
denied either that profitability will go down drastically for market 
infrastructures. Due to fiercer competition, revenues may go down 
even further, so – in order to remain commercially viable – they 
need to integrate their businesses vertically (greater consolidation 
among trading, clearing and settlement providers is already part of 
the process) and horizontally to create economies of scale (size) and 
scope (services).  
EMIR, in particular on the mandatory clearing side, has 
spurred a sea change, since a new market emerged for central 
clearing of hitherto bilaterally traded derivative contracts. Huge 
investments have been made and are still to come in clearing 
technology and value added services, which will bring important 
changes in the coming years. Existing CCPs will see huge 
opportunities for growth, and new ones can be expected to emerge. 
On the settlement side, free competition between CSDs may lead to 
further concentration and horizontal consolidation within the 
sector, as this is a scale business par excellence, but also to greater 
competition with specialised banks for the expansion of territory.  
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With growing concentration in the clearing and settlement 
sector, the task for macro and prudential supervisors will not 
become easier. However, as long as the regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks ensure that these integrated infrastructures are 
sufficiently interoperable, i.e. open at each key juncture of their 
value chain (trading, clearing and settlement), the process of ‘pan-
Europeanisation’ of the market infrastructure will continue and be 
beneficial for financial integration. Locking collateral and customers 
in vertical and non-interoperable market infrastructures may also 
have spillover effects on trading flows, by distorting flows from 
non-vertically integrated infrastructures. In the short term, this may 
generate predatory practices by vertically integrated and non-
interoperable market infrastructures to push infrastructures that are 
unable to ring-fence collateral pools with post-trading operations 
out of the market. This may drive further consolidation but with 
limited benefits in terms of efficiency as these pools of collateral will 
be unable (and unwilling) to interact.  
A problem on the supervisory side is the multiplicity of 
actors, with three different bodies in charge at European level alone: 
the ECB (and other central banks), ESMA and EBA, and with 
licensing and supervision still in the hands of local authorities, 
contrary to what was initially envisaged. With Banking Union, a 
more streamlined structure will be necessary, given also that it 
concerns only a few players, and of systemic importance. In 
addition, close cooperation between the two major European 
supervisors, the ECB and the Bank of England, will be required, in 
the form of a MoU to structure control, as was done for CCPs after 
the EU Court decision on the location of CCPs. 
Finally, more light should be shed on the implications of 
market infrastructure regulation on the availability of collateral 
(total volumes), and in particular on the possibility for this collateral 
and assets, if segregated in individual client accounts by CCPs and 
for settlement and custody by CSDs, to be reused for other purposes 
(‘re-hypothecation’) or to limit its reuse by the 
infrastructure/intermediary. Securities lending and repo markets in 
Europe have topped out, following our prudent estimate, at more 
82  SOLIDIFYING DERIVATIVE MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURES 
 
than €6 trillion.50 In the end, much will also depend on how each 
CCP will draft the “right of use” policy of the collateral, in line with 
the guidelines set by Art. 47 on the investment policy of a CCP (and 
Art. 52.1 on risk management procedures with interoperability 
agreements). The entire financial system depends on the integrity 
and turnover of collateral channels (Sissoko, 2011; Singh & Stella, 
2012), on which the market has leveraged and grown so rapidly in 
the last decade. Any change that generates indirect effects on the 
architecture of the financial system should be subject to thorough 
investigation and a testing period to assess potential unintended 
effects and new sources of systemic risk. 
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5. NEW CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS: 
BASEL III IMPLEMENTATION IN 
EU LAW* 
he new bank capital requirements serve as the centrepiece of 
the post-crisis regulatory set-up, at global as well as EU level, 
but they are also the most complex part of it – and possibly 
excessively so. The EU capital rules build on what has been 
designed by an international committee, the Basel Committee, since 
the late 1980s, and have been adapted to the European 
circumstances. But compared to earlier versions, CRR/CRD IV 
contains real harmonisation, compared to previous attempts which 
left far too much leeway to the member states and to the banks. The 
loopholes in Basel II were called “one of the major factors of the 
crisis” by Mario Draghi, in his former capacity as Chairman of the 
Financial Stability Board.51 
During the financial crisis, the losses of many banks wiped 
out their total capital base, even though the latter had been above 
the amount required by regulation. Figure 5 shows the annual 
returns as a share of risk-weighted assets for the top percentiles of 
the largest European banks during the crisis years, also subdivided 
according to business model. In more than one in 100 bank-year 
observations, the single-year losses were for all banks more than the 
total capital the banks were required to hold. In particular, the losses 
of the top percentiles of the banks focusing on retail activities and 
the banks conducting more investment activities were substantial. 
                                                        
* This chapter was drafted with the useful help of Willem Pieter De Groen. 
51 In his remarks at the Conference on Financial Integration and Stability, 
organised by the European Commission and the ECB, Brussels, 2 May 2011 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/economic_analysis/conference201105
02_en.htm). 
T
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Figure 5. Return on risk-weighted assets (top percentiles) 
 
Note: This figure depicts the return on risk-weighted assets (RoRWA) of the top 
percentiles (1st, 5th, and 10th) for the 147 largest and most systemic banks in 
the EU and Norway for the period 2006-13. The dotted lines show the minimum 
regulatory requirements under CRD IV, common equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
requirement of 4.5% and total capital ratio (TCR) requirement of 8% 
respectively.  
Source: Ayadi & De Groen (2014). 
Basel III should reduce the likelihood of a bank default, while 
the resolution mechanisms should reduce the costs to taxpayers of 
a bank default. Basel III is a regime change as compared to Basel II, 
as it tightens the definition of capital and requires capital buffers 
and add-ons for large systemically important banks, and macro-
prudential buffers. Basel III also not only targets solvency, but also 
liquidity. But one important part was not modified, the risk-
weighting of assets, and the related internal models to calculate risk 
weights, meaning that an important advantage remains for large 
banks. Another change compared to the previous translation of the 
Basel agreements in EU legislation is in the method of 
harmonisation. Most of the EU rules are now packed in a directly 
applicable regulation (CRR), rather than in a directive (CRD IV), 
which is transposed in national law. In response to the financial 
crisis, member states agreed on a ‘single rulebook’, meaning that 
exactly the same rules should apply all across the EU, and that 
loopholes as a result of differences in interpretation should be 
TCR CET1 
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banned. This has added an additional level of complexity in the 
technical standard setting, which is still an ongoing process. 
The EU is the only jurisdiction fully ‘codifying’ Basel III for 
application and implementation in the national law of 31 states, 
whose financial systems collectively represent over 40% of global 
banking assets. Other jurisdictions leave this responsibility mostly 
to the discretion of national supervisory authorities. EU-licensed 
banks may thus feel more constrained than their counterparties in 
third countries. 
This chapter starts with an explanation of the structure of 
CRR/CRD IV, followed by the focal elements: capital requirements, 
liquidity rules and reporting requirements. 
5.1 Structure of CRR and CRD IV 
CRR/CRD IV is hugely complex, composed of a Regulation 
containing 521 articles and four annexes and a Directive consisting 
of 165 articles and one annex. Its size alone makes it a monster. The 
Regulation addresses elements that must be harmonised at EU level, 
whereas the Directive deals with elements, including capital 
buffers, on which member states can have leeway (see Table 4). Both 
make ample references to secondary law, which have kept the EBA 
busy since the adoption of both measures in 2013. 
Table 4. Comparison of CRR/CRD IV 
CRR (R=Regulation) CRD (D=Directive) 
Definitions Authorisation 
Scope Competences of supervisors 
Definition of capital Sanctions 
Solvency requirements Governance 
Large exposures Remuneration 
Retention requirements Consolidation supervision 
Liquidity coverage ratio Pillar II 
Leverage ratio Capital buffer provisions 
Disclosure (‘Pillar III’)  
Transitional arrangements   
Source: DNB (2013). 
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The Regulation covers those prudential requirements for 
banks that need to be uniform across the EU to ensure a level 
playing field. CRR Recital 9 reads: “In order to avoid market 
distortions and regulatory arbitrage, prudential minimum 
requirements should therefore ensure maximum harmonisation”, 
meaning that the minimum requirements shall be absolutely the 
same across member states. However, this does not stop individual 
institutions from having a higher level of own funds (Art. 3). The 
CRR sets the definition and composition of Common Equity Tier 1, 
Tier 1 and total capital, the leverage ratio and the capital 
requirements for credit risk under the different approaches. The 
Regulation further describes the standardised and internal ratings-
based approach, with the risk-weightings according to external 
credit ratings or internal assessments, and the definitions of and 
exceptions to large exposures and the liquidity coverage ratio, and 
the disclosure of all this to the public. 
The Directive addresses authorisation and the powers of 
home- and host-country authorities, governance requirements for 
banks and the thorny issue of remuneration, supervisory powers 
and review, consolidation, initial capital of banks and investment 
firms, capital buffers, including the capital conservation buffer, the 
institutions-specific countercyclical buffer, the globally systemically 
important institution buffer (G-SII), the other systemically 
important institution buffer (O-SII) and the systemic risk (or macro-
prudential) buffer. Hence whereas the definition of capital is part of 
the regulation, the levels of capital are part of the directive. Member 
states can therefore decide to set higher capital requirements. 
The Regulation and Directive delegate many tasks to the 
standard setters, to be confirmed by the European Commission in 
secondary legislation. CRR and CRD IV are complemented by no 
fewer than 49 Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) and 26 
Implementing Technical Standards (ITS), issued in 2013-15.  
5.2 Capital 
CRD IV is a radical change as compared to CRD I, not only in the 
level of capital, but also in its definition. What has not changed is 
the denominator, as the assets remain risk-weighted, with no or 
limited risk weights for crucial asset classes. A leverage ratio 
remains optional for the time being. 
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Table 5. CRR/CRD IV capital and liquidity ratios 
Ratios (Minimum) 
Rate 
Imple-
mented 
Calibration 
Capital ratios    
Leverage ratio 3% 2018 Tier 1 capital/ 
Total exposure 
(On- and off-balance 
sheet assets) 
Risk-adjusted capital 
ratios 
   
Common Equity Tier 
1 capital (CET1) ) 
ratio 
4.5% 2018 CET1/ 
Risk-weighted exposure 
Tier 1 capital ratio 6% 2018 Tier 1 capital 
(CET1 + Additional Tier 
1 capital)/Risk-weighted 
exposure 
Total capital ratio  8% 2018 Own funds (Tier 1 + Tier 
2)/ 
Risk-weighted exposure 
Capital buffers (1 to 3 
are cumulative) 
   
Capital conservation 
buffer 
2.5% 2019 Additional CET1 ratio 
Countercyclical 
capital buffer 
0-2.5% 2019 Additional CET1 ratio 
G-SII and O-SII 
capital buffer 
0-2-3.5% 2016 Additional CET1 ratio 
Systemic risk buffer  0-3-5% 2015 Additional CET1 times 
exposure to which risk 
buffer applies 
Liquidity ratios    
Liquidity coverage 
ratio (LCR) 
100% 2018 High quality liquid 
assets/  
Net liquidity outflows in 
30-dayperiod 
Net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR) 
100% 2018 Available stable funding 
/ Required stable 
funding 
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Although the basic minimum remains the same as in CRD I – 
8% of Tier 1 and 2 – the definition of capital was tightened, and 
countercyclical and several other buffers were added, most 
importantly for large banks (G-SII and O-SII). This means that as a 
result of the bank or country specific capital requirement, the 
requirement could easily be double the 8%. Table 5 provides a 
complete overview of the capital and liquidity ratios that have been 
included in the EU implementation of Basel III. The Common 
Equity Tier 1 capital (CET1) is the purest form of capital (retained 
earnings and capital stock). The required level of CET1 increased 
from 2% under CRD I to 4.5% under CRD IV. Together with the 
additional Tier 1 capital, e.g. convertible capital instruments, CET1 
forms the total going concern capital. The Tier 1 requirement has 
been increased, too, from 4% under CRD I to 6% under CRD IV. 
In addition to going concern capital, the total regulatory 
capital ratio contains gone concern capital, i.e. Tier 2 capital. 
Whereas the definition of capital was tightened, the basic minimum 
of the total capital ratio remains the same at 8%. Countercyclical and 
several other buffers were added, most importantly for large banks 
(G-SIIs and O-SIIs). The buffers, which are mostly cumulative, are: 
● Capital conservation buffer: Member states shall require 
institutions to maintain an additional capital conservation 
buffer of CET1) capital equal to 2.5% of their total risk 
exposure. Small and medium-sized investment firms may be 
exempted, but the Commission, EBA and European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB)  need to be notified (CRD IV, Art. 129). 
● Countercyclical capital buffer: Member states shall require 
institutions to maintain an additional countercyclical buffer 
of CET1 capital equal to up to 2.5% of their total risk exposure. 
Small and medium-sized investment firms may be exempted, 
but the Commission, EBA and ESRB need to be notified (CRD 
IV, Arts 130 and 136). 
● Systemically important institutions buffer 
o G-SII buffer: Member states can require global 
systemically important institutions (G-SII)  to maintain 
an additional capital buffer of CET1 capital equal to up 
to 3.5 % of their total risk exposure (from 1% for the 
lowest sub-category to 3.5% for the highest) (CRD IV, 
Art. 131). The G-SII identification is aligned with the 
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Financial Stability Board (FSB)  framework for global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs). 
o O-SII buffer: Member states can require other 
systemically important institutions (O-SII) to maintain 
an additional capital buffer of CET1 capital equal to up 
to 2% of their total risk exposure. The Commission, the 
ESRB and EBA need to be notified about the buffer 
(CRD IV, Art. 131). The identification of G-SIIs and O-
SIIs will be reviewed annually. In case of overlaps 
between the two SII categories, the higher level will 
apply. 
● Systemic risk buffer: Member states can require institutions 
to maintain an additional capital buffer of CET1) capital equal 
to up to 5% of their total risk exposure (CRD IV, Art. 132). The 
risk buffer can apply to all exposures as well as to specific 
exposures. The Commission, the ESRB and EBA need to be 
notified about the buffer. For buffers in excess of 3%, the 
opinion of the Commission is required, taking into account 
the advice of the ESRB and EBA. When in agreement, the EU 
Commission shall then adopt an implementing act 
authorising the buffer (CRD IV, Art. 133, 12-15). When an 
institution is subject to both SII and systemic risk buffers, in 
principle the higher applies. Only when the systemic risk 
buffer for macro-prudential risks  does not apply to exposures 
outside the member state is it cumulative to the SII buffers.   
The capital conservation, countercyclical and G-SII buffers are 
similar to what is contained in the Basel III Accord; the O-SII and 
systemic risk buffers  only apply in the EU. In addition, member 
states can also adopt macro-prudential measures, which can include 
the level of own fund requirements or a systemic risk buffer, but 
also other elements, such as changes in the risk weights and 
exposure limits (CRR, Art. 458) . Such measures can only be adopted 
if not rejected by the EU Council (CRR, Art. 459). 
What remains surprising from level playing field perspective 
is that the requirements to set institution-specific capital and 
systemic risk buffers  are fully left to the member states (CRD IV, 
Arts 128-140) , as are the requirements to set macro-prudential 
buffers (CRR, Art. 458). In the EU context, such capacity should 
have been left to a central authority, such as EBA, or the ECB in the 
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context of the Banking Union. It is only in exceptional circumstances 
that they need to be authorised by the EU Council. 
The capital requirements for banks have thus increased 
importantly, which was one obvious lesson of the financial crisis: 
they should have been higher. This can already be noticed from the 
available data. Figure 6 shows a gradual increase in the Tier 1 ratios 
from 2008 onwards. 
Figure 6. Evolution of Tier 1 capital ratios 
 
Note: The amounts expressed in the figure are median values of Tier 1 capital 
ratios, Tier 1 capital as percentage of risk-weighted assets.   
Source: Ayadi & De Groen (2014). 
All the binding capital ratios and buffers remain risk-
weighted. A weakness thereby is that a preferential risk weight 
applies to some assets under the standardised ratings-based (SRB) 
approach. For example, the risk weight for government bonds is 0%, 
whereas reduced risk-weightings apply for mortgage debt 
depending on the level of collateral, and for loans to small and 
medium-sized enterprise (SME)  the risk weights are multiplied by 
a factor 0.7619. The exposures to governments are further amplified 
due to an exemption from the large exposures limitation. Hence, 
CRD IV puts a €150-million, or 25% of own funds, cap on exposures 
to a single debtor. Government debt denominated in national 
currency, however, is excluded from the scope of these 
requirements. The largest euro area banks held at the end of 2013 
government debt equivalent to about twice their own funds, of 
which almost 60% was debt from home-country governments (De 
Groen, 2015).   
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The banks can also choose to use the internal ratings-based 
(IRB) approach, an option used especially by the larger banks. This 
approach provides banks the possibility to use internal models to 
calibrate the probabilities of default and loss-given default, which 
form the foundation for the risk weights. The risk-weighted assets 
calibration is more costly under the IRB approach, i.e. in addition to 
the development and maintenance the internal models, additional 
reporting is required. These costs, however, are more than 
compensated by the reduction in capital charge-related costs. Banks 
need to require permission from the competent authority before 
they can use the IRB approach (CRR, Art. 143).  
A major problem for supervisors is the erosion of risk-
weighted assets under the internal ratings-based approach, and the 
differences applied by large banks in the risk weights for assets. For 
large banks, the EU average risk-weighting of assets is 33%, while 
in the US it is about 58%. This means that for these EU banks assets 
can be risk-weighted at one-third of the standard rule of 8% capital 
to total assets. A review by the Basel Committee found that internal 
risk weights for credit risk in the banking book vary significantly 
across banks, variations that are not necessarily supported by 
differences in underlying assets.  
Capital ratios vary by as much as 1.5 to 2 percentage points in 
either direction around the 10% benchmark as a result of different 
practices (Basel Committee, 2013). The culprits of this situation are 
EU-based banks, accounting for over 40% of global bank assets, 
which can continue to be more or less ‘compliant’ with the Basel 
framework, while on average being highly leveraged. The average 
leverage ratio for large euro area banks was about 3.2%, or one 
percentage point below large US-based banks, even on a 
comparable IFRS basis (ECB, 2013, p. 39).  
In addition, most EU-based banks that use the IRB approach, 
apply it to only part of their portfolio, invoking the ‘permanent 
partial use’, whereby they may request to follow rules of the 
standardised approach for certain exposures. Most notable are the 
zero risk-weighted government bond exposures (CRR, Arts 149-
150). The EU regulation thus allows banks to ‘cherry-pick’ how they 
measure their risk: for sovereign exposure, banks can use the 
standardised approach, which assigns a risk of zero to all 
government bonds of euro area countries if they are denominated 
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in euro (Gros, 2013). Another crucial exemption to the capital rules 
relates to bank insurance groups. The rules allow banks not to 
deduct from their common equity participations in insurance 
undertakings, under certain conditions (CRR, Art. 471).  
Figure 7. Relationship between Z-score on distance to default and RWA 
 
Notes: The axes have been cut at a Z-score of 1 to 100 and RWA to total assets 
to make it easier to visualise the large majority of the observations. 
Source: Ayadi & De Groen (2014). 
Notwithstanding the strengthening of the capital 
requirements, the calibration of the risk-weighted assets has not 
changed under CRD IV. Das & Sy (2012), for example, show that 
banks with lower average risk weights are not predicting well the 
market risk measures. Moreover, using the Z-score distance to 
default measure as an indicator for underlying risks reveals a 
misalignment with the risk-weighted assets. As shown in Figure 7 
there seems to be no clear relation between the Z-score and the 
average risk-weighted assets. Using a multivariate regression finds 
that the relation is especially distorted for the banks that are more 
involved in financial markets activities and inter-bank activities 
(Ayadi et al., 2011 and 2014). 
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The only non-risk weighted ratio that is part of CRD IV is the 
leverage ratio, which is not binding for the time being. The CRR sets 
the way of calculating the ratio for reporting purposes, but does not 
make it obligatory, nor does it set a floor (CRR, Art. 429). This is left 
to an EBA report to be finalised by October 2016, which could be 
accompanied by a legislative proposal (CRR, Art. 450). 
5.3 Liquidity 
The rules on a minimum liquidity buffer to cope with (deposit) 
outflows are another important novelty of Basel III. Although banks 
are known for their maturity mismatch, prior legislation did not 
take into account the liquidity shortage that could trigger defaults. 
The new rules define liquid asset classes and set a minimum level. 
Under the former regime, no well-defined rules existed on liquidity, 
neither at global nor EU level. Under CRD I, it was left to the host 
country to set liquidity requirements, including for branches of 
other member states’ banks, and was a matter of supervisory 
discretion.  
The new rules on liquidity are contained in Art. 510 of the 
CRR, and were further detailed by an EBA Implementing Technical 
Standard (ITS). They require the holding of liquid to high-quality 
liquid assets (HQLA) to cover stressed conditions over a period of 
30 days. The asset classes are subdivided in three categories: Level 
1 (0% haircut): coins and bank notes, central bank reserves, 0% risk 
weighted (RW) debt securities issued or guaranteed by public 
entities, certain non-0% RW sovereign debt or central bank 
obligations issued in the country in which the liquidity risk is taken; 
Level 2A (15% haircut): 20% RW debt securities issued or 
guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs, supranationals or 
MDBs, corporate debt securities rated at least AA and covered 
bonds not issued by the bank itself or any of its affiliates and rated 
AA minimum; Level 2B (25% to 50% haircut): certain residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)  rated AA or higher, corporate 
debt securities rated A+ to BBB and unencumbered equities.   
5.4 Reporting 
The regulation also introduces reporting standards, which must 
reduce the information gap or so-called ‘information asymmetry’ 
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between the bank and its supervisors. Financial reporting consists 
of the financial reporting for supervisory purposes known as 
FINREP, which is complemented by the reporting for capital 
requirements and own funds known as COREP. The reporting 
standards are designed by EBA under the various delegated acts, 
which have contributed to the harmonisation of definitions and 
methodologies. However, differences in accounting standards, as 
the basis for supervisory reporting, and in the enforcement of these 
standards persists. The majority of the directly supervised banks are 
reporting in IFRS, while some non-listed banks report in local and 
US GAAP, which can result in differences that make the data 
incomparable. The difference in the level of total assets under 
different accounting standards has, for instance, an impact on the 
leverage ratio as well as on the calibration of other micro- and 
macro-regulatory requirements. The accounting standards within 
the EU have converged in the past few years, at least for listed firms, 
while the talks between EU and US authorities to make IFRS and US 
GAAP compatible are stuck. 
Besides reporting to the supervisor on the different regulatory 
capital and liquidity ratios, banks are also obliged to disclose 
additional information fields that seemingly have little to do with 
prudential affairs, e.g. tax and subsidy allocation as well as 
remuneration, to the public. The objective of the members of 
parliament who mainly pushed for the reporting on taxation and 
remuneration is to discipline the banks by granting the public the 
possibility to spot tax avoidance and excessive remuneration. The 
remuneration is further restricted by a cap on bank bonuses. The 
variable part of the remuneration is in principle limited at 100% of 
the fixed part. Only if shareholders agree can the ceiling be doubled 
to 200% (CRD IV, Art. 94). On the other hand, some member states 
have decided to apply more stringent requirements to the relative 
share of variable remuneration. For example, the Netherlands 
applies a cap of 20%. 
5.5 Conclusions 
The new EU bank capital framework substantially increases capital 
charges for banks, and above all for large banks. The paradigm has 
shifted: today, the larger the bank, the higher the level of capital. 
Formerly, this relationship was the reverse. Basel II was thus 
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corrected for one of its important weaknesses, which had 
considerably contributed to the financial crisis. But two caveats 
remain: 1) the ratio is based upon a risk-weighting of assets, 
whereby under external models limited or no risk-weighting 
applies to important asset classes, and internal models are still 
allowed, although their robustness is questionable; 2) the capital 
buffers for large and systemically important banks are decided by 
the member states, who can still favour national champions. Hence 
much will depend on the consistent implementation to ensure the 
robustness of the new framework.  
The new capital framework is furthermore composed of a 
host of measures, and also exemptions, which make the rules 
extremely complex to implement, raising the question of whether a 
simpler set of rules would have been preferable. The introduction 
of a leverage ratio by 2018 should allow for a simpler metric to judge 
banks’ soundness. But a further streamlining of the rules, and a 
reduction of the exemptions, should be a priority in view of a more 
integrated banking market. 
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6. THE ECB AS BANK SUPERVISOR 
UNDER THE SINGLE 
SUPERVISORY MECHANISM* 
nstitutionally, the biggest change brought about by the financial 
and economic crisis was the decision to centralise banking 
supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB) . 
This seemed new in 2012, but the issue had actually been widely 
debated in the run-up to and during the first years of monetary 
union, as the possibility had already been foreseen in the Maastricht 
Treaty. The ECB, especially its Executive Board member Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa, had also pushed for it, but the EU finance 
ministers thought differently, until the decentralised structure of 
supervision in the EU proved untenable.52 
Politically, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was 
packaged under the Banking Union project, which was proposed in 
the Four Presidents Report, led by European Council President Van 
Rompuy (June 2012).53 The two other Banking Union pillars are a 
resolution mechanism and a deposit insurance scheme that are 
discussed in the next chapter.  
A banking union can be defined as a fully integrated bank 
regulatory and supervisory system within a federal structure. 
Supervision is denationalised, in that its form becomes exactly the 
same and is neutral with respect to the nationality of the bank. 
Banking unions exist today in other federations, such as in Canada, 
the US, Australia and even Germany and Switzerland. It is worth 
recalling that in these federations other elements of financial 
                                                        
* This chapter is a revised and updated version of Lannoo (2014). 
52 See e.g. the speech by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa on EMU and banking 
supervision (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999) and the ECB paper (ECB, 2001). 
53 Van Rompuy et al. (2012). 
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supervision, such as the supervision of securities markets and 
insurance companies, or the taxation of firms and financial 
products, are not necessarily unified. Full federal supervision of 
banks does not mean that lower-level authorities no longer exercise 
competences, as is exemplified in the US.  
In the EU model, a banking union, further to the Eurozone 
Council decision of June 2012, was formed on the basis of Art. 127(6) 
of the EU Treaty (TFEU). Hence, supervision moved to the ECB only 
for banks licensed in the eurozone, as that article is only applicable 
to those countries that are part of the EMU, not to the countries that 
have a derogation or a special status within the EU.  
Art. 127.6 (TFEU) reads: 
The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance 
with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, 
and after consulting the European Parliament and the 
European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and other 
financial institutions with the exception of insurance 
undertakings. 
This language is repeated in Art. 25 of the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB) Statute. 
The Regulation implementing the SSM was adopted in 
October 2013 and formed the basis for the ECB to start as banking 
supervisor in November 2014. This chapter discusses the key 
aspects of the SSM: its composition and operational structure, the 
supervisory reporting and division of labour between the ECB and 
national authorities, the European Banking Authority (EBA)  and 
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).  
6.1 The basis: The SSM Regulation 
The SSM Regulation is a relatively straightforward piece of EU 
legislation implementing Art. 127(6) of the EU Treaty. It supersedes 
the home/host-country distinction and entrusts to the ECB 
authorisation and supervision of the systemic and largest credit 
institutions of each of the eurozone countries and of the countries 
that choose to opt in to the SSM. It defines supervision, mandates 
cooperation between the ECB and the national competent 
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authorities (NCAs), the other European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs)  and the ESRB. It allows the ECB to enact regulations and 
guidelines to carry out the tasks set out in the SSM Regulation. For 
those credit institutions in the eurozone where the ECB is not in 
charge of direct supervision, the regulation maintains the 
home/host-country system (Art. 17) but mandates close 
cooperation with and reporting to the ECB. It also allows the ECB to 
take over supervision of those institutions at any time (Art. 6.5b). 
The SSM only covers prudential supervision. The regulation 
states clearly that those “supervisory tasks not conferred on the ECB 
should remain with the national authorities” (Recital 28). Nor are 
accounting standards harmonised by the Regulation (Recital 19). In 
addition, capital buffers and macro-prudential  measures remain 
the primary responsibility of the member states, as further to the 
capital requirements Directive (CRD IV), implementing Basel III, 
although the ECB is allowed to apply higher buffers (Art. 5.1-2).  
Soon after publication of the SSM Regulation, the ECB 
published a list of the 130 institutions falling under its direct 
supervision, and announced a comprehensive assessment of these 
institutions, as foreseen in Art. 33.4, “prior to assuming its new 
supervisory tasks in November 2014” (see Figure 18). This list 
included all banks that the ECB believed could be regarded as 
significant at that time, when the methodology to determine 
significance had not been finalised. This comprised an asset quality 
review (AQR) and a stress test. The intention of the exercise was to 
increase transparency, build confidence and repair the banking 
system where necessary, requiring corrective measures from the 
banks. The Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital was used as a 
benchmark, with a threshold level of 8% for the AQR and baseline 
scenario of the stress test, and 5.5% for the adverse scenario. In total, 
25 banks failed at least one part of the test, in total falling €24.6 
billion short (see ECB, 2014e). Due to capital measures taken earlier 
in 2014 and restructuring arrangements agreed with the European 
Commission, only eight of the banks still had to raise in total €6 
billion in the period up to July 2015. 
The list was later narrowed down to 120 banking groups, the 
‘significant’ banks, accounting for almost 85% of total banking 
assets in the euro area, and published jointly with the list of ‘less 
significant’ banks on 4 September 2014. The list illustrates the huge 
102  THE ECB AS BANK SUPERVISOR UNDER THE SSM 
 
diversity of banking models and structures in Europe, with France 
having four large banks with assets in excess of €1 trillion, 
compared to only one in Germany (see Figure 8). But the latter 
country has a long list of less significant banks.  
Figure 8. Distribution of assets of the 10 largest banks supervised by the 
ECB in five countries, 2013 
 
Source: CEPS. 
The diversity is also clear from a distinction on the basis of 
ownership (see Figure 9). The single largest group are public limited 
or commercial banks (SHV). This group accounts for about two-
fifths of the banks supervised by the ECB, including subsidiaries of 
both EEA non-SSM and non-EEA banks. Cooperative and savings 
banks each represent almost one-fifth of the banks supervised by 
the ECB. The third group, accounting for the remaining fifth, are 
public banks and banks nationalised during the crisis. This diversity 
highlights what a challenge the ECB has in putting in place an 
“independent, intrusive and forward-looking supervision”, in the 
words of Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism, writing in the SSM’s first Annual 
Report (ECB, 2015).  
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Figure 9. Banks supervised by the ECB by type of ownership 
 
Source: CEPS configuration based on financial statements from banks under the 
SSM. 
6.2 The SSM operational structure 
Merging 18 different supervisory authorities into one operational 
structure is a monumental task. Not only does it pose pure 
operational challenges, but also political and cultural ones. It is not 
unprecedented in the history of European integration – the start of 
monetary union in 1994 with the European Monetary Institute was 
a comparable effort – but the lead time was much longer, in the 
context of a smaller EU and EMU. The SSM’s first Annual Report 
gives a good overview of the operational challenges (ECB, 2015). 
The central elements of the SSM operational structure are the 
Supervisory Board and the Joint Supervisory Teams. The 
Supervisory Board is composed of a chair, a vice-chair, four ECB 
representatives, the representatives of all of the NCAs and the 
eventual opt-ins, which have equal voting rights. The Supervisory 
Board, however, is subordinate to the ECB’s Governing Council, 
which has ultimate decision-making power, and in which the opt-
ins are not represented. The concerns of the opt-ins may thus not be 
sufficiently taken into account. An appeals process is foreseen in a 
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decision by the ECB’s Governing Council for opt-ins, but they do 
not have a full say. 
Opt-ins have an additional disadvantage, i.e. they cannot take 
part in the liquidity-providing operations of the ECB, unless they 
have substantial operations and collateral in the eurozone. 
Moreover, as long as the opt-ins are not part of the euro area, the 
risk that they may opt out again will hinder their financial 
institutions. Hence, even if the facility of opting in to the SSM is a 
good way to bridge the gap between the ins and the outs, the 
playing field remains uneven.  
The Supervisory Board is assisted by a Steering Committee, 
which is responsible for preparing its meetings. The Supervisory 
Board has a more limited composition and follows a rotational 
system, to ensure a balanced composition of NCAs. But it has no 
formal decision-making capacity. 
The Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs) should be the big game 
changer of the SSM. These teams are in charge of the day-to-day 
supervision of those banks that are the responsibility of the ECB. 
They are composed of ECB and NCA representatives. They replace, 
at least for the SSM, the function of the Colleges of Supervisors of 
banks active exclusively in SSM countries, and should ensure a 
more balanced, more efficient and less biased supervision of cross-
border banks. Their size and composition varies depending upon 
the supervised institutions.  
The chair as well as the core team (except sub-coordinators) 
are part of the ECB staff, and the full team are a combination of local 
and international staff from the ECB and NCAs. The chair cannot 
come from the same country as the home country of the bank. 
He/she can delegate specific tasks and liaise with sub-coordinators 
of the NCAs. The SSM Regulation states that the “exchange and 
secondment of staff should establish a common supervisory 
culture”, on which the ECB should report on a regular basis (Recital 
79). Danièle Nouy, Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board, announced 
further details of the JSTs on 30 September 2014: “We will be a truly 
pan-European supervisor operating without national bias or 
prejudice.” For example, she indicated that Crédit Agricole’s chief 
supervisor will be a German national, Unicredit’s French and ABN 
AMRO’s Spanish.  
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The composition of the JSTs was further detailed in the April 
2014 ECB Regulation and in the September 2014 Banking 
Supervision Guide (see Figure 10). These documents state that the 
ECB is in charge of the establishment and the composition of JSTs, 
and that it can modify the appointments made by NCAs (Art. 4, ECB 
Regulation). JSTs are appointed for a period of three to five years, 
depending on the risk profile and complexity of the institution. JST 
coordinators and members are expected to rotate on a regular basis. 
The challenge is to acquire the necessary expertise about the 120 
banks in the ECB, compose balanced and competent teams, make 
the JSTs work effectively together, and avoid duplication of effort 
between the NCAs. The human resource management skills of the 
ECB are thus be crucial.  
Figure 10. Organisational pyramid of the Joint Supervisory Teams 
 
Source: ECB (2014c), “Guide to Banking Supervision”, p. 16. 
Whereas supervisory colleges were already multinational, the 
big change for the SSM is the single centre, the ECB. Previously, the 
home country was in charge of final supervision, with reporting 
lines from host-country authorities that EU-wide resembled a 
spaghetti. Under the new model, the ECB appoints the members of 
the Supervisory College and serves as chair for the banks for which 
it acts as consolidating supervisor. The members from NCAs within 
the SSM can participate as observers. For significant banks from 
outside the SSM, the ECB participates in the College as member, and 
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the NCAs as observers (Art. 10, ECB Regulation). The challenge is 
to make the transition to the new structure as fluid as possible, 
avoiding abrupt changes and the imposition of too many new 
requirements on banks, in order to achieve the ultimate goal: 
adequate supervision. 
A key element for the JSTs and the SSM is the language 
regime. As a general rule, the supervised entities may address the 
ECB in any one of the official languages of the EU. Decisions 
addressed to supervised entities are adopted in English and the 
official language of the home member state. The ECB nevertheless 
allows banks to use only one official EU language in their written 
communications, including with regard to ECB supervisory 
decisions (Art. 24, ECB Regulation). For communications between 
the ECB and the NCAs, English is used as a rule, although it is not 
the standard for most NCAs and supervisors in the member states, 
and presents a big challenge for the functioning of the JST, as an 
enormous amount of relevant information on the supervised 
entities is available only in the national language.  
With a view to ensuring a fluid transition, the ECB will need 
to be pragmatic, with core documents in English, and supporting 
documents in the home-country language of the bank. This means 
that most banks in the SSM, of which only two countries use English 
as the official language (Ireland and Malta), need to move to dual-
language documentation, which is a huge challenge. But once the 
system becomes truly functional, it will be a big step forward 
towards a common supervisory culture and equally for a common 
understanding of reporting and data.  
The costs incurred by the ECB for the SSM and its supervisory 
activities are paid for by contributions from all the SSM banks, 
following the SSM Regulation (Art. 30). The ECB estimated that this 
amounts to about €260 million for 2015. A draft paper was 
circulated, setting out the methodology for calculating the 
contributions. This does not impact the respective national systems, 
where the cost of supervision is accounted for in different ways. 
Many banks thus end up paying over and above the national 
contributions. 
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6.3 Common definitions for supervisory reporting 
and data processing 
A prerequisite for an SSM and the JSTs are common definitions for 
supervisory reporting and an integrated IT infrastructure. Here, the 
ECB can build on the work undertaken jointly with the EBA in 
recent years. But unravelling and assessing the progress achieved in 
this domain is not a trivial task and challenges remain. In addition, 
as supervisory reporting is related to financial reporting and to the 
IT framework used, allegiance to this framework must be 
maintained to avoid duplication and confusion.  
Harmonised reporting requirements are required by CRD IV, 
but work on the subject started well before, with the financial 
reporting (FINREP)  and common reporting (COREP) work of the 
EBA and its predecessor CEBS in 2006. FINREP introduces 
standardised data formats and definitions for financial reporting for 
prudential purposes, which use International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) templates. This is complemented by COREP for 
reporting of the capital adequacy and own funds ratios, as set 
forward in CRD IV. The aim is to provide supervisors with all 
relevant information on the financial institutions’ risk exposure, as 
well as their capital and liquidity positions. COREP and FINREP use 
Extended Business Reporting Language (XBRL) that sets a common 
taxonomy for financial reporting, compatible with IFRS.  
Initially, the supervisory reporting framework gave too much 
flexibility to national supervisors, as it was too accommodating to 
the different national reporting formats, which was clear from the 
huge number of cells through which banks could report core (1,277 
cells) and detailed (21,606 cells) prudential information. The 
maximum number of cells that banks could be asked to use was 
about 18,000, as not all information was applicable to all banks at 
the same time (CEBS, 2006). On top of that, COREP and FINREP 
were implemented to varying degrees across member states (see 
ECB, 2010, p. 62). 
The financial crisis, CRD IV and the advent of the SSM 
galvanised an in-depth review of COREP and FINREP, which led to 
the Commission Implementing Regulation No. 680/2014 on 
supervisory reporting. But it also contained an extension towards 
large exposures, leverage, liquidity, stable funding, asset 
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encumbrance, forbearance and non-performing exposures. The 
Regulation uses a Data Point Model to reconcile different reporting 
frameworks with their respective IT solutions, with a view towards 
avoiding unjustified implementation and operating costs, so as to 
ensure that the different IT solutions in place produce harmonised 
data as well as reliable data quality. The 2014 Supervisory Reporting 
Regulation follows maximum harmonisation, and has not reduced 
the number of reporting cells, but made the data formats identical 
across member states.  
But much of this remains work in progress. Amendments 
were proposed in July 2014 to the 2014 Supervisory Reporting 
Regulation covering non-performing exposures (NPE) and 
forbearance. A non-performing exposure is defined as every 
material exposure that is 90 days past due even if it is not recognised 
as in default or impaired. But this does not impact the payment 
cycles in EU member states, which vary widely (from one to four 
months). In August 2014, the EBA also published a new XBRL 
taxonomy to be used by competent authorities for remittance of data 
under the EBA Implementing Technical Standards (ITS)  on 
supervisory reporting. It replaces the existing one that was released 
in September 2013. 
The ECB’s October 2014 Asset Quality Review used the latest 
definitions on NPE of the EBA, resulting in a much higher level of 
NPE provisions than before. Overall, 28% of the banks used an NPE 
definition that was less conservative than the AQR, compared to 
15% that used a more conservative definition, leading to an increase 
of €55 billion on the NPE book. This added up to €81 billion as a 
consequence of the credit file review in the context of the AQR, 
resulting in an additional €136 billion in provisions. The overall 
increases among SSM debtor countries ranged from 7% to 116%, 
with the largest percentage increases for shipping finance, but in 
terms of volume, the most was for large SMEs and corporate 
finance, followed by real estate (ECB, 2014e, p. 67). 
The relationship with IFRS forms an additional difficulty that 
was clearly brought to the fore by the financial crisis (see Nouy, 
2014). The IFRS relies heavily on fair-value accounting, but this only 
provides useful information for certain liquid financial assets and 
liabilities. For various other items on a bank’s balance sheet, there is 
no market information. For these items, the use of fair value reduces 
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both the verifiability and comparability of the results. Second, 
accounting standards allow for a delayed recognition of credit 
losses on loans and debt instruments or ‘impairment charges’, as 
they require observable indicators that signal a default of the 
counterparty. Third, there was no accounting rule for off-balance 
sheet exposures, such as for Special Purpose Entities (SPEs). At the 
request of the G-20, the International Accounting Standards Board 
has already come up with improved rules on fair-value recognition 
and additional disclosure towards SPEs, and is working on a model 
for more timely recognition of credit losses. But a downside is the 
continued divergence between the EU and the US on global 
accounting rules.  
More will have to be done to maintain the link between IFRS 
and supervisory reporting. In a speech on accounting and financial 
reporting for central banks, Danielle Nouy asked standard setters to 
consider the financial stability implications of any revisions to 
existing accounting rules or when developing new ones and to 
identify, analyse and – where feasible – mitigate the potential pro-
cyclical effects of financial reporting. But, more important, she 
insisted that the ECB wanted to continue to use financial reporting 
standards as a basis for supervisory reporting (see Nouy, 2014). This 
has two important implications: i) internationally, progress must be 
achieved towards a single accounting standard, while improving 
the quality of the standards, and ii) within Europe, the use of IFRS 
must be broadened, which is not required for non-listed 
corporations, including many of the 120 banks the ECB supervises.  
The ECB therefore launched a consultation in October 2014 to 
extend the uniform supervisory financial reporting requirement 
(FINREP, based upon IFRS) to a significant number of supervised 
groups applying national generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP), taking proportionality into account. In the AQR, the ECB 
already made valuation adjustments for €4.6 billion to the banks 
supervised by the ECB as a result of the fair-value exposures review 
(ECB, 2014e, p. 93). This implies that the ECB de facto already started 
to apply one standard, even if the SSM Regulation explicitly states 
that accounting standards do not fall within its reach (Recital 19).  
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6.4 Supervisory tasks of the ECB and NCAs 
The split between the ECB and NCAs is twofold: the ECB supervises 
the significant institutions of the participating states of the SSM, and 
only in the prudential field. Supervision of the other institutions and 
the other tasks are left to the NCAs. Or to express the arrangement 
differently, the original EU form of supervision continues to apply 
where the ECB is not the supervisor, with the ordinary division of 
competences between home- and host-country supervisors. But 
some important exceptions to the ECB’s competences are set in CRD 
IV and the capital requirements Regulation (CRR), and in the draft 
‘Barnier’ proposals on the structure of banks. The ECB can mandate 
NCAs to cooperate closely with the ECB and override their 
decisions in its fields of competence, but evidence will need to 
indicate how this will function. This may even be more difficult 
towards the non-eurozone countries that opt-in to the SSM (see 
Table 6 for an overview of the relevant prudential supervisors for 
credit institutions and branches). 
The division of labour for ‘passporting’ between the ECB and the 
NCAs is a more complex process than indicated above, and was 
detailed in the ECB’s SSM Framework Regulation (April 2014) and 
the Guide to Banking Supervision (September 2014). The 
passporting procedure continues even for the significant banks to 
follow EU law, i.e. a bank wishing to provide services or to set up a 
branch in another SSM or non-SSM state needs to inform its NCA, 
who then informs the ECB (Arts 11-12, SSM Framework 
Regulation). For banks from non-participating states, the same 
applies. The ECB thus exercises the powers of the home- and host-
member state. One may wonder whether it still makes sense to 
maintain the detour of the notification to NCAs for significant banks 
within the eurozone. 
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Table 6. Relevant prudential supervisors for credit institutions/branches 
in the EEA 
Type of bank Area in which credit institution/branch is located 
Euro area Other EU Other EEA Third 
(SSM) SSM Non-SSM (Non-
SSM) 
(Non-
SSM) 
Parent credit institution domiciled in SSM area 
Significant 
(Group) 
ECB ECB .. .. .. 
- Subsidiary ECB ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Branch ECB ECB ECB ECB NCA 
Less 
significant 
(Group) 
NCA/ECB NCA/ECB .. .. .. 
- Subsidiary NCA/ECB NCA/ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Branch (F)NCA/ECB  (F)NCA/ECB FNCA/ECB FNCA/ECB NCA 
Parent credit institution domiciled in non-SSM EEA area 
Signif. & less-
signif. 
(Group) 
.. .. NCA NCA .. 
- Subsidiary 
(Signif.) 
ECB ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Subsidiary 
(Less-signif.) 
NCA/ECB NCA/ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Branch FNCA FNCA (F)NCA (F)NCA FNCA 
Parent credit institution domiciled in non-EEA area 
Signif. & less-
signif. 
(Group) 
.. .. .. .. NCA 
- Subsidiary 
(Signif.) 
ECB ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Subsidiary 
(Less-signif.) 
NCA/ECB NCA/ECB NCA NCA NCA 
- Branch .. .. .. .. NCA 
Notes: Significant institutions are credit institutions that have more than €30 billion 
in assets; represent more than 20% of GDP and at least €5 billion in assets; are among 
the three largest credit institutions in the member state; or have more than 
significant cross-border assets. The grey highlights the areas in which the SSM 
contributed to a change in supervision. NCA = national competent authority; FNCA 
= foreign national competent authority. 
Source: Author’s own compilation. 
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Although CRD IV was negotiated at the same time that the 
SSM initiative was launched, it leaves important prudential 
supervisory tasks explicitly to NCAs. CRD IV and the CRR make 
explicit reference to “Member States”, as compared to “competent 
authorities”, regarding the determination of capital buffers, macro-
prudential buffers  or the reduced weightings for mortgage debt. 
The requirements for setting institution-specific capital and 
systemic risk buffers  are fully left to the member states (CRD IV, 
Arts 128-140), as are the requirements for setting macro-prudential 
buffers (CRR, Art. 458). But the freedom left to member states is 
clearly defined, and the Council has the power to reject the 
proposed national macro-prudential measures in accordance with 
Article 291 TFEU (Implementing Acts), acting on a proposal by the 
Commission. 
Reduced risk-weightings for mortgage debt apply under the 
external ratings-based or standardised approach of Basel II (CRD 
IV, Art. 124). The general rule is a 35% risk-weighting for loans 
secured by residential property and 50% for commercial property, 
but ”member states” can ask for more rigorous criteria for the 
assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory 
provisions. In this case, however, the attribution of these 
competences is not so clear in the article as it is for the capital 
buffers, as it refers mostly to ”competent authorities”. A higher risk 
weight will be set based on loss experience and taking into account 
forward-looking markets developments and financial stability 
considerations, and be based on EBA standards. Host-country rules 
apply in case of cross-border activity. 
The SSM Regulation allows the ECB to set higher 
requirements for capital buffers and macro-prudential risks than 
those laid down in the CRD IV, and “any national competent 
authority” can ask the ECB to act in this sense (Art. 5 (2)(3)). The 
ECB, when doing so, shall cooperate closely with the NCAs. It needs 
to notify the member state in question and state the reasons. In 
doing so, the ECB needs to take the specific situation of the member 
state into account. 
Other elements of the CRD IV fall in a grey zone between the 
ECB and the NCAs, such as for example the leverage and liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR), until they will be fully implemented in 2018. 
In the meantime, member states may impose national requirements 
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or require a faster transition. In the Netherlands, for example, a 4% 
leverage ratio by 2018 was imposed as a ‘Pillar II’ issue, which falls 
under the discretion of the supervisor. The LCR will fully apply 
from 2018 onwards, but its application to branches is a host-country 
competence; hence, the NCAs will regulate, meaning again that no 
single rule exists. Overall, the ECB indicated, in response to a 
question from a member of the European Parliament, there are some 
150 legal provisions where flexibility is expressly granted either to 
the competent authorities (that is, the supervisory authority) or to 
the national government for the application of prudential 
requirements to European Union banks.54  
Under the Barnier (or Liikanen) proposal on the structure of 
banking (European Commission, 2014c), the ECB may have an 
additional but delicate supervisory task, if adopted, which is to 
require large banks to separate their trading activities from their 
ordinary deposit-taking and lending business. The draft prohibits 
proprietary trading, but allows trading for market making, hedging 
and underwriting purposes. The draft leaves this task with the 
“competent authorities”, but will this be the ECB under the SSM? 
This could apply for Global SIFIs, and for banks having 
trading activities above a certain threshold. The ECB, or the NCAs 
outside the SSM, would have to review the permissible trading 
activities of such banks, and if they find that some pose a threat to 
financial stability, they could require the institution to separate its 
entities into a banking group. But derogation from this requirement 
could be requested by the member states for national legislation 
adopted before January 2014, to be approved by the European 
Commission (Art. 21). Hence these member states would need to 
lobby the Commission for their legislation on banking structures to 
be accepted before the ECB imposes separation. The French, 
German and British legislation on the subject, all adopted before the 
Commission proposal, do not go as far as Europe has gone, or call 
for a different form of separation. 
                                                        
54 Letter from Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board, to several 
Members of the European Parliament, on options and national discretions, 26 
May 2015. 
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6.5 Division of labour between the ECB and the 
EBA 
The division of labour, at least within the SSM, seems to be clear-
cut: the ECB is in charge of prudential supervision, and the EBA is 
the standard setter. However, the split is not so precise. The EBA 
also has supervisory tasks, such as data collection, stress tests and 
participation in supervisory colleges, whereas the ECB can adopt its 
own rules. Moreover, the ECB is not formally represented on the 
EBA board; this remains exclusively the role of the member states. 
These issues are also relevant for the other ESAs, and the entire 
European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), and in particular 
for the ESRB, although the latter’s secretariat is based within the 
ECB.  
The Regulation governing the EBA was modified at the same 
time that the SSM was adopted. It basically changes the voting 
procedures in the Board of Supervisors to allow for a positive co-
existence between the SSM members and non-members, requiring 
qualified majorities in both groups for measures adopted by the 
EBA. The Regulation also allows a representative of the ECB’s 
Supervisory Board to participate in the EBA Board of Supervisors, 
without a right to vote, and to attend discussions within the Board 
of Supervisors relating to individual financial institutions (Art. 
44.4). The ECB is thus not formally represented as a supervisor 
within the EBA.  
Confusion may emerge in markets concerning who is in 
charge, and duplication in reporting by banks can be an issue. The 
EBA conducted its 2014 stress tests on 123 banks, which were not an 
entirely comparable sample of banks and using different 
configurations of banking groups from the 130 banks on which the 
ECB was applying its comprehensive assessment. The end result 
was well-coordinated, using the same methodology and the same 
data formats, and was welcomed by the markets, but duplication 
may have occurred in reporting, at least for the banks supervised by 
the ECB, and some resistance could emerge, also towards future 
stress tests. Hence extensive coordination between both 
organisations should continue to be a priority. 
Other supervisory tasks of EBA include the participation in 
supervisory colleges, conducting peer reviews of supervisors, 
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mediating between supervisors and resolution authorities and 
delegating responsibilities. As regards the colleges, the EBA stresses 
that it will continue to play an important role in colleges where the 
consolidating supervisor is outside the SSM. Some 105 colleges were 
identified by the EBA during the course of 2013, of which 43 are 
being closely monitored. Some 73% of these are headquartered 
inside the SSM, and the remainder outside the SSM (19%) or in third 
countries (7%). The EBA says that “the number of colleges will be 
only slightly affected by the introduction of SSM” and “that only 
five banking groups will have presence only inside SSM countries”. 
Hence “cross-border aspects in supervisory cooperation will remain 
significant also after SSM is in place” (EBA, 2014). In our view, the 
start of the SSM should allow for a significant decline in the number 
of statutory supervisors present in a college, and make supervision 
more consistent. On peer reviews, the question arises whether this 
also applies within the SSM, and to the ECB.  
In its report on the ESAs, the European Commission did not 
address these or other sensitive matters. On the contrary, it 
recommended that “the focus on supervisory convergence could be 
increased”, but without mentioning the role of the ECB under the 
SSM (European Commission, 2014a). It calls for swifter decision-
making within the EBA, but without raising the issues of 
representation and the non-voting right of the ECB in the EBA and 
of the chair and managing directors of the EBA. On the budget, the 
Commission suggested revisiting the current financing 
arrangements of EBA, which is based on a 40% contribution of the 
EU budget and 60% from the member states, without 
recommending a specific change. In the Staff Working Document, 
however, it raises the possibility of contributions from the 
supervised institutions.  
The European Parliament, in its report on the European 
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) , went much further, and 
called for a full review of respective regulations, covering as well 
the governance and the role of the chair, the powers of and the rule-
making by the ESAs and the European Commission and the role of 
the ESRB within the ECB. As regards the EBA, it asked for a 
thorough assessment of its tasks and mandate in view of the start of 
the SSM (European Parliament, 2014). The Commission has thus 
chosen to duck the debate. 
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Confronted with a possible duplication of rule-making owing 
to the start of the SSM, the EBA and the European Commission, as 
the endorser of secondary legislation, should be extremely vigilant 
in monitoring and controlling the regulatory output. The 
establishment of the Single Rulebook is a noteworthy objective, but 
it could lead to an almost unstoppable process. In 2013-15, with the 
implementation of CRD IV/CRR, the EBA issued or is in the process 
of issuing 49 regulatory technical standards (RTSs)  and 26 
implementing technical standards (ITS). In a report for the 
European Parliament, experts called for a ‘Structured Single 
Rulebook’. ESAs should apply a ‘think-small principle’ when 
developing new implementing measures and apply proportioned 
rules to small and medium-sized businesses. ESAs should also 
measure the impact of their proposals on other regulated entities 
and assess any unintended consequences on the EU economy 
(Demarigny et al., 2013). Others have called for more consistency 
across RTSs and ITSs, or to group them according to themes.  
The problem is that the secondary legislative process is almost 
entirely under the control of the European Commission. The 
European Parliament and the Council have up to six months to react 
to an RTS, but they can only reject it if they do not agree with its 
implementation (Art. 13 EBA Regulation). On ITSs, there is no direct 
control by European Parliament and the Council. The huge volume 
of rule-making activity also raises the question of consistent 
implementation and application across the EU. Some level 2 acts are 
regulations, and thus directly applicable, whereas others are 
directives. The EBA and the European Commission have a Q&A for 
interpretation of level 2 legislation, which almost has the force of 
law, but this is not an ideal situation. Now that post-crisis rule-
making is (almost) over, it is time to reconsider the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the Single Rulebook objective. Inspiration could 
be drawn from the Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT) 
exercise that is being applied in other areas of EU rule-making.  
6.6 Division of labour between the ECB and ESRB 
The possible duplication of tasks applies as well to the ESRB, but in 
this case, for an organisation based within the ECB. Everything 
depends on the effective cooperation established between the 
Supervisory Board of the SSM, which also has macro-prudential 
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tasks, and the ESRB, which is not supposed to look at individual 
institutions in the member states. Here again, the Commission 
report on the functioning of the ESRB was silent on the division of 
competences with the SSM and the possible replication of tasks 
(European Commission, 2014b).  
The broader questions are: What should macro-prudential 
regulation do, and should it be a task of the central bank? On the 
first question, a consensus exists that it should tackle systemic risk, 
smooth the financial cycle and limit contagion, but how and to what 
extent remain to be seen. Tackling certain indicators may not be 
sufficient, or may lead to strong reactions from certain interest 
groups. Hence the results will always be sub-optimal. Locating the 
function in a central bank raises the additional problem of whether 
macro-prudential considerations should be part of the monetary 
policy stance. Macro-prudential tasks could divert attention from 
the inflation target, create conflicts of interest or politicise the central 
bank. The Fed, as well as the ECB, have indicated that financial 
stability is the task of macro-prudential policy bodies, whereas 
interest-rate policy pursues macro-economic targets (Portes, 2014). 
The danger posed by deflation to financial stability, however, 
highlights that it is difficult to maintain a clear separation between 
both policies and makes it imperative that the central bank takes 
action, which is the view of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). Or expressed the other way around, a deflationary 
environment will require even more action on the macro-prudential 
side. Hence the policies are complementary. 
Locating the macro-prudential function within the ECB has 
fostered the necessary cooperation, which should also facilitate 
global coordination. Even under the SSM, member states and 
national designated authorities retain important competences, such 
as for financial stability and macro-prudential buffers (see e.g. CRR 
Art. 458) for banks, subject to coordination with EU bodies to avoid 
negative spillover effects. The ESRB highlights that implementing 
these macro-prudential instruments needs to be part of a strategy, 
and that they need to be coordinated. But the problem is that the 
ESRB, unlike, for example, the British Financial Policy Committee, 
can only issue recommendations on the subject. In 2011, the ESRB 
issued a recommendation to the national authorities to assign, in 
their national legislation, a single national macro-prudential body 
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in charge of financial stability with a clear mandate, statute, means 
and structures to monitor and mitigate macro-prudential risks.  
In the 2013 Annual Report, published in July 2014, the ESRB 
noted that there have been substantial delays in implementing this 
provision (ESRB, 2014, p. 56), and that the operationalisation of 
macro-prudential policy across the EU is in progress (ESRB, 2014, p. 
49). One problem is that the tasks have been assigned to different 
authorities in the EU, mostly the central banks, but also the FSA and 
a separate committee (Schoenmaker, 2014). In addition, the ESRB 
complained that the data received from national authorities leave 
much to be desired. The problem with this situation is that the SSM, 
or the micro-prudential arm of the ECB, may take over the macro-
prudential function, as it has clear powers to oversee and, if 
necessary, override NCAs, but only within the SSM. 
Hence the future role of the ESRB within the ECB is unclear 
in the context of the SSM. On the one hand, it is a useful network to 
further the discussion on the policy framework for tackling macro-
prudential risks within the EU as a whole, although other fora exist 
for this as well. On the other hand, the SSM also has macro-
prudential competences, but only for the eurozone and opt-ins. The 
SSM side will have much more accurate and harmonised data, and 
more capacity to act. Of course, as with all micro-supervisors, the 
crucial question is whether it will see the bigger picture. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The ECB will have to maintain its credibility as a central bank, set a 
high standard as supervisor, and demonstrate that both tasks can be 
combined under one roof. The advantage of the combination is that 
the ECB will be much better informed than in the past about the 
state of the European financial system. The disadvantage is that it 
may blur its tasks, which may undermine the effectiveness of both 
policies. This could be aggravated by the complexity of the structure 
under which it has to work.  
The basis for the SSM, as well as the operational structure, will 
need to be reviewed regularly. The legal base currently limits the 
ECB’s tasks to prudential supervision of banks. However, the need 
may arise to expand these to insurance companies, or to capital 
market activities, which will evidently require an EU Treaty change. 
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At the same time, the suitability of the combination of monetary 
policy and supervisory functions under the same roof will have to 
be assessed continually.  
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7. RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION, 
THE SINGLE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISM AND DEPOSIT 
GUARANTEE SCHEMES 
mong the many responses to the financial crisis, the most 
novel has been the insistence on specific financial sector 
resolution frameworks. What started out as a discussion in 
the early days of the financial crisis on ‘living wills’ segued into a 
discussion on bail-ins. Banks must now have detailed recovery 
plans readily available, and authorities are invested with the fullest 
powers to apply early intervention policies in the event that 
minimum capital requirements are not met, with the possibility of 
wiping out shareholders and bail-in debtors. For the Banking 
Union, this took the form of a new EU authority with the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM). What has been agreed already for the 
banking sector is now on the table for insurance companies and 
market infrastructure as well. But resolution frameworks are still 
largely theoretical, and only a real crisis within a major financial 
institution, infrastructure or region will be able to test whether they 
work effectively. 
Similar bail-in proposals have been developed at 
international level. The global systemically important European 
banks will also become subject to the total loss absorbency capacity 
(TLAC) requirement, designed by the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) , which seems compatible but nevertheless contains important 
differences with the EU’s minimum requirement for own funds and 
eligible liabilities (MREL). 
This chapter analyses the main elements of the new EU bank 
resolution requirements, the powers of the resolution authorities 
and the single authority for the SSM, and the role of deposit 
protection schemes.  
A
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7.1 Resolution: BRRD, SRM and state aid 
The agreements on the bank recovery and resolution Directive 
(BRRD)  and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the second 
pillar of the Banking Union, were milestones. One of the key 
objectives is to ensure that insolvent banks can be resolved in an 
orderly and uniform manner in the EU without state aid. A single 
resolution board plays a key role in ensuring that this process 
unfolds under a unique governance structure, at least for the 
eurozone. A single bank resolution fund should function as the 
backstop in the Banking Union, breaking the link between the 
funding costs of the bank and the sovereign. None of this structure 
was in place when the financial crisis hit: no member state had a 
separate bank resolution authority nor were there resolution funds 
or a European structure to coordinate bail-outs, apart from the EU’s 
state aid control authority. Combined with the mandatory bail-in 
and pre-funded deposit guarantee schemes, the building blocks are 
now in place to deal with a crisis in banking, and bar banks from 
direct access to taxpayers’ money. 
But will there be no more state support? The SRM still allows 
for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) by the national central 
banks and for guarantees or equity purchases by the member states, 
in which case state aid rules can apply. State aid rules will also apply 
insofar as the European Commission could impose conditions on 
the use of resolution funds, in line with the principles applied 
during the financial crisis, such as burden-sharing with other debt 
holders and behavioural constraints. The single resolution fund will 
take some time to be well-funded and its future size remains small 
in comparison to the size of the eurozone banking sector, but the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM)  can be used as the ultimate, 
although not unlimited, backstop (the ESM direct recapitalisation 
instrument) as was clarified by the Eurogroup on 10 June 2014. 
Any discussion today on the backstop in Banking Union thus 
has to start from the new structure, although the transition period 
raises some questions. The SRM is applicable from 2016 onwards, 
but the board is operational from 2015 onwards. The BRRD should 
be implemented by 2015, but its provisions on bail-in only apply 
from 2016. Lastly, there are the EU’s state aid rules, on which the 
Commission has published its ultimate post-crisis guidelines in July 
THE GREAT FINANCIAL PLUMBING | 125 
 
2013. They require, until the BRRD comes into force, only bail-in of 
subordinated debt. 
It should be recalled that harmonisation attempts of bank 
resolution are almost as old as the single market. Proposals have 
been made since the end of the 1980s to harmonise winding-up 
procedures of banks, in line with the home country control principle 
of the free provision of financial services directives. A first directive 
on the reorganisation and winding-up of credit institutions 
(Directive 2001/24/EC) was adopted in 2001 after many years of 
discussion. It introduced the principles of unity and universality of 
liquidation procedures, and required the home member state 
authorities of a bank to have sole jurisdiction over a bank and their 
decisions to be recognised in all the other member states. It 
establishes that the law of the home member state determines all the 
effects of reorganisation measures or winding-up proceedings. The 
degree of harmonisation was minimal, supervisory practices too 
divergent, and the principles of information sharing between home 
and host left much to be desired. In the few cases of bank failures 
that occurred for banks with EU-wide operations after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, such as the Icelandic banks or Fortis, host-
country rules were applied, meaning that host-country authorities 
took over the operations of a foreign bank. A much more far-
reaching harmonisation was thus needed, which the BRRD and 
SRM undertake. 
This part reviews the main principles introduced by the 
BRRD and the SRM and analyses the interaction with the EU’s 
competition policy rules. It addresses the question of how bank 
recovery and resolution will function from now on in the EU, and 
what questions remain to be resolved.  
7.2 The BRRD’s ambit 
The degree of harmonisation of the BRRD is far-reaching and 
addresses in detail the planning of recovery and resolution by banks 
and resolution authorities, the need for early intervention, the bail-
in of senior debt holders and other resolution tools, and the creation 
of a resolution fund. Even if the BRRD is a directive, it is far-
reaching, in a field where before national laws were unclear in the 
powers for authorities. It is a major step forward and can be 
expected to influence the rules beyond the banking industry.  
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The focal point of the BRRD is the minimum of 8% contractual 
bail-in instruments as a share of total liabilities (Art. 44), which 
applies from 2016 onwards. When losses affect the minimum capital 
base, common equity tier 1 items are reduced in proportion to the 
losses, and additional tier 1, tier 2 and certain subordinated 
instruments are converted into capital. When this is not sufficient, 
senior liabilities will be written down, in a way that respects the pari 
passu treatment of creditors and the statutory ranking of claims 
under the applicable insolvency law (Recital 77). An independent 
valuation of the assets and liabilities of the institution will therefore 
be undertaken before taking resolution action or exercising the 
power to write down or convert relevant capital instruments (Art. 
36). This valuation will “not assume any potential future provision 
of extraordinary public financial support or central bank emergency 
liquidity assistance or any central bank liquidity assistance 
provided under non-standard collateralization” (Art. 37.5).  
A bail-in requires that banks’ balance sheets have sufficient 
liabilities that can be bailed in, in a progressive and hierarchical 
manner. The bail-in can apply to all liabilities, with the exception of 
covered deposits, covered bonds and other collateralised 
instruments, short-term liabilities, and liabilities related to fiduciary 
functions on the bank (Art. 44). Resolution authorities will require a 
minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) 
for bail-in, to be met at all times. For groups, the minimum 
requirement is set by the group-level resolution authority, decided 
upon in cooperation with host countries, with the EBA mediating if 
no decision has been reached between national authorities (Art. 
45.9). A proposal shall be made on a harmonised application of the 
MREL by the EU Commission before the end of 2016, on the basis 
of an EBA report (Art. 45).   
The bail-in is only part of a broader series of options to resolve 
a bank, which are also set out in the Directive. It starts with early 
intervention, the removal of management or the appointment of a 
temporary administrator (Art. 35). Other specific tools discussed 
include the bridge institution tool, the sale of business tool and the 
asset separation (‘bad bank’) tool (Arts 37-42). In each of the cases, 
the authorities are vested with appropriate powers to undertake 
these actions, “without obtaining the consent of the shareholders of 
the institutions under resolution or any third party other than the 
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bridge institution, and without complying with any procedural 
requirements under company or securities law” (Art. 42.1). “When 
applying the resolution tools and exercising the resolution powers, 
Member States shall ensure that they comply with the Union State 
aid framework, where applicable” (Art. 34.3). 
If these actions are not sufficient, resolution authorities may 
make a contribution to the institution under resolution to cover 
losses or shore up the capital (Art. 44.4). But this can only be done 
after the 8% bail-in threshold is reached, to an amount not exceeding 
5% of a bank’s liabilities, and in full respect of EU state aid rules. 
Member states can also provide extraordinary public financial 
support through additional financial stabilisation tools, such as 
equity support and temporary public ownership, but again as a last 
resort, after all other measures have been exploited, and following 
state aid rules (Arts 56-58). 
A second focal point of the Directive is the requirement to 
designate resolution authorities with all the powers necessary to 
apply the resolution tools described above to institutions and to 
entities (Arts 62-65). This includes the power to take control of an 
institution under resolution and exercise all the rights and powers 
conferred upon the shareholders. For banking groups, resolution 
colleges will be created, with the group consolidating supervisor in 
the lead. This may include the implementation of a group resolution 
scheme, in case all authorities involved agree (Art. 91). But the 
challenges for the group administrator will be great, as the 
resolution authorities of the host member state can object to the 
decisions of the group-level resolution authority, “not only on 
appropriateness of resolution actions and measures but also on 
ground of the need to protect financial stability in that Member 
State” (Recital 97). “The resolution college should not be a decision-
making body, but a platform facilitating decision-making by 
national authorities. The joint decisions should be taken by the 
national authorities concerned” (Recital 98).   
The objectives of resolution are to ensure the continuity of 
critical functions, preserve financial stability and “to protect public 
funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial 
support” (Art. 31). The resolution authorities intervene if the 
determination that the institution is failing or is likely to fail has 
been made by the competent authority. This implies that 
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supervisory and resolution authorities should cooperate closely, 
and that they can intervene even before a licence has been 
withdrawn. State support is still possible to keep an institution 
afloat “in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of 
a Member State and preserve financial stability” (Art. 32.4d). This 
“shall be confined to solvent institutions and shall be conditional on 
final approval under the Union State aid framework. Those 
measures shall be of a precautionary and temporary nature and 
shall be proportionate to remedy the consequences of the serious 
disturbance and shall not be used to offset losses that the institution 
has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future.” Such support 
measures “shall be limited to injections necessary to address capital 
shortfall established in the national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests, 
asset quality reviews or equivalent exercises conducted by the 
European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities” (Art. 32.4d, 
Art. 16.3d in SRM). These provisions will be reviewed by the 
Commission by 31 December 2015. 
A third key element of the Directive is the establishment of a 
resolution fund, financed by bank contributions. By 31 December 
2024, the fund should reach at least 1% of the amount of covered 
deposits of all the locally authorised institutions, with the possibility 
to set target levels in excess of that amount. To deal with the 
resolution of groups, the funds should have the power to lend from 
other funds in the EU, or to mutualise the national funds. The fund 
can only be used to resolve a bank and to contribute to a bank under 
resolution only after the 8% was bailed-in, and the resolution 
financing arrangement may not exceed 5% of the total liabilities 
(Art. 44.5). State aid rules apply when the resolution fund comes in. 
A difficult issue in an EU context is how to balance the 
existence of two different resolution strategies: single point of entry 
(SPOE) and the multiple point of entry (MPOE) approaches. In 
SPOE, the home authority applies resolution powers at the top 
parent company level, ideally the holding company, through the 
absorption of losses by the parent. In MPOE, resolution powers may 
be applied differently to different parts of the group, and is more 
adapted to banks with separately capitalised subsidiaries. MPOE 
nevertheless requires actions to be coordinated across jurisdictions 
so as to avoid conflicts or inconsistencies that undermine the 
effectiveness of separate resolution actions.  
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The BRRD describes in detail how groups may provide 
financial support to any other party to the agreement that meets the 
conditions for early intervention, without it being a prerequisite 
(Art. 19). MPOE may, however, lead to disagreements among 
supervisory authorities on the approach to take to a bank in trouble, 
with the EBA performing the task of mediator (Art. 20). This 
problem should be lifted by the existence of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM), at least for the SSM, although it will remain a 
challenge for the new single resolution board to align different 
countries, and different banks. The operational structure as created 
by the BRRD remains loose and could lead to ring-fencing in case of 
trouble and strengthen the tendency towards subsidiarisation, 
which could further reduce financial integration in the EU and affect 
financial sector efficiency.  
7.3 A Single Resolution Mechanism for the SSM 
The SRM regulation creates a centralised but complex system of 
decision-making for bank resolution in the eurozone, and for the 
countries participating in the SSM. Through the intergovernmental 
agreement, it will be endowed with adequate financing means 
through the establishment of a fund with a target level of 1% of 
covered deposits, or approximately €55 billion based on European 
Commission estimates. This fund should start to irrevocably 
mutualise national funds by 2016, with 40% of the available means 
within the national compartments in the first year and 60% in the 
second year, and equal amounts in the subsequent six years up to 
2024, until it is fully mutualised. The agreement was signed by 26 
member states on 21 May 2014 (all except Sweden and the UK).  
The centralised decision-making structure is composed of one 
board, which can meet in an executive and a plenary session. The 
board exercises the tasks or powers, which, according to the BRRD, 
are in the hands of the national resolution authorities (Art. 5). It is 
composed in its executive session of a chair, vice chair and four 
other members, and was established from 2015 onwards, in 
Brussels. The ECB and the European Commission have 
representatives on the board. It is accountable to the plenary session 
of all national resolution authorities, to the European Parliament 
and the participating national member states. It is independent and 
has its own budget, separate from the EU budget, funded by 
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contributions from national resolution authorities. Created under 
EU law, however, it functions as an agency of the European 
Commission, and will be political.  
The Single Resolution Board (SRB)  is tasked with drawing-
up resolution plans for the significant banks within the SSM in 
cooperation with the national authorities and setting the minimum 
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities. Non-significant 
banks continue to fall under the responsibility of the national 
resolution authorities, under the control of the SRB. In case of crisis, 
the SRB shall decide on the adoption of a resolution scheme, in 
cooperation with the Commission and the EU Council. The 
complexity of the decision-making in the SRM came in for heavy 
criticism during the debates on the draft, raising questions whether 
it would ever work. The moment the SSM declares a bank is failing 
or likely to fail, the SRM’s board must adopt a resolution plan. The 
decision on this plan is adopted by the SRM board, in which 
delegates from the national resolution authorities where the bank is 
active also participate. It decides with a simple majority, each 
delegate having one vote. The Commission has 24 hours to object to 
the plan, or it can ask the Council within 12 hours whether it objects 
to the plan (Art. 18). 
The complexity of the SRM is aggravated by the fact that the 
EBA also needs to make an assessment of recovery plans of banking 
groups (see also EBA, 2014). Hence the likelihood of overlaps 
between the EBA and the ECB for supervision also exists between 
the EBA and the SRM for resolution.  
Another issue of debate were the contributions by a bank to 
the fund, which should be calculated pro rata to the amount of its 
liabilities (excluding own funds and covered deposits) with respect 
to the aggregate liabilities (excluding own funds and covered 
deposits) of all the institutions authorised in the participating 
member states. Contributions will be adjusted in proportion to the 
risk profile of each institution. The fund was agreed as an 
intergovernmental agreement “to provide maximum legal 
certainty”, and comes into force once it has been ratified by 90% of 
the weighted votes of signatories.  
The SRM makes extensive reference to the state aid 
framework. All aid, including aid from the single resolution fund, 
must be compatible with the EU’s state aid framework. Prima facie, 
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SRF financing would not qualify as state aid since it is decided at 
EU level by the SRB, not by member state authorities, and the SRF 
funds are managed by the SRB. However, in the course of the 
negotiations, non-SSM participating member states argued that 
there is a potential threat that the SRF financing could be used in a 
manner that could favour the participating member state’s banks, 
and distort competition (Zavvos & Kaltsouni, 2014). The SRM 
allows the EU Commission to check the compatibility of use of the 
SRF with the single market (Art. 19), and thus gives it a second level 
control over the SRB, apart from the control over a resolution plan. 
The SRB cannot engage the member states. The SRM 
regulation states that “decisions or actions of the Board, the 
Commission or the Council shall neither require Member States to 
provide extraordinary public financial support nor impinge on the 
budgetary sovereignty and fiscal responsibilities of the Member 
States” (Art. 6). Member states can still provide aid “to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve 
financial stability”, which refers to Art. 107.3b of the Treaty, which 
was also invoked during the crisis (see chapter 8 on state aid). This 
can be composed of guarantees or capital support. The latter should 
“be limited to injections necessary to address capital shortfalls 
established in the national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests, asset 
quality reviews or equivalent exercises conducted by the ECB, EBA 
or national authorities, where applicable, confirmed by the 
competent authority” (Art. 16.3). But they “shall be conditional on 
final approval under State aid rules” (Art. 16.3).  
The same applies in case the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM)  is used as a direct bank recapitalisation instrument. This 
instrument, as clarified by the Eurogroup on 10 June 2014, may be 
activated in case a bank fails to attract sufficient capital from private 
sources, and the ESM member is unable to recapitalise. “A bail-in of 
8% of all liabilities will be a precondition for using the instrument, 
as well as the resources available in the ESM members’ national 
resolution funds.” The aid will be provided in accordance with EU 
state aid rules. The facility has a recapitalisation capacity of €60 
billion. 
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7.4 Interaction with the state aid framework 
The new rules on resolution tie in with the approach of the 
European Commission’s competition authority (DG Comp), which 
published its ultimate guidelines in a July 2013 Communication (see 
chapter 8 in this book). They replace and complement previous 
communications that were published during the financial crisis. The 
Communication clearly establishes that financial stability remains 
the overarching objective for the Commission in reacting to a 
financial crisis, “whilst ensuring that State aid and distortions of 
competition between banks and across Member States are kept to 
the minimum”. The rules reiterate that state aid can only be 
accepted after hybrid capital and subordinated debt holders have 
contributed to reducing the capital shortfall “to the maximum 
extent” (Art. 41 Communication). But the Commission does “not 
require a contribution from senior debt holders (in particular from 
insured deposits, uninsured deposits, bonds and all other senior 
debt) as a mandatory component” (Art. 42), which is the big 
difference in the BRRD framework. The Communication repeats 
that future state recapitalisation measures can only be accepted on 
very strict conditions, once other means, such as bail-ins, have been 
exhausted, and after a restructuring plan has been accepted by the 
Commission (Arts 29-30). Only in exceptional circumstances, when 
financial stability is at risk, can measures be accepted ex post (Arts 
45-51), which does not prevent the compliance with burden-sharing 
measures. Guarantees and liquidity support can be granted before 
a restructuring plan is approved, but only after notification and 
temporary approval, following the conditions set in the previous 
communications, including adequate remuneration, and 
behavioural restrictions. They are restricted to banks that have no 
capital shortfall (Items 56-58).  
These rules, together with the elements of the new broader 
resolution framework, were applied to the Banco Espirito Santo 
(BES) case (August 2014), whereby the state capital injection of €4.9 
billion to the Bridge Bank was authorised by the European 
Commission. It noted that the full contribution of shareholders and 
of subordinated debt holders to the losses of BES was ensured, but 
that EU state aid rules did not require any contribution from 
depositors or other senior debt holders. 
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The July 2013 Communication also reiterated the conditions 
for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA)  by the central bank and 
support by the deposit guarantee scheme. ELA needs to be fully 
secured by collateral, with haircuts and at penalising rates. State 
guarantees on ELA will be considered state aid, and the use of 
deposit guarantee funds, in case they are used for restructuring 
purposes, may constitute state aid and will be assessed by the 
Commission (Items 62-63). Also, the ECB restated its policy with 
regard to ELA in October 2013, noting that it is limited “to a solvent 
financial institution, or group of solvent financial institutions, that 
is facing temporary liquidity problems, without such operation 
being part of the single monetary policy. Responsibility for the 
provision of ELA lies with the NCBs (national central banks) 
concerned. This means that any costs of, and the risks arising from, 
the provision of ELA are incurred by the relevant NCB.” But NCBs 
should inform the ECB of the details of any ELA operation daily, 
and should obtain ex ante approval for any operation exceeding a 
threshold of €500 million. This policy was applied to Greek banks in 
2015, when the ECB authorised ELA by the Greek central bank to 
face the situation of large deposit withdrawals in the Greek banking 
system, although there were strong doubts about their solvency.  
7.5 More harmony in deposit guarantee schemes 
The agreement reached in early 2014 on a further harmonisation of 
deposit guarantee schemes is often overlooked in the policy 
debates. It is indeed the case that no single deposit guarantee system 
was created, as was set out in the Four Presidents Report,55 but an 
agreement was reached on a far-reaching harmonisation and 
update of the previous directives containing rules on pre-funding, 
the maximum pay-out deadlines and the functioning across 
borders. Again, none of this existed before, even considering the 
limited changes that were agreed upon in the early days of the 
financial crisis. 
Deposit guarantee schemes are an important building block 
for financial stability. By ensuring a generous level of protection, 
depositors should be motivated to entrust their money to banks and 
not to make a run on their bank. This assumes, however, that 
                                                        
55 Van Rompuy et al. (2012). 
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depositor protection schemes have the necessary funds available, 
and that they can be paid out rapidly, upon failure of the bank. The 
EU’s 1994 Directive undertook only a very limited form of 
harmonisation, i.e. it made a minimum level of €20,000 coverage 
obligatory in the EU, but did not allow for competition between 
schemes, i.e. branches of host-country banks were not allowed to 
export more generous levels of protection, whereas branches of 
banks with home countries with lower levels of protection were 
allowed to top-up to the level of the host country. The failure of the 
Directive was clear with the start of the financial crisis, as in most 
cases states chose to bail out banks rather than liquidate them and 
let the deposit protection system bail out depositors. Hence the 
radical increase of the level of coverage to a maximum of €50,000 in 
October 2008 (and later €100,000) was intended to maintain financial 
stability.  
How necessary a common deposit guarantee scheme is for the 
Banking Union remains debatable. Given the premise of the 
Banking Union, breaking the vicious circle between the sovereigns 
and the banks, a common system should be an important element. 
Maintaining different contribution levels and forms of financing 
would maintain the vicious circle. However, the level of funds kept 
in all EU deposit insurance systems today remains very limited, and 
totals about €18.6 billion (2011), less than one-half the level that will 
be needed when the new directive is fully implemented. In addition, 
only scant funds were effectively used during the crisis, in most 
cases; the state intervened directly to support banks. Hence other 
elements probably matter much more. 
The degree of harmonisation achieved by the 2014 recast of 
the 1994 Directive is an important step forward. Although it does 
not introduce a single fund, it goes far enough to make deposit 
insurance systems a more important building block for financial 
stability in the EU and the EEA, at least over time. It establishes that 
within 10 years of this Directive’s publication, i.e. by July 2024, the 
available financial means of a DGS shall at least reach a target level 
of 0.8% of the amount of the covered deposits of its members (Art. 
10). In the event that bank deposits are declared unavailable, 
schemes need to cover up to €100,000 or the equivalent within seven 
working days (from 2024, 10 to 15 days during the transition), at a 
ratio of one depositor per credit institution. In case the fund is not 
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sufficient, it can call upon ex-post contributions (of 0.5% of the 
covered deposits), or it can borrow from the government or the 
market. 
As a step towards a common EU-wide fund, the Commission 
had introduced borrowing between funds, which proved to be a 
‘hot potato’ during the discussions. The Directive allows for 
borrowing between funds, but on a voluntary basis, not exceeding 
0.5% of covered deposits of the borrowing DGS, and subject to 
repayment within five years. For another problem, the treatment of 
deposits with branches, the text leaves this as the financial 
responsibility of the home member state of the bank, but the pay-
out will take place through the DGS in the host member state, acting 
as a ‘single point of contact’ on behalf of the DGS in the home 
member state (Art. 14). For branches of third-country credit 
institutions, they must join a DGS in operation in a member state. 
The level of protection, €100,000, is seen to be very high, 
especially for certain new member states, and is applied per 
depositor per bank (which may be individuals or enterprises). 
Hence the incentives for depositors to monitor the riskiness of the 
limited banks could be seen to contribute to moral hazard. The 
Directive, however, allows DGS to use their own risk-based 
methods for determining and calculating the contributions by their 
members, taking due account of the risk profiles of the various 
business models, with the EBA proposing non-binding guidelines 
on technical aspects (Art. 13).  
The DGS Directive leaves an important backdoor open to the 
sovereign-bank nexus, i.e. it does not cover “contractual schemes” 
or “institutional protection schemes” that are not officially 
recognised as DGS (Art. 1.3). This means that member states with 
additional generous protection schemes can decide to exclude them 
from the scope of the Directive, thus leaving an important distortion 
to the single market. 
Hence, within the SSM, depositor protection will remain 
decentralised, unlike the supervision of the significant banks and 
resolution. Considering that consumer protection remains a host-
country responsibility in the SSM and the EU, this does not seem 
problematic, as the EU managed to agree on further harmonisation 
of the funding and functioning of depositor protection schemes. The 
crucial issue will be the link with resolution, and ensuring that 
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resolution actions, particularly a call to the deposit insurance fund, 
are closely coordinated across the member states. It is not 
unimaginable under the current structure that reactions to a cross-
border banking crisis will in practice unwind differently across the 
EU, even more so with a decentralised deposit insurance fund. The 
DGS Directive allows member states to use its funds for resolution, 
in the last instance to prevent a bank failure, and when certain 
conditions are met. But could this be decided over a weekend, and 
will different member states take the same decision for their DGS? 
Under the BRRD, member states can still decide differently for a 
cross-border bank according to their financial stability concerns. 
This is less likely within the SSM with the SRM, although it remains 
possible that the SRM board will not agree.  
7.6 Conclusions 
The new resolution framework is clear. All extraordinary public 
support for a bank that does not meet the required capital levels is 
subject to state aid rules, and can only come in after burden-sharing 
and bail-in rules have been applied. The difference between the 
current and the new rules is that bail-in can under the BRRD and 
SRM be extended to the senior debt holders, including depositors, 
above €100,000. It is only in exceptional circumstances, i.e. a serious 
disturbance in a national economy, that exceptions can be accepted.  
Experience is limited with bail-ins in the financial sector, and 
it was only applied on a large scale very late in the financial crisis, 
most importantly in the resolution of some Spanish savings banks 
in November 2012, but also in Cyprus in 2013, and more recently in 
particular cases in Slovenia, the Netherlands and Portugal. The 
question also arises how the new rules will be applied for cross-
border banks that operate in several jurisdictions and under 
different models, and whether they would give rise to legal 
challenges.  
Following the EU rules on the subject, the ECB (and the 
NCAs) will for the time being only use one prudential measure to 
assess a bank’s soundness, i.e. Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ), as it 
did in the AQR, which gives banks and supervisors some room for 
manoeuvre in the short term. CET1 is a risk-weighted capital 
standard, which allows for zero risk-weighting for government 
bonds and reduced weighting for property loans, or applies internal 
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models for risk measurement, which for large European banks gives 
a low level of risk-weighted assets to total assets (see chapter 5 in 
this volume). In addition, the ECB has other tools at its disposal to 
address temporary liquidity problems in the banking sector, as it 
did in 2012 with the long-term refinancing operation (LTRO), and 
with the measures it announced again in June 2014. By 2016, 
however, a harmonised definition of MREL should be in place, by 
which time it may become a more important benchmark than CET1. 
But how it will be applied in practice remains to be seen. 
The consistent implementation of the new resolution 
framework will require hard work by supervisory and resolution 
authorities, and by financial institutions. Many member states still 
have to create an authority and set up a resolution fund. Banks will 
need to examine their balance sheets, check the amount of debt 
subject to bail-in and draft recovery plans. At EU level, a new 
element in the supervisory structure emerged, with a single 
resolution authority for the SSM and later possibly for almost the 
entire EU, with the exception of two member states. 
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8. THE EU’S BANK STATE AID 
POLICY DURING THE CRISIS* 
he financial crisis posed an enormous challenge for the EU’s 
state aid regime. Conceived to ensure a level playing field in 
the single market, the scheme also had to show that it could 
be adapted to very exceptional circumstances, in the absence of an 
EU-wide recovery and resolution framework for systemic financial 
institutions. The size and nature of the aid, the number of the 
schemes and the complexity of the cases that had to be examined 
and approved were overwhelming. Although some high-profile 
cases of bank state aid had been dealt with by the European 
Commission in the past, never in the EU’s half-century of history 
had the European Commission dealt with so many cases in such a 
short period of time. The approach followed during this period will 
thus continue to influence policy-making for a long time to come. 
Throughout the crisis, 21 national schemes of state aid to the 
financial sector and over 90 cases of individual banks and other 
financial intermediaries were dealt with by the European 
Commission. At the height of the crisis, the effectively committed 
value of aid amounted to some 14.3% of the GDP of the EU. The 
final amount may turn out to be lower, however, as the largest part 
of aid was granted in remunerated guarantees of bank liabilities, 
which cease with the withdrawal of the guarantee, and provide 
income to the state. But many guarantees lasted much longer than 
expected at the outbreak of the crisis. 
During the crisis, the EU Commission gave guidance to the 
private sector about its policy in applying state aid rules to the 
                                                        
* This chapter is drawn from Lannoo et al. (2010), Bank state aid in the financial 
crisis: Fragmentation or level playing field, CEPS Task Force Report and was 
updated up to February 2015, taking into account the period of the sovereign 
debt crisis. Valuable research assistance by Willem Pieter De Groen is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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financial sector. The EU published eight Communications, but it 
remains an open question how closely this policy was applied in 
practice. Considering the approach taken in specific state aid cases, 
it seems that the policy followed was more ad hoc. Some general 
principles were followed, including new conditions that had not 
been applied before, but it seems that the end-result, certainly at 
European level, was a more uneven playing field. Some member 
states’ banks were in better shape when the crisis hit, but some 
states were also better prepared to respond to the crisis and to make 
their state aid schemes compatible with EU rules. Different forms of 
restructuring packages were thus not necessarily only institution-
specific, but also country-specific. 
The legal provisions of the EU framework to assess state aid 
are unique. The EU is the only international entity with real powers 
to assess aid and its distortions to competition and trade, and to 
enforce remedies, but its framework is limited to aid given by EU 
member states. Beyond that, the EU needs to rely on international 
agreements, most importantly the WTO’s GATS, which are much 
weaker than what exists in the EU, and without any case law so far. 
8.1 The EU’s state aid policy: Rationale and 
perspective 
State aid control is a core EU task, enshrined in the Treaty from its 
founding. Its objective is to ensure that government interventions 
do not distort competition and trade in the internal market. State aid 
is defined as ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition’ (Art. 107 TFEU). Subsidies granted to 
individuals or general measures open to all enterprises are not 
covered by Art. 107 and do not constitute state aid.  
The EU Treaty pronounces a general prohibition of state aid. 
In some circumstances, however, government interventions can be 
permitted. These concern measures to promote regional 
development, responses to serious economic disturbances, and aid 
to economic sectors in trouble. The European Commission has the 
sole competence to decide when state aid can be permitted. The 
Treaty provides that all new aid measures must be notified and 
approved by the European Commission prior to their 
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implementation, if not, the aid is invalid. It is only after the approval 
by the Commission that an aid measure can be implemented. 
Incompatible state aid can be recovered. The Commission can be 
overruled by the EU Council of Ministers, which can decide, acting 
unanimously, that aid is compatible with the single market, in 
derogation from the provisions of Art. 107. 
Until the crisis hit, the experience of applying state aid rules 
to the financial sector was limited to a few, but high profile cases. 
The most well-known ones are the Crédit Lyonnais case and the 
German regional banks ruling. In the former case, the European 
Commission decided in 1995 that Crédit Lyonnais, in return for the 
green light on the €6.9 billion (FF45 billion) in state aid, had to 
reduce its commercial operations abroad, including a substantial 
part of its European banking network, by at least 35% by the end of 
1998.56 In the Landesbank case, the European Commission agreed 
with the German government in 2001 and 2002 to abolish the system 
of state guarantees for the regional savings banks (Landesbanken) 
and distinguish between the public policy and purely commercial 
tasks of these institutions. The continued use of state guarantees 
was allowed for public policy tasks, e.g. the financing of SMEs and 
infrastructure, housing, investments for environmental protection 
and cooperation with developing countries.57  
Some have argued before that the EU’s state aid rules are not 
entirely appropriate for the banking sector, because of its special 
nature (Grande, 1999). Public subsidies may be needed in the 
banking sector in prolongation of the objectives pursued by 
regulation and supervision, and may not necessarily distort 
competition, as the entire financial system benefits from stability. 
When combating systemic risk, state aid is used to prevent a serious 
disruption of the financial system, and of the overall economy. In 
addition, the aid may be granted through special liquidity support 
by the central bank. Hence the overall public interest is at stake, not 
simply a private one. This public interest is essentially monitored by 
national supervisory authorities and central banks, implying that 
the control of state aid, when related to financial supervisory and 
systemic stability issues, should be in their hands.  
                                                        
56 European Commission, 95/547/EC of 26.07.1995. 
57 European Commission, Decisions of 17 July 2001 and 1 March 2002. 
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Figure 11. Non-crisis related state aid excluding railways, 1992-2013 (% 
of EU GDP) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU State Aid Scoreboard 2014. 
The outbreak of the financial crisis forced policy-makers to 
come to terms with a calamity, of proportions no one had imagined 
before, and to which they had to respond rapidly. Some 
preparations had been made before to simulate crisis, but no overall 
crisis framework existed. For comparison, the overall level of state 
aid granted in the EU between 1992 and 2007, expressed as a 
percentage of GDP, decreased from 1.5% per year in 1992 to 0.5% in 
2007, see also Figure 11. 
This chapter reviews the forms of aid that were given to the 
financial sector and the application of the EU’s state aid policy 
during the financial and sovereign crisis. It demonstrates that there 
are vast differences in the way member states have offered and 
implemented aid to the financial sector, and that these differing 
policies have called the coherence of the single market into question. 
We also examine state aid in the global context, and question 
whether existing international tools for ensuring a level playing 
field are sufficient, given the global nature of the financial industry. 
8.2 Financial sector support during the financial 
and sovereign crisis 
The EU’s state aid policy for the financial sector was not challenged 
during the first year of the financial crisis (August 2007-August 
2008). It is only in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
and after a special Eurogroup, meeting at the level of heads of state 
and government in the Elysée Palace in Paris on 12th October 2008, 
THE GREAT FINANCIAL PLUMBING | 143 
 
that its application was temporarily relaxed to deal with the 
extraordinary circumstances in financial markets. Political leaders 
did however not realise that the temporary nature of these measures 
would last much longer than they expected, some of which are still 
in place at the day of writing, March 2015. 
In absence of a European-wide bail-out plan, the Eurogroup 
took two decisions on 12 October 2008: 
- Governments can provide state guarantees to bank debt 
issues for up to five years under well-determined conditions, 
and can participate in these issues. All banks should be 
eligible for these operations, including foreign-owned banks. 
- Governments can take equity stakes in financial institutions 
and recapitalise banks in trouble. 
The Eurogroup requested that governments avoid national 
measures that would negatively affect the functioning of the 
internal market and harm other member states. The Eurogroup 
committed to “coordinate in providing these guarantees, as 
significant differences in national implementation could have a 
counter-productive effect, creating distortions in banking markets”. 
The support actions would be “designed in order to avoid any 
distortion in the level playing field and possible abuse at the 
expense of the non-beneficiaries of these arrangements”.58  
The Eurogroup suggested to the European Central Bank to 
fulfil its role in assuring sufficient liquidity for the financial sector 
and to react with flexibility to market circumstances. In particular, 
the ECB was asked to ease its rules on assets eligible as collateral in 
liquidity providing operations, on which the central bank acted a 
few days later. From that moment on, the ECB dramatically 
expanded the eligibility criteria of marketable and non-marketable 
assets, including the lowering of the credit threshold for these assets 
from an A- to a BBB- credit assessment by an eligible External Credit 
Assessment Institution (ECAI)  or rating agent.59 Later during the 
sovereign crisis, the ECB decided to temporarily accept credit 
claims, such as enterprise loans, as collateral and to suspend the 
                                                        
58 Eurogroup meeting, 12 October 2008, pp. 2-3. 
59 ECB, Measures to further expand the collateral framework, Press release, 15 
October 2008. 
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application of the minimum credit rating threshold in the collateral 
eligibility requirements for debt instruments issued by the central 
government of countries that are under an EU-IMF programme.60 
The Eurogroup decisions were later endorsed by the Autumn 
European Council (October 2008), which broadened their 
application to the EU as a whole. The European Council endorsed a 
flexible interpretation of the EU’s state aid rules, given the 
exceptional circumstances.61 EU leaders allowed exceptional bank 
state aid so as to restore financial stability and to allow credit flows 
to continue. 
Hence, to have a correct picture of ‘state’ support during the 
crisis, the different actions must be seen in combination. Enhanced 
credit support by the ECB and quantitative easing by the Bank of 
England are not state aid, but help to stabilise the financial system. 
The full list of financial sector stabilisation measures comprises: 
● Government financial sector stabilisation measures: 
- (Re)capitalisation 
- Asset relief interventions: 
o support for impaired assets in asset support 
programmes  
o ‘bad bank’ schemes 
- Guarantees:  
o bank deposits 
o interbank lending 
o bank bonds 
- Other liquidity support measures: 
o participation in debt issues/loans 
o underwriting of subordinated debt 
● Central bank monetary policy adjustments and liquidity 
support 
- Lowering of rates for main refinancing operations and 
standing facilities, fine-tuning operations and longer term 
credit provision (LTRO)  
- Enhanced credit support, composed of full allotment in 
liquidity providing operations, expansion of eligible 
                                                        
60 ECB, Measures to preserve collateral availability, 8 December 2011 and 6 
September 2012 respectively. 
61 European Council, 15-16 October 2008, p. 2. 
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collateral and direct purchases of securities (quantitative 
easing) 
Figure 12 below shows that the policy was successful for the 
eurozone. The large spread between the 3-month Euribor and the 
ECB’s main refinancing rate was gradually narrowed as a result of 
the exceptional measures agreed upon at the Eurogroup meeting. It 
is thus the combination of state aid, the ECB’s monetary policy and 
enhanced credit support that has stabilised the situation all along 
the financial and sovereign crisis. The 3-month Euribor stabilised at 
0.7% in the last quarter of 2009, or well below the ECB main 
refinancing rate of 1%, which indicates that liquidity was abundant. 
Though only temporary, the ECB intended to start reducing the 
eligible collateral in credit providing operations, but the sovereign 
debt crisis that started in early 2010 forced it to delay this measure. 
Greek government paper was rated BBB- (Fitch, S&P), which would 
have curtailed access of Greek banks to the ECB’s liquidity 
providing operations. 
Figure 12. Evolution of the ECB’s refinancing rate and 3-month Euribor 
(Jan 2005 - Jan 2015) 
 
Sources: ECB and EBF. 
The intervention of the ECB contrasted, at least in the initial 
phase, with those of other central banks, in particular with the 
Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, which were more active 
in the direct purchase of securities with the so-called ‘quantitative 
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easing’ schemes. In addition, asset support and debt guarantee 
programmes were more extensive in the US and the UK than in the 
eurozone, in the sense that initially a distinction could be made 
between the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world and continental Europe in the 
response to the crisis. According to numbers released by the Bank 
of England, state support for the financial sector, including central 
bank assistance, was up to 74% of GDP in the UK, 48% in the US, 
compared to 28% in the eurozone until end-2009. This changed with 
the sovereign debt crisis of the first half of 2010. 
8.3 Central banks’ interaction with the financial 
system in times of crisis 
Central banks can thus support the financial system through the 
conditions of the liquidity-providing operations. In normal 
circumstances, central banks control money supply through the 
central interest rate on credit for the banking sector. Banks can 
access liquidity in exchange for collateral, which is limited to high-
quality securities, on which a haircut is applied. The ECB for 
example applies a fixed valuation haircut of up to 5.5% on highly-
rated 10-year government bonds (declining with maturity), or up to 
16% for top quality asset backed securities. To cope with market 
fluctuations, margin calls are applied by the ECB.  
During the financial crisis, the ECB initially lowered its 
conditions for acceptable collateral from A- to BBB-, without 
changing the valuation haircuts. It later scrapped the minimum 
credit rating threshold altogether for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, the 
‘Programme countries’, and later for Cyprus, and subject to special 
haircuts. This implies that securities may well have been accepted 
by the central bank with valuation haircuts that were above the 
market price at a given moment, allowing banks to arbitrage. It is 
unclear whether the margin calls have been fully applied in the 
volatile financial market context of the period 2010-2012, or whether 
they have been fully applied for less marketable financial 
instruments.  
In its most extreme form, central banks can buy assets directly 
in the markets at distressed prices to inject liquidity and bring 
stability into the financial system (‘quantitative easing’), as was 
widely carried out in the UK and the US. These operations 
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artificially shore up the value of the assets, and are a support to the 
financial system. Quantitative easing, however, is risky and may 
affect the capital base of the central banks, if losses have to be taken 
on these purchases.  
The EMU form of extensive liquidity assistance were the long-
term refinancing operations (LTROs), by which the ECB injected 
more than €1 trillion over two to three years, the first on 10 
December 2011 with €489 billion, the second on 19 February 2012 
with €530 billion, in the European banking markets. Banks in 
trouble mostly in southern European member states, were large 
participants, but also banks based outside the eurozone, but with 
subsidiaries within, participated. According to the Financial Times, 
based upon Morgan Stanley data, Bankia, the former Caja Madrid 
savings bank, got the lion’s share with €40 billion, followed by 
Intesa Sanpaolo with €36 billion, Dexia with €32.5 billion, Unicredit 
with €23.5 billion, BBVA with €22 billion and Lloyds Banking Group 
with €13 billion.62 The ECB’s action thus provided relief outside the 
eurozone as well. 
Within EMU, direct aid by central banks to the financial 
system is forbidden under the Treaty. However, as financial 
stability remains, even under Banking Union, a national 
responsibility, national central banks can still provide emergency 
liquidity assistance (ELA). This is also ‘state aid’ and needs to be 
authorised by the EU Commission. Also the agreement of the ECB’s 
Governing Council is required for ELA. In the case of Fortis, for 
example, the Belgian central bank (NBB) gave emergency liquidity 
assistance of €60 billion, which had to be specifically authorised by 
the ECB. This also happened later for Dexia Bank. 
8.4 Types of direct bank state aid 
State aid to the financial sector can be offered in four main forms, as 
described below.  
First, states can provide capital support to strengthen the 
capital base of financial institutions. In recapitalisation 
programmes, governments inject funds into banks in exchange for 
direct equity, preferred shares or subordinated debt (as a form of 
                                                        
62 Financial Times, 2 March 2012. 
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hybrid capital). In a situation of serious distress, as the financial 
crisis, banks may need new capital, which will be difficult or 
impossible due to market uncertainty. Recapitalising banks can 
improve the functioning and stability of the banking system and 
maintain financing flows to the wider economy. If the government 
obtains more than fifty percent of the voting rights the 
recapitalisation is considered to be nationalisation. Public 
ownership itself is not a form of state aid – the EU Treaty is neutral 
with regard to the form of ownership – it is the capital injection in a 
bank in trouble that forms state aid. In most cases, the goal of 
nationalisation is to return the bank to health with the objective of 
one day returning it to the private sector. This discussion started 
already in some member states as the financial situation started to 
normalise from 2013 onwards.  
Second, a special form to absorb losses in the financial system 
is asset relief, i.e. the creation of a so-called bad bank. In a bad bank, 
banks get a delay to reimburse their creditors until the financial 
system normalises, and assets recover. Under a bad bank scheme, 
assets are protected or guaranteed by the state in separate legal 
entities. Bad banks can be private, controlled by the bank in trouble 
or by the banking sector at large, or they can be owned by the state. 
Relieving financial institutions of impaired assets can help a bank 
strengthen its balance sheet, re-gain access to liquidity, and reduce 
leverage. Bad bank schemes raise fundamental competition policy 
problems, however, related to determining the new book value of 
the impaired assets, tackling the distortions created by the schemes 
and justifying the scheme to taxpayers when public money is used 
to guarantee the bad assets of banks in trouble, as was the case in 
Belgium, Ireland and Spain.  
Third, governments can guarantee bank deposits, banks bonds 
or all bank liabilities. As deposit guarantee schemes are designed 
for all retail depositors, funded by the banking sector and limited to 
a fixed maximum amount, they do not raise a state aid issue. To the 
extent that the deposit insurance fund is used to bail out an entire 
bank, as happened in the Banesto (1993) and Banco di Sicilia (1995) 
cases, the EU’s state aid rules apply. Deposit protection can be 
extended to cover a broader set of bank liabilities so as to prevent 
gridlock in the financial system, as was done in Ireland in the 
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Eligible Liabilities Guarantee scheme.63 Governments can also 
specifically guarantee certain bank loans and bonds to maintain the 
ability of banks to raise funds. Such guarantees should be 
remunerated, to maintain a level playing field with banks not 
subject to a scheme. 
Fourth, governments can provide other types liquidity support. 
This considers for example direct loans from governments to banks. 
The other liquidity support measures are treated similarly by DG 
Competition as guarantees on bonds and loans. The liquidity 
measures need to be remunerated to maintain a level playing field. 
In turn, for governments it is in general less attractive to grant direct 
loans than guarantees, because the loans are included in the 
calculations of the official government debt figures.  
8.5 EU state aid policy during the financial and 
sovereign crisis 
Direct state aid during the financial and sovereign crisis posed a 
fundamental challenge for the application of the EU’s competition 
policy rules, which had never faced a crisis of that magnitude. The 
remainder of this chapter discusses only direct state aid, and covers 
the period 2008-09 of the financial crisis, with massive state aid for 
North-European banks, and the period 2010-2012 of the sovereign 
crisis, and large cases of aid for Southern-European banks. 
The announcement of the Irish Credit Institutions Financial 
Support scheme on 27 September 2008 was the first of a cascade of 
national bail-out plans, all of which raised to a greater or lesser 
degree single market competition policy problems. From the early 
days of the financial crisis in the autumn of 2007, the EU continued 
to apply its state aid policy, for example in the Northern Rock, IKB 
or Sachsen LB cases. With the start of the systemic crisis in autumn 
2008, it temporarily accepted the exceptional circumstances of the 
crisis and let financial stability concerns precede over the strict 
application of the state aid rules. The EU Commission invoked Art. 
107(3)(b) of the Treaty as legal basis, which exceptionally allows for 
aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a member 
state. 
                                                        
63 See European Commission, State aid case N 254/2010 of 16.06.2010. 
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Table 7. Form of interventions by EU states in support of financial 
institutions, September 2007-August 2014 
Member 
state 
Guarantee 
schemes 
Recapitali-
sation 
schemes 
Schemes 
combining 
several 
measures 
Other 
measures, i.e. 
bad bank 
schemes 
Affected 
financial 
institutions* 
Austria   x  5 
Belgium     5 
Denmark x x   8 
Finland x x   1 
France x x   2 
Germany   x x 12 
Greece   x  9 
Ireland x x  x 8 
Italy x x   1 
Luxembourg     1 
Netherlands x    4 
Portugal x x   7 
Spain x x  x** 15 
Sweden x x   1 
UK x  x  5 
EU15 10 8 4 3 84 
Bulgaria    x***  
Cyprus x    2 
Croatia      
Czech 
Republic 
     
Estonia      
Hungary   x  1 
Latvia x    3 
Lithuania   x  2 
Malta      
Poland x x  x***  
Romania      
Slovakia x x    
Slovenia x x   5 
EU13 5 3 2 2 13 
EU28 15 11 6 5 97 
* This number counts cases during the financial crisis concerning one and the same bank 
or closely-linked network only once. 
** In the case of Spain, this concerns an asset repurchase scheme. 
*** Liquidation scheme. 
Source: Compiled from European Commission, DG Comp, updated until August 2014. 
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Until August 2014, the European Commission had been 
notified of 21 state debt guarantee and 17 recapitalisation schemes, 
and 97 specific bank state aid cases. Some 13 of the old member 
states (except Belgium and Luxembourg) had a national scheme, 
and eight new member states (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). Five EU member states 
had neither bank support schemes nor individual bank support 
cases, all of these new member states (Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Malta and Romania). The national support schemes are in 
some cases limited to guarantees only, but can also comprise 
recapitalisation or bad bank schemes, as shown in Table 7. Germany 
and the UK had the most comprehensive national schemes, whereas 
Spain had the highest number of individual bank cases (15).  
The total amount of support measures to the financial sector 
approved during the crisis added up to €5.4 trillion, 39.7% of the 
EU’s GDP. It consists of general and ad hoc support for financial 
institutions, composed of debt guarantees, short-term liquidity 
support, equity (recapitalisation) and debt (subordinated debt) 
financing, and support for bad bank schemes. €1.9 trillion (14.3% of 
GDP) of this amount has been effectively used. State guarantees on 
bank liabilities represent the largest budgetary commitment among 
the aid instruments, with €3.7 trillion (27.5% of EU GDP) of 
approved measures, out of which €1.2 trillion (8.8% of GDP) have 
been effectively granted (see also Table 8). These guarantees were 
provided in national schemes, with varying legal frameworks and 
timelines. They differ in three general aspects:  
- Amounts granted: Allowances available ranged from 
insignificant to unlimited (Belgium, Denmark and Ireland). 
- Eligibility: Certain countries were much more restrictive with 
respect to which firms were eligible for guarantees. For 
example, Ireland made allowances available to any financial 
institution with a systemic relevance to the Irish economy. By 
contrast, the Dutch scheme was open only to those 
institutions defined as banks and having their corporate 
domicile or substantial operations in the Netherlands, and 
with an acceptable solvency ratio. 
- Conditionality: While many schemes placed restrictions on 
executive pay, only some placed restrictions on balance sheet 
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growth, and fewer made guarantees available only to 
“fundamentally sound institutions”. 
Table 8. Public interventions in the EU banking sector, 2008-13 (€ bn) 
 Committed 
aid 
Effectively 
used 
% share % EU 2013 
GDP 
(A) (B) (B/A) (B/GDP) 
Re-capitalisation 781.8 448.2 57.3 3.31 
Asset relief 599.8 188.2 31.4 1.39 
Total re-capitalisation and 
asset relief 
1,381.6 636.4 46.1 4.70 
Guarantees  3,724.2 1,188.1* 31.9 8.78 
Other liquidity support 269.0 104.9* 39.0 0.78 
Total liquidity measures 3,993.2 1,293.0 32.4 9.56 
Total 5,374.7 1,929.4 28.7 14.26 
Note: For country specific data, see European Commission (2014). This does not 
include the revenues obtained by governments from these support schemes. 
*Calibrated using the aggregates of the highest end of year values per country. 
Source: European Commission (2015). 
According to the latest Commission data, member states have 
received a total of €148 billion (1.1% of EU 2013 GDP) in revenue in 
exchange for their support to the banking sector.  
During the crisis, the European Commission’s Competition 
Directorate published several Communications to try to bring some 
order in the national support schemes. However, the Commission 
only succeeded gradually in doing this, as the crisis receded and the 
need to preserve the single market re-emerged as a policy priority. 
Issues such as non-discriminatory access or unjustified protection of 
shareholders were apparent but initially led to no or only limited 
reaction on the part of the EU. In total, the European Commission 
published eight Communications of a temporary nature.  
The first Communication, published in October 2008, sets out 
the general principles to be respected, the successive ones focus on 
aspects of it, i.e. the required remuneration for state support, the 
treatment of impaired assets and the restructuring plans in the 
return to viability. The next two discuss the temporary prolongation 
and adaptation of certain elements of the previous communications. 
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The 2013 Banking Communication consolidates all the previous 
ones.  
Overall, the Commission’s objectives are to: 
- demonstrate a capacity for an effective Community-level 
response to the financial crisis, 
- limit negative spill-over among member states, 
- protect the single market and 
- minimise competitive distortions and moral hazard. 
It should be recalled that many of these single market 
distortions and thorny competition policy problems could have 
been avoided if an effective EU bank resolution and crisis 
management framework had been in place. A first directive on the 
re-organisation and winding up of credit institutions (directive 
2001/24/EC) was adopted in 2001, but the harmonisation was too 
limited and the supervisory practices too divergent.  
The most important document in the context of this chapter, 
and the future shape of the European banking markets, is the July 
2009 Communication on the return to viability. It states that the 
Commission will examine restructuring plans in view of: 
- A thorough diagnosis of a bank’s problems. The starting point for 
a viability plan with, where applicable, disclosure of impaired 
assets and off-balance sheet items. 
- A restructuring plan with a flexible and realistic timing. A 
viability plan requires a stress test. It should demonstrate how 
the bank will return to viability without aid as soon as 
possible (maximum term is five years), giving details per 
business line on the re-structuring, funding, risk controls, 
governance. It should also analyse alternative considered 
options, such as sale of the bank or break-up. 
- Clear burden-sharing between the member state and beneficiaries. 
The aid should be limited to the minimum necessary, which 
can include the sale of assets, although the Commission 
acknowledges that absolute thresholds cannot be set ex ante. 
Aid should be remunerated, but cannot be used to pay 
dividends or subordinated debt holders. 
- Measures to limit distortions of competition. These will again be 
case-specific or tailor-made, as many elements have to be 
taken into consideration: the survival of the bank, the 
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maintenance of the single market, the promotion of 
competitive markets. State aid cannot be used for 
acquisitions, a condition that applies for at least three years. 
In applying these rules, the European Commission accepted 
new conditions. It accepted the recapitalisation of banks during the 
crisis, not only emergency loans and special guarantees. For non-
financial corporations, the rule is that recapitalisation is only 
accepted after the restructuring. Recapitalisation is also seen as a 
more permanent measure than loans and guarantees, meaning that 
aid becomes longer-term, and thus more permanent, than the state 
aid rules as applied before. Finally, the Commission also accepted 
aid schemes, not only individual measures. 
The Commission published its latest guidelines on the subject 
in July 2013, which replace the previous Communications. It sets 
that financial stability remains the overarching objective for the 
Commission in reacting to financial crisis, “whilst ensuring that 
State aid and distortions of competition between banks and across 
Member States are kept to the minimum”. The rules state that state 
aid can only be accepted after hybrid capital and subordinated debt 
holders have contributed to reducing the capital shortfall ‘to the 
maximum extent’ (Art. 41 Communication). But the Commission 
does ‘not require contribution from senior debt holders (in 
particular from insured deposits, uninsured deposits, bonds and all 
other senior debt) as a mandatory component’ (Art. 42), which is the 
big difference with the framework of the new Bank Resolution and 
Recovery Directive (2014).  
The Communication repeats that future state recapitalisation 
measures, whether in the context of stress test or asset quality 
review, can only be accepted on very strict conditions, once other 
means, such as bail-ins, have been exhausted, and after a 
restructuring plan has been accepted by the Commission (Art. 29-
30). Only in exceptional circumstances, when financial stability is at 
risk can measures be accepted ex-post (Art. 45-51), which does not 
prevent the compliance with burden-sharing measures. Guarantees 
and liquidity support can be granted before a restructuring plan is 
approved, but only after notification and temporary approval, 
following the conditions set in the previous communications, 
including adequate remuneration, and behavioural restrictions. 
THE GREAT FINANCIAL PLUMBING | 155 
 
They are restricted to banks that have no capital shortfall (items 56-
58).  
8.6 State aid cases during the financial crisis 
The principles of the Return to Viability Communication formed the 
basis for the state aid decisions that the European Commission 
adopted from the autumn of 2009 onwards. Although some 
decisions had been taken before, such as with Commerzbank, the 
Commission aimed to indicate that the situation had returned to 
normal. In announcing the ING, KBC and Lloyds Decisions on 18 
November 2009, former Competition Policy Commissioner Neely 
Kroes said: “We want to ensure that banks can be rebuilt so that they 
can play their role in helping Europe's economy to recover and will 
not be a long-term burden on Europe's taxpayers.” The 
Commissioner added that three common principles underpin the 
Commission’s approach to these cases: 1) presence of a long-term 
business model, 2) minimisation of taxpayer burdens and 3) the 
maintenance of the single market. The final approval of the 
measures was conditional upon the presentation of a restructuring 
plan capable of restoring the long-term viability of the bank without 
continued state support.  
The announcement of the Commission Decisions regarding 
state-aided banks seemed to have taken markets by surprise, as the 
stocks of these banks fell considerably, depending on the scale of the 
restructuring plan. The share price of ING and Lloyds fell by about 
30% in the week following the announcement. Markets appeared to 
be unaware of the Commission’s powers to act on state aid, or had 
simply disregarded them. The Commission plan was also a signal 
to those banks that did not benefit from explicit government 
support during the crisis that the level playing field would be 
restored.  
The agreement between the Commission and the home state 
of the bank in question is specific in each case. The ING 
announcement that it would divest all its insurance and investment 
management activities – and thus end its bank-insurance model – 
led to speculation that the Commission would impose the same 
conditions on other groups. In the KBC case, however, another deal 
was reached, including the divestment of the group’s private 
banking and private equity business, and the sale of non-core 
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activities in Central and Eastern Europe. In the case of Lloyds, 
probably one of the most difficult cases after the takeover of the 
bankrupt HBOS, the Commission took comfort from the sale of a 
part of the retail banking group.  
The Commission applied the following criteria in judging 
each case:  
- The aid must be limited to the minimum necessary to achieve 
the objective. 
- It must be proportional to the contribution made by private 
share- and bondholders. Hence, constraints are imposed on 
management and owners. 
- The aid must be appropriate and well-targeted. 
- The aid must be remunerated. 
Applying these criteria in practice is difficult, however. What 
is the strictest minimum for aid? What is proportional? What 
conditions can be imposed on state-aided banks? As Table 9 and Box 
3 below demonstrate, the European Commission has clearly applied 
certain principles consistently: adequate remuneration, dividend 
ban, price leadership ban, but the degree of downsizing and the core 
market reduction differs importantly.  
Table 9. Comparing state aid decisions of one mid-sized and five large 
cross-border European banks 
 Balance sheet total (€ bn) Burden-sharing Business reduction 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Remuner-
ation 
Coupon Core 
market 
Balance 
sheet 
(%) 
Bans 
Standard rule       -/+ (-) (-) 50 (-) 
Commerzbank 625 844 754 662 636 550 + +/- - >45 ++ 
Dexia 651 578 567 413 357 223 + - + >35 ++ 
ING 1332 1164 1247 1279 1169 1081 + - + >45 ++ 
KBC 355 324 321 285 257 241 + + +/- <20 + 
Lloyds (£) 436 1027 992 971 925 847 + + + <20 + 
RBS (£) 2402 1696 1454 1507 1312 1028 + +/- + >25 + 
Data sources: Nicola Pesaresi and DG Competition, European Commission; 
European Commission, State Aid Monitor; and banks annual reports. 
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Box 3. Main points of state aid decisions affecting five large cross-
border banks and one mid-sized bank 
Commerzbank 
- State aid: Recapitalisation worth €8.2 billion and a guarantee framework 
for securities worth up to €15 billion (October 2008), additional equity 
capital totalling €10 billion (January 2009) 
- Internal headcount reduction and restructuring/downsizing 
programme (45% reduction of balance sheet) 
- Divestment of Eurohypo by 2014 at the latest 
- Reduction of investment banking operations and divestment of some 
entities (Kleinwort Benson) 
- Reduced market presence in Central and Eastern Europe 
- Acquisition ban until April 2012 
- Dividend ban (2008-09) 
- Price leadership ban 
Dexia 
- State aid: €8.4 billion recapitalisation and guarantee or guaranteed 
liquidity assistance of €95-135 billion  
- Domestic (life insurance business, retail branches, bond portfolio) and 
international (Crediop, RCB International, Dexia bank Slovakia, …) 
divestment programme  
-  35% reduction in Dexia’s balance sheet total by end-2014 compared to 
end-2008 
- Reduction of short-term funding from 30% of total balance sheet in 2009 
to 11% in 2014 
- Reduction of operational costs by 15% by end-2012 
- Dividend ban (until end-2011) 
- Acquisition ban (until end 2011) 
- Advertising restrictions 
- Adherence to G-20 remuneration principles 
ING  
- State aid: Recapitalisation €10 billion and €12 billion of liquidity 
guarantees (October 2008), illiquid asset back-up facility covering 80% of 
a portfolio of $39 billion (January 2009) 
- Internal headcount reduction and restructuring programme (45% 
balance sheet reduction) 
- Divestment of several ING insurance brands and complete separation of 
banking and insurance by end 2013 
- Divestment of ING Direct US (considered to be core by the group, but to 
be divested by 2013) 
- Divestment of new company for Dutch retail financial market (composed 
of mortgage and consumer credit activities) 
- Price leadership ban for the EU for certain retail and SME banking 
products for three year period maximum 
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- Acquisition ban for three-year period maximum 
KBC 
- State aid: Recapitalisation of €3.5 billion (December 2008), a second 
recapitalisation of another €3.5 billion (January 2009) and an asset relief 
measure on a portfolio containing CDOs (May 2009) 
- Divestment of KBL Private Bank 
- Divestment of non-core activities in Central and Eastern-Europe (Serbia, 
Slovenia and Russia) 
- Divestment or scaling down a number of specialist investment banking 
activities, including most of the operations of the subsidiary, KBC 
Financial Products  
- Sale of several complementary distribution channels in Belgium 
- Focus on six home markets in bank-insurance for retail and SMEs in 
Belgium and five countries in Central and Eastern Europe, namely the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria 
- Scaling back a large proportion of loan portfolios outside home markets 
- Dividend, acquisition and price leadership ban 
Lloyds 
- State aid: £17 billion recapitalisation (January 2009) and £5.9 billion 
(November 2009) 
- Asset reduction programme (£181 billion by end-2014) 
- Divestment programme of some brands (including TSB) 
- Divestment of 600 branches in England and Wales (corresponding to 
4.6% market of the current account market), and behavioural constraints 
- Acquisition ban 
- dividend ban 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
- State aid: £15 billion recapitalisation and £5 billion preference shares 
(October 2008), converted into ordinary shares in January 2009. Further 
injection of £25.5 billion in November 2009, giving the state a total stake 
of 84% 
- Internal headcount reduction and restructuring programme 
- Large divestment programme (including RBS Insurance)  
- Divestment of foreign participations (e.g. Bank of China) 
- Sales corresponding to 25-30% of balance sheet 
- 14% ceiling in SME market 
Source: State Aid Register, DG Competition, European Commission. 
 
Given that each of these banks operate with different business 
models and in different circumstances, it is obvious that the 
outcome of these state aid decisions is ‘tailor-made’. Commerzbank 
and RBS had just engaged in a large acquisition before the crisis 
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erupted (Dresdner Bank, respectively ABN AMRO’s wholesale 
banking unit), leading to substantial adjustments. However, the 
large losses were in the RBS case covered by a large recapitalisation 
by the British state, in the case of Commerzbank through a 
subordinated debt subscription and more limited capital injection 
by the German federal republic. In ING’s case, the crisis forced it to 
rethink its business model, reducing complexity and to focus on its 
core business: banking. KBC had to reduce its number of home 
markets and divest its private banking, but was not asked to divest 
insurance; Lloyds substantially reduced its dominance in the UK 
market, after the forced acquisition of HBOS.  
The degree of requested balance sheet reduction differed 
considerably: from less than 20% in KBC, to 45% in ING and 
Commerzbank. The argumentation for the large-scale reduction in 
ING was that the aid amounted to more than 2% of risk-weighted 
assets, but this was also the case for KBC and Lloyds, which were 
less heavily sanctioned. According to the Commission, the latter 
two cases were satisfactory on behavioural constraints, hence the 
balance sheet reduction was lower. From what can be observed until 
end-2012, the outcome of the balance sheet reduction led to mixed 
results. 
On several occasions, the Commission mentions that it will 
use the restructuring plans to increase competition in the local retail 
banking markets. The concentration in retail financial markets in the 
smaller member states is a well-known problem, which the 
Commission’s competition policy directorate addressed in a 2007 
inquiry (European Commission, 2007). Although overall the inquiry 
concluded that retail banking markets in the EU were only 
moderately concentrated, they were highly concentrated in Finland, 
the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden. Increasing competition in 
the home market is explicitly mentioned in the decisions on ING, 
KBC and Lloyds as reason for requiring certain divestments.64 On 
the other hand, the European Commission’s state aid unit has 
mandated the divestment of foreign entities of state aided banks, 
and to focus on some core markets, which reduces competition at 
                                                        
64 Explicitly mentioned in the press releases on ING and KBC, European 
Commission, 18 November 2009. 
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EU level. This has led to the criticism that it was acting contrary to 
its own objectives.  
It could be argued that the Commission was measuring 
competition at national level, not at European level. The French 
refinancing scheme, agreed in October 2008, was cleared the same 
month by the Commission, who judged that the scheme was an 
appropriate, necessary and proportionate means of remedying a 
serious disturbance in the French economy. The Commission 
authorised it as it gave non-discriminatory access for all banks 
authorised in France, including the subsidiaries of foreign groups; 
it included a pricing mechanism that covered the funding costs of 
the scheme and ensured a fair contribution by the beneficiary banks, 
and it had appropriate safeguards against abuse of the scheme.  
The same happened with the recapitalisation scheme, which 
was authorised by the European Commission on the same grounds. 
Under the SPPE (Société de Prises de Participation de l’Etat) 
structure, the state invested in securities issued by the beneficiary 
banks. These securities took the form of hybrid capital instruments 
(subordinated debt securities classified as non-core Tier 1 capital) 
and were remunerated at a fixed rate for the first five years and at a 
variable rate thereafter. The remuneration, which averaged about 
8%, reflected the degree of solvency of each beneficiary bank via a 
credit default swap (CDS) component, whereby remuneration is 
modulated according to the risk of default. All large French banks 
benefited from the scheme, but it did not lead to any specific 
demands on the banks involved.65 Only one French bank was the 
subject of an individual state aid procedure, the Banque 
Populaire/Caisse d’Épargne, which benefited from €2.45 billion 
government aid, on top of that already granted under the French 
scheme. But also that case was cleared by the European Commission 
without further restructuring demands.66 This compares to 12 
individual bank cases in Germany, some of which are still under in-
depth investigation, and much deeper restructuring demands. 
It should thus come as no surprise that some states felt 
unjustly treated, leading to criticism of arbitrariness and inflexibility 
                                                        
65 See cases 613/2008 (recap) and 548/2008 (refinancing) in the European 
Commission’s state aid register. 
66 Case N249/2009. 
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in the decisions. In January 2010, ING lodged an appeal with the 
European Court of Justice against specific elements of the EC’s 
Decision of 18 November 2009. ING objected to the price leadership 
restrictions and the proportionality of the restructuring 
requirements demanded by the European Commission. In addition, 
the Commission judged that the early repayment by ING to the 
Dutch state of the first tranche of the subordinated debt as 
additional state aid of approximately €2 billion. Both ING and the 
Dutch state contested this element of the Decision.67 The 
Commission argued that early repayment would distort the level 
playing field again. In an historic court case, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union judged that renegotiation of the 
reimbursement conditions may not necessarily amount to 
additional state aid, arguing that a private investor would have 
done the same.68 
8.7 State aid cases during the sovereign crisis 
The highest profile cases in the second phase of the crisis were 
undoubtedly the Spanish savings banks, although the Greek, 
Cypriot and Irish cases should also be discussed. But the crisis 
continued to affect other countries as well, such as Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Belgium or Germany. The exceptional situation in the 
financial sector continued in many countries until well into 2013, 
also in core countries such as Denmark and Germany.  
The Spanish savings banks cases, agreed upon in November 
2012, ended a 2-year long process of increasing concerns about the 
health of the Spanish banking sector, but was also the first state aid 
case where a bail-in was applied on a large scale, to preferred stock 
(preferentes) and subordinated debt holders, and where burden-
sharing was enforced. Of the estimated €59 billion needed to 
recapitalise the financial sector in Spain, about €12.7 billion was 
raised though bail-ins, compared to €38.8 billion public money, lent 
to Spain by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).69 
                                                        
67 See ING 2009 Annual Report, p. 12.  
68 Judgement of the ECJ, 2 March 2012, Cases T-29/10 and T-33/10. See also 
Clifford Chance (2012), ING's landmark victory brightens the outlook for State 
aid recipients, Client Briefing, March. 
69 IMF (2013), Spain: Financial Sector Reform—Third Progress Report, July. 
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Notwithstanding this sum, the losses in the Spanish savings banks 
were enormous, with the direct capital support (not including 
impaired asset measures or state guarantees) to the banks from the 
beginning of the crisis amounting to €61.9 billion, or 6.1% of 2013 
GDP. Spain also created a bad bank scheme in November 2012, the 
SAREB, to which a substantial part of the assets of the restructured 
banks were transferred. It was decided that the average value of the 
assets transferred to the bad bank should be 63.1%. In early 2013, 
SAREB had more than €50 billion in assets (compared to a gross 
value of over €100 billion).   
Box 4. Main points of state aid decisions affecting the Spanish savings 
banks 
BFA-Bankia  
- State aid: In form of direct capital injections of €22.4 bn, and capital relief 
and impaired asset measures amounting to up to €13.8 billion (or in total 
22% of its RWA as of 31 December 2011), in addition to the State 
guarantees on senior unsecured debt for a total of €53.9 billion. 
- Haircut of 38% for holders of preferred stock and 36% for subordinated 
debt 
- Reduction of branch network and headcount 
- Decrease its existing geographical footprint 
- Remuneration control 
- Coupon ban 
- Marketing and acquisition ban 
Catalunya Banc  
- State aid: In form of capital injections €12.05 billion and impaired asset 
measures up to €1.6 billion (32.3% of RWA), in addition to guarantees on 
€10.76 billion assets. 
- Haircut of 61% for holders of preferred stock and 40% for perpetual 
subordinated debt 
- Reduction of branch network and headcount 
- Focus on core region and businesses 
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Nova Caixa Galicia 
- State aid: Capital injections totalling €9.1 billion and guarantees up to €7.5 
billion on bonds issued under the Spanish guarantee scheme  
- Haircut of 43% for holders of preferred stock and 40% for subordinated 
debt 
- Focus on core region and businesses, non-core divestments 
- Marketing and acquisition ban 
Sources: State Aid Register, DG Comp, European Commission. 
Table 10. State aid decision of the main Spanish savings banks 
 Balance sheet  total 
(€ bn) 
Burden-sharing Behavioural 
commitments 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 Remun
eration 
Coupon 
ban 
Bail-in 
pref./ 
sub debt 
Core 
market 
Balance 
sheet 
(%) 
Bans 
Standard 
rule 
    -/+ (-)  (-) 50 (-) 
BFA Bankia n.a. 298 278 251 ++ + 38% - 
36% 
+ >40 ++ 
Catalunya 
Banca 
77 77 74 63 + - 61% - 
40% 
+ >20 ++ 
Nova Caixa 
Galicia 
67 72 60 53 + - 43% - 
40% 
+ >30 ++ 
Source: Aid Register, DG Competition, European Commission; IMF (2013) and bank 
annual reports.  
Ireland was the EU country that started the bail-outs with 
huge bank support measures in September 2008, but continued to 
struggle throughout the sovereign crisis. Expressed as a % of GDP, 
the support for the financial sector was highest in Ireland of all EU 
countries. All local banks were affected, and Ireland’s debt to GDP 
also doubled as a result of the financial crisis, raising questions 
about the sustainability of its public finances.  
The highest profile case was Anglo-Irish Bank, which 
received a cumulated capital injection of €29.3 billion, upon a total 
balance sheet of €72 billion in 2010 (€101 billion at the end of 2008), 
an even higher absolute amount than Bankia. Anglo-Irish was a 
‘monoline’ bank specialising in commercial real estate lending in 
three core markets: Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, three markets that faced huge declines during the crisis. 
However, with more than 30% aid to total balance sheet, or 18% of 
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the Irish 2012 GDP, one could wonder whether this ‘limits the 
restructuring costs and the amount of State aid to the minimum 
necessary’, and whether the bank had to be bailed-out for systemic 
reasons. The Commission considered, however, that an immediate 
liquidation would be more costly than an orderly resolution and 
would require more state aid.70  
The two largest banks, Allied Irish banks, and Bank of Ireland, 
also received substantial capital injections, €13.1 billion respectively 
€5.2 billion, apart from impaired asset measures and liability 
guarantees. The capital support to these three banks alone adds up 
to 29% of the Irish 2012 GDP. 
Greece had no individual bank state aid cases in the first stage 
of the financial crisis, but a general guarantee and recapitalisation 
fund (HFSF) that had been approved from November 2008 
onwards. With the start of the sovereign crisis, the huge decline in 
economic activity, and the deposit flight, the needs grew 
exponentially, and the HFSF was endowed with €50 billion of the 
EU money to save Greece from default. The four large Greek banks 
Alpha Bank, EFG Eurobank, Piraeus Bank and National Bank of 
Greece received total capital support amounting to €18 billion. After 
the 2015 crisis, a new package of capital support for the Greek banks 
was approved by the European Council. 
8.8 Conclusions 
The containment of the financial and sovereign crisis was the result 
of a vast comprehensive effort by governments, central banks and 
international authorities. Measures to stabilise the financial sector 
and support the economy taken at EU and national levels have 
benefited all financial players and economic actors. But some 
financial institutions or sectors were in need of much more 
substantial support than others. 
The direct state support happened in a very disparate and 
non-coordinated matter, however, in contrast to what the 
Eurogroup meeting of 12 October 2008 had affirmed. Many member 
states chose to call upon a national scheme to support the entire 
                                                        
70 Commission Decision of 29.06.2011 on state aid, No SA.32504 (2011/N) and 
C 11/2010 (ex N 667/2009). 
THE GREAT FINANCIAL PLUMBING | 165 
 
financial sector, but the schemes varied widely in scale and scope. 
In other cases, states provided support to individual banks, or 
through a combination of both. But the quality of sovereign 
guarantees and aid differed significantly, thus favouring ‘weak’ 
borrowers with a ‘strong’ sovereign backing, or disadvantaging 
‘strong’ borrowers with a ‘weak’ sovereign backing. To break the 
doom-loop between banks and their sovereigns the European 
Council agreed on the creation of a Banking Union in June 2012. 
Seen in hindsight, comprehensive national support schemes 
raised much less of a competition policy problem, as they provided 
support for the whole banking sector in a certain country.71 The 
French scheme was a case in point, since it was imposed on all the 
large banks, and rapidly got the blessing of the EU, as it was non-
discriminatory. In other countries, the problem with some banks 
was much more acute, and required direct state support, often in 
addition to a national scheme. The end-result is that some banks 
ended up in a tight restructuring and downsizing plan imposed by 
the European Commission, whereas others have fared almost 
unaffected. A direct consequence of these differences in national 
policies is that the banking landscape emerged entirely reshaped 
after the crisis. 
The question whether the single market was maintained 
seems almost rhetorical in this perspective. Banking started on a 
much more uneven playing field after the crisis than before. To 
some extent, there is only the bank and its management to blame. 
But national policy-makers could also be criticised for their limited 
knowledge of the EU’s state aid rules, for their incapacity to put 
together a comprehensive support plan and for not having reacted 
rapidly enough. The renewed legislative and supervisory 
framework, including the recovery and resolution framework, must 
ensure that the markets become more European again.   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
71 See also Boughdene et al. (2010), who came to the same conclusion in an 
overview regarding asset relief measures in the EU. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS: SAFE TO BANK? 
he financial and economic crisis will remain in the public 
memory for at least a generation to come, and concerns about 
the safety and soundness of the financial system will haunt 
policy-makers and the public alike. The vast array of regulatory 
reforms, described in this book, are largely a reaction to the past 
crisis, critics argue, and there is no assurance they can avoid or 
withstand the next one. The whole body of global financial 
regulatory reform has not been based on a clear design, but rather 
grew progressively, starting after the Great Depression in the 1930s 
and evolving in different ways across the various countries affected. 
A wave of liberalisation started in the 1970s, which in the EU context 
was later encapsulated in the single market programme, which 
harmonised the basic prudential standards for banking and finance. 
A second wave followed in the late 1990s, with the start of the Basel 
II discussions, which in the EU coincided with the launch of 
monetary union. But the financial crisis abruptly stopped this 
process and reinstated old recipes from the 1930s on the menu.  
While not perfect, we would argue that the EU, in close 
cooperation with the G-20, managed to push through a well-
designed process of regulatory reform in a limited period of time. 
Following its determination to subject “all systemically important 
financial institutions, markets and instruments … to an appropriate 
degree of regulation and oversight,” the G-20 adopted a clear 
programme for financial sector re-regulation. In certain areas, such 
as oversight of rating agents, hedge funds and derivatives markets, 
these elements had already been on the agenda of policy-makers – 
but without consensus on the way to act. For other areas, such as 
the resolution of banks, an entirely new framework was put in 
place, with a global approach for the bail-in of debt-holders, in case 
banks fail to meet minimum thresholds for capital. In the EU 
specifically, the crisis made policy-makers realise the need for 
stronger centralisation of supervision, which culminated in the 
T
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Banking Union proposals, with a single supervisor and a single 
resolution authority – a major step forward.  
The paramount question remains implementation and 
enforcement. A vast array of new measures have been put in place, 
creating the formidable challenge for policy-makers and 
supervisors of applying them consistently, and for banks and 
operators of complying with them. In the EU in particular, because 
of the single market and the need for a single rulebook, the G-20 
commitments were implemented through a long list of regulations 
and directives, and an even longer list of secondary legislation 
(implementing regulatory and technical standards). For the 
eurozone and the countries that opt in to the SSM, the expertise of 
the ECB should be a source of reassurance, but the challenge of 
bringing European banking markets in line with a single template 
is huge. For large eurozone banks, the change from the comfort of 
communicating with the national administration in the capital to 
dealing with one distant European supervisor for the entire group 
in Frankfurt is more profound than the start of monetary union, 
which unified monetary policy but left its execution, i.e. the 
liquidity-providing operations, decentralised. 
Once fully in place, the resolution and deposit guarantee 
schemes framework should provide a substantial buffer for coping 
with future banking crises. This should be seen in combination with 
all the steps that have been taken in recent years to make banks safer 
and more resilient to crises, but also to allow banks to fail, if 
necessary, in an organised way. The debate surrounding the 
presumed lack of a fiscal backstop needs to be qualified, as it does 
not sufficiently take into account all the layers of defence that exist 
to make the financial system more resilient.  
The first layer of defence is a much plumper cushion for 
absorbing losses, composed of a higher level of capital, under a 
tighter definition, as shown in Table 11. In addition, authorities can 
request macro-prudential, systemic and institution-specific capital 
buffers in different forms, such as for globally systemically 
important institutions. As capital is measured on a risk-weighted 
basis, this should be complemented from 2018 onwards with a 
minimum leverage ratio. As soon as a bank falls below the 8% 
capital ratio, it will be requested by the resolution authorities to 
return to that level through an asset sale or rights issue, or proceed 
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with a bail-in, which should happen smoothly if it is of a limited 
magnitude.   
The question remains of how a crisis in a large bank or region 
will be dealt with, and whether the funds in place are sufficient to 
cope with it. These matters are even more urgent given the 
transition period between now and 2024, during which time the 
deposit insurance and resolution funds will not yet be fully funded. 
A large bail-in for a bank in excess of €1 trillion in assets will not 
take place without having effects on global capital markets. This 
step will most likely be taken in tandem with the disposal of certain 
entities of the group, whereby the resolution and/or the deposit 
insurance fund will be called upon, causing further challenges for 
global coordination. A €55 billion resolution fund for the eurozone 
is very small indeed, compared to the sums the US provided under 
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program, initially set at $700 billion) 
or to AIG in 2008, or to the €25 billion needed to recapitalise the 
Greek banks after the 2015 crisis. Emergency lending assistance 
(ELA) may also be used as a temporary solution, but even within 
the Eurozone, this is provided by the national central bank. It 
remains to be seen how a single approach will be applied in these 
circumstances.  
Table 11. Layers of defence for bank crisis 
 What minimum? Where and 
when? 
Before 
Capital 4.5% CET1, 6% incl. 
additional Tier 1 
capital, and 8% incl. 
Tier 2 capital, risk-
weighted  
Global, EU and 
EEA 
4% Tier 1 upon 
looser definition 
of capital, 8% 
total capital, risk-
weighted 
Capital add-
ons and 
macro-
prudential 
buffer 
G-SIBs (up to +3.5% 
CET1), O-SIIs (up to 
+2% CET1)  
Capital Conservation 
buffer (+2.5% CET1) 
Countercyclical 
capital buffer (up to 
+2.5% CET1)  
Systemic risk buffer  
(0%-3%-5% CET1)  
EU and EEA Only in a few 
member states 
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Leverage 
ratio 
3%, non-risk-
weighted 
Global, EU and 
EEA expected 
from 2018 
onwards 
Not in EU 
Bail-in Minimum 8% of total 
liabilities and own 
funds  
EU and EEA, 
from 2016 
onwards 
Non-existent 
Deposit 
Guarantee 
Schemes 
Pre-funding at 0.8% 
of covered deposits, 
max coverage 
€100,000 per 
depositor per bank 
EU and EEA, 
to be fully in 
place in 2024 at 
the latest 
Only €18.6 billion 
(2011) in DGS 
funds in the EU 
Resolution 
Fund 
1% of the amount of 
covered deposits; 
covering max 5% of 
liabilities in case of 
resolution 
EU and EEA, 
to be fully in 
place in 2024 at 
the latest 
Non-existent 
Single 
Resolution 
Fund 
Pre-funding at 1% of 
covered deposits  
EMU and opt-
ins, to be fully 
in place in 2024 
at the latest 
Non-existent 
European 
Stability 
Mechanism 
€55 billion direct 
recap facility 
EMU, since 
June 2014 
Non-existent 
 
The ultimate backstop for the eurozone is the European 
Stability Mechanism, when a bank has no clear national parent or a 
weak sovereign, but the amount allocated for the recapitalisation 
facility remains low. Since the ESM is state-funded, however, it 
could be significantly increased, if necessary. But in the latter case, 
the decision will need to be taken by unanimous agreement by all, 
or almost all ESM members. The most recent episodes in the Greek 
crisis has shown that unanimity would not be easy to obtain. 
The challenge for the years to come is to extend the logic of 
the SSM, and Banking Union in general, to other parts of the 
financial system, where needed, and eventually to make the 
necessary changes to the supervisory architecture. The EU Treaty 
article that passed banking supervision to the ECB was an easy 
solution to centralising supervision and gave a clear sign to the 
markets that the lessons of the past had been heeded. In the longer 
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term, the question needs to remain on the agenda of whether this is 
the best solution or whether it would be preferable to separate 
supervision from monetary policy in an altogether different 
European institution. The specific European supervisory needs of 
the insurance sector, capital markets and financial infrastructures 
also require close monitoring, more cooperation and possibly 
changes to the EU Treaty. So far, member states have been reluctant 
to follow the logic of Banking Union for the supervision of market 
infrastructures such as CSDs or CCPs, which does not make sense. 
A more rational division of labour between the EBA and the ECB 
should also be on the agenda. 
Another priority is the allocation of macro-prudential 
supervisory tasks that will require further streamlining. In the 
current set-up, they remain scattered across different entities, both 
national and European, which does not facilitate coordinated action. 
The CRD IV formally maintained important macro-prudential 
powers and the possibility to impose specific measures, such as 
capital buffers, at the national level. Macro-prudential coordination 
is undertaken by the ESRB within the ECB for the whole of the EU, 
but this body can only act in an advisory capacity, while the SSM 
has the capacity to overrule national measures for eurozone banks 
and countries that have opted-in. 
The complexity of rules and rulemaking is a major issue of 
concern and one that has spiralled out of control. Firstly, to fulfil the 
promise of a single rulebook, the primary legislation has become 
very complex and detailed. Secondly, much reliance is placed on 
secondary legislation in regulatory and technical standards in 
hundreds of separate pieces of legislation, which often fall outside 
parliamentary control. Remembering the adage that “complexity is 
the road towards capture”, this does not necessarily facilitate good 
oversight; on the contrary. Supervisors and banks may be bogged 
down in details and lose sight of the overall picture. 
Hence, even if the SSM started in November 2014, creating an 
integrated regulatory and supervisory framework will remain a 
work in progress. 
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ANNEX: OVERVIEW OF BANKING 
AND FINANCE LEGISLATION 
● Banking 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 
conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning 
policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)  
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform 
procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund 
Council implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/81 of 19 December 
2014 specifying uniform conditions of application of Regulation 
(EU) No 806/2014 with regard to ex ante contributions to the Single 
Resolution Fund  
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)  
Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery 
and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (DGSD)  
Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV)  
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions 
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms 
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Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)  
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms 
● Securities markets and investment firms 
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MIFiR) 
Regulation (EU) 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) 
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments 
Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)  
Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse  
Market Abuse Directive (MAD II) 
Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse 
Short Selling Regulation (SSR)   
Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of 
credit default swaps 
TD  
Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market 
Credit Rating Agency Regulation (CRAR) 
Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 
on credit rating agencies 
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● Investment funds and managers 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities (UCITS V) 
Directive 2014/91/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 July 2014 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities as regards depositary 
functions, remuneration policies and sanctions 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) 
Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
European Venture Capital Funds (EuVECA) 
Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 April 2013 on European venture capital funds 
European Social Entrepreneurship Funds (EuSEF) 
Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 April 2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds 
European long-term investment funds (ELTIF) 
Regulation (EU) 2015/760 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 29 April 2015 on European long-term investment funds 
Packaged Retail and Insurance-based Investment Products 
(PRIPS) 
Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 November 2014 on key information documents for 
packaged retail and insurance-based investment products 
● Market infrastructure 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)  
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties 
and trade repositories 
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Central Securities Depositories Regulation (CSDR) 
Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the 
European Union and on central securities depositories 
Settlement finality in payment and securities settlement system 
Directive (SFD) 
Directive 2009/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 May 2009 amending Directive 98/26/EC on settlement 
finality in payment and securities settlement systems and Directive 
2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements as regards linked 
systems and credit claims 
● European System of Financial Supervisors 
European Banking Authority (EBA) 
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Banking Authority) 
Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority 
(European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific 
tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1024/2013 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA) 
Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority) 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-
prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a 
European Systemic Risk Board 
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